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"A is A". For mechanical thought to proceed, this law of identity has to be accepted. Wherever there is another premise B, the two may interact somehow. The interaction is itself a premise that such a thing happens. It must be proven that such an interaction is impossible, rather than suggested by language that they cannot relate to each other. This may appear simple enough—"innocent until proven guilty"—except the law of the world is the inverse. There is no substantive link between all potential premises but substance itself as a proposition—"there is no God but Allah". The very common condition of such an interaction is that both A and B share membership in a set where this interaction takes place, and this is sufficient for our typical purposes. A and B may be physical objects that are believed to exist in something called "space" or "space-time", sharing a property called "mass" or "force" which is a general rule rather than a premise specific to particular physical things. But, this confines all that exists to some continuum and disallows transgression of that continuum. Nothing but physical things can come from physical things, and it becomes impossible to speak of any change with a naive approach. It is very easy, as we have seen, for inappropriate claims to be made of physics or Being regarding traits that have no "physical" essences or direct manifestation as a physical pattern. The concept of emergence better handles this problem as written elsewhere, which states that no space or nature provided any "preferred space" for this mechanics to play out. If the question of mechanics is a question for all that exists and nothing less, and there truly is no God but Allah—if the world itself is where this mechanics plays out—then mechanics is placed not in natural history but artificial history. Only its results enter the annals of natural history to provide any forms for us.
The spaces where this plays out in artificial history are on one hand arbitrarily defined for whatever purpose the artificial agents describe. On another hand, they are constructed only as the scientist would be able to perceive them. This is where the charlatan uses a trick of subjectivity to bullbait and degrade science. But, that trick does not work nearly as well as the charlatan insists it always does. A child can see, without any great theory, that the world is not what the most naive sense believes it to be. There is a world that happened before the child and outside of the child's awareness. It is obligatory to ask the question of mechanics about the world generally so that physical space is delineated from virtual space or some simulation of physics.
So far as history pertains to definite things—about that which we can claim with reasonable certainty to be specific facts, from which any general facts regarding the world may be drawn—it is a mechanical view of those things and nothing more than that. The theories of natural history are helpful to better know those specific actors in the first assessment, rather than being the point for themselves. The "secrets of the universe" are not that secret, for nature and the world have no use for occulting this. It is the world that disdains to conceal its aims before any human thought that this naive honesty would serve them well. Why would the world lie, and why would the world have any capability of lying absent any mechanism by which this great lie can be naturalized and operationalized? It is only after some knowledge of the land—of the wealth of knowable things—that the question moves to something entirely different. History does not ask what we are to do, or why events "had" to happen as they did. It explains why events did happen as they did, and suggests that motives of actors are possible in certain contexts. Inserting this moral motive into nature to suggest a teleological goal of anything is anti-historical and intended to be so. We instead discern that living things with the capacity for any moral aims would do so, and this is where the inquiry into ourselves may begin, which is a necessary refinement of history. This happens not because of an inner virtue, but because understanding the tools of the historian and how to conduct this inquiry better are a necessary precondition for it to begin. We are entities that care about history, but the world itself had no use for an inquiry. The history of the natural world is replete with enough absurdities to tell us that nature had no plan for anyone or anything. Only in artificial history regarding certain entities is such a motive demonstrable.
This repeats much of what was written in the first section of this book. If, however, history itself is to be scrutinized—and nothing about how we think is sacrosanct or exempt from mechanics by any special rules—it tells anyone that there is a limit to self-indulgence. The purpose of the cult of the self and subjectivity is to consume as much thought and effort as possible in empty indulgence, so that anything of substance may be extracted or destroyed. For most of us, this is obviously stupid and pointless, and so the crude view of history is overwhelmingly concerned with the world, rather than our doubts about it. Doubt is still very necessary for science to begin, but if humanity is doubtful of its own organs or any nerve, it will not go far, and its efforts will sputter out. The purpose of raising these doubts is to periodically maintain honesty for ourselves. They are not an argument for rhetorical use.
All study of history begins as the study of these clockworks. If there is a question that is timeless or detached from these mechanical interactions, it is not directly a historical question or co-equal with this mechanical description. In many cases, the interpretation of these events is not meant to encapsulate, subsume, or "sublate" all of the mechanical agents at work into a convenient narrative. This "narrative theory of history" is a bastardization of why the Greeks first set out to write history as stories, which was novel to human writing or thought regarding history for its time. Questions about temporality itself had been raised as a religious matter in every tradition of religion. Many a fool will claim that the ancients believed "time was cyclical" or some other idiotic koan, but the view of historical revelation was not solely Judaism's invention. I do not wish to be bogged down in a long inquiry into religious views of temporality involving specific religions, since that material is freely available as of today, but it would be quite impossible for an honest human being to believe "time was cyclical", and nothing about the religious traditions suggest that they did believe temporality itself was violated by some mechanical or superstitious principle. The concept of the religious cycle mentioned in the third book is what was contended rather than any statement about what actually happens or how the gods mechanistically functioned. That is, it was understood that the observation of recurrences began as superstitions. There is not even a mechanical guarantee that the next moment will follow from the present as if the world itself were designed for this. The invention of the Abrahamic religions was a study of these cycles and historical progress as a vehicle for contesting spiritual authority, and this they learned from experience with such, going back to the most ancient civilizations of the region. This question is not fundamentally a historical or temporal one, but a spiritual one. In all spiritual views, history runs alongside a cosmic struggle, which is on its own terms "outside of time" entirely. None of the investigations of the Abrahamic religions would be relevant if they believed that they held a master key to arrest history. It is quite the opposite—the struggle for spiritual authority is understood by all because the sniveling cowardice that claims history will be frozen by thought alone can be seen for what it is. For their part, the Babylonian Satan-worshippers did not actually believe history invariably served this goal when their own future was concerned. Kings invented new cults and rituals to enshrine the incoming monarchy, which would be quite impossible if history was arrested. The Abrahamic religions developed a general theory of this that was peculiar to their cosmology, and the Jews rejected many of the tropes of knowledge that prevailed among the Gentiles. Nowhere does trinitarianism, unitarianism, or the five-caste model we have seen often appear in Judaism, and this is one of its marked distinctions from its ancient contemporaries. All three of those systems were known to the pagan philosophers, and all three would be compared and critiqued on their own merits, rather than dogmatically asserted. This is very different in Christianity which inherited the trinitarian philosophical view, and Islam which placed in God a singular spiritual authority—the first where vociferous denunciation of the very existence of any other god was a central pillar of the religion. Christianity recast the old gods and spirits as angels or demons, but the core invocation of Christians was less about denying the Being of those heathen demons but siding with the right god, the right doctrine, and the right ideas about knowledge. There were very clearly demons to be cast out by the power and wisdom of the Christ, while Islam's history is replete with doctrinal choices which are "shady" to say the least. History and genealogy figure most prominently in Judaism as any student of religious history knows well, and this is not an ornamental practice. The religious and superstitious treatment of history is inappropriate for natural or artificial history, but the reader may by now know the sleight-of-hand tricks used by the dishonest to make farcical historical claims, primarily about religious and spiritual authority. The same dishonesty is used in a vain effort to rewrite temporal, mechanical history, which on its own did not answer any contest for spiritual authority. It is instead spiritual authority that grants to believers any faith beyond supposition that what they study with temporal, mechanical history is meaningful beyond a dry recitation of events. Such a spiritual authority is erected before there is a religious dogma asserting how the contest for spiritual authority or temporal victory shall be conducted. It is this authority that the dishonest challenge and the honest must preserve against the dishonest—and by no means am I insisting that all religious views regarding spiritual authority are invalid, for the truth of the world, and any moral or ethical theory, are well within the domain of religion's purview to ask. There is a need for the religious adherent to believe that anything they preach is worth a damn in the mechanical world we live in, for that spiritual authority to be anything other than idolatry.
It is not the "idea of learning" that drives history, but the events which largely happen without any human agency. It is improper to speak of them happening "without agency". The existence of the mechanical objects grants them agency to act on their own power, which they certainly possess without any hobgoblin supplying the spiritual authority to move anything. But, much of what happens in history, including human behavior, is dry, mechanical recitation. The small iota of distinction with humans—that they are machines with peculiar faculties allowing them to compare quickly a wide range of potentials and act accordingly—does not grant motor power to humanity's intellectual agency. If that big-brained human wants to move very fast, it will require an engine or very, very well-honed legs for locomotion. Even if it wishes to move slowly, it will only move with the consumption of calories for the task. Even its thinking, when strenuously focused, consumes some energy beyond the normal operation of human faculties, and this strenuous thought disengages the sense and reaction that the human would otherwise be engaged in. Deep contemplation is not trivial or a thing that can be induced by a prompt, and the products of that contemplation—necessary for the contemplation to produce its most useful fruit—require time that is not exerted to do anything, such as find raw data to contemplate. Simple proximity to the forceful, physical events that comprise much of our "real world" would place the study of history in those agents first, and only speak of "grand narratives" to explain those events. The moment the narrative asserts what history is supposed to be, an obvious philosophical error is committed, and it is the ideology that flagrantly commits it.
In general, named objects and events are unmistakable and not controversial as they happen. If someone is commanded to disbelieve their eyes and ears, they would need a good reason. Any authority insisting that the brain shut down and follow something obviously wrong is no authority. Any authority with reasonable cause to tell someone to ignore their sense and reason only does so is aware that this command can lead to doubts about the commander's authority. It is on the commander to be proven right, rather than instruct his subordinates to live in fear of the most basic sense. If the commander cannot demonstrate this—that the commander of authority has a better model—that commander would lose any invested authority. It would be contrary to the commander's authority to assert what is true in these questions. If for example the commander has experience regarding a matter of war which he knows very well, but his subordinates have preconceived notions about as the commander expects, the commander proves his virtue by the merit of outcomes, rather than projecting an image of infallibility. The technocrat and the proclivity of the commons is beguiled by these projections and often sell them as commodified Lie, but also face the greatest peril. If the technocrat is wrong about a fact or scientific matter, the result is not defeat in one battle and a loss of esteem. The result of the technocrat being wrong about science and reality is the supreme mark of foolishness, for the technocrat only has this technical expertise. The general and soldier has that stored-up virtue and reputation, that can suffer one or two blunders if his record is otherwise acceptable. For any technocrat who takes his function seriously, one error is one error too many, and any technocrat insisting it's okay to fail is a damned dirty and insulting liar. It seems very overwrought for the lower orders and inverts common sense, but in the core functions of their tendencies—if distilled to what functions they would serve if they weren't purified in people—we would rather be right about the technology we use rather than standing in wealth or honors that we will never attain. A failed piece of technology is unforgivable. Defeat in battle, regardless of the shame of losing to our sense of merit, usually means living another day to repeat the sad cycle of ceremonial struggle. If we thought the first failure in the great struggle meant throwing away our lives, we would obviously lose, and this itself is a conceit of the technologists more than warriors who were used to suffering losses and retreating to keep their army intact. The distinction is the tolerance for what is to be understood. Bad ideas will always fail, but defeat in a fight is a temporary condition. Even if the penalty for losing a battle is death, death is preferable to the sentence of retarded—a shame no warrior would allow associated with their name. It is only because those who do things have closer proximity to human values and sense that the workers see correctly that a wrong idea is something easily corrected, while defeats in battle—even if they can be survived—are never erased. If this is true, then why would a history of things place undue weight on what "should" be? This is supported by an appeal to pure reason, without any investigation of the passions and a more effective moral thought. In every case, the dispassionate view of events, which is the lot of most of humanity, sees the "battle of ideas" as farcical and absurd when it is politicized. In our useful application of any idea, all of us will, out of necessity, choose something suitable for us, unless we are forced by some foulness into a permanently maladaptive thought form—the retarded ideology
I speak here not of "change of essence" or "sublation", but of what is necessary to speak of systemic change - that parts of a system may be rearranged in artificial history, which leads to qualities of the system which are novel. Nowhere in artificial history does anything "die", or "is destroyed" in that sense. There is only the present moment, and to speak of some system being or not being integrated refers to a different notion of history. If all of the events of artificial history were recorded dutifully, "what is done cannot be undone", but this has no substantive existence. What is really asked is the cost of these transformations - the energetic content of things, and the volition of any part of those things to act, which is for artificial history a "black box" until it can be opened to inspection. If all aspects of the system were entered into artificial history, it cannot be claimed that there is any volition or "change" whatsoever, and the result of history is the result of a recursive calculation leading up to the moment of the artifice. This is a problem for us because we do not possess "infinite calculation", that is how the annals of artificial history are understood. This is not a limitation of the faculties of thought or abstraction in their proper or true existence, because the brain is not a calculator or abstraction, but the faculties of anything are still limited by their constituents. It is entirely permissible for us to ask "how we think" and accept the limits of Reason generally. We can more easily envision the limits of Reason as we know it formally, or the limitations of some way we ask or seek to answer a question posed. We can more easily solve this quandary by a simple fact—most of history does not entail any human thought or subjectivity, and nowhere does the universe play games of chance to decide what will happen. The question may be posed another way—by what force does the energy maintaining a chemical molecule break it into nothing but pure "prime matter"? That investigation leads to modern chemistry. The molecules may be broken by processes that are voluminously recorded and occur in nature or by the deliberate machinations of human tools. The "atom" does not split easily, and this behavior can only be induced in elements susceptible to it, with the tools available to us. We know of nuclear fission today, but the vast majority of humanity has never seen a nuclear reactor, let alone received a thorough education on how this works so that they could build their own. With nuclear power, the nature of the problem is made starkly clear to our knowledge. What smaller concepts someone has about anything happening in the world meet a universe that is far bigger than any individual agent, even when there are no agents with a particular concern about what happens. When those agents have motives and volition working against them, building a fission reactor is much harder than simply possessing the knowledge and access to raw materials, and the reactor is only one part of power distribution or any reason why this fission reaction would be sought, or would occur naturally.
A simple way to state this principle is that an agent is an agent, and nothing more than that. If someone makes aspersions about "the system", any system in the view of artificial history is comprised of similar agents. Their individual mechanical contribution to the problem that is modeled can be judged. The collectivity of these forces can be abstracted, and then "reified" into something familiar—a wave, a force arrow, an area of pressure—which simplifies the calculation for us. Any time this faculty of abstraction is utilized, it is done with the understanding that all of these abstractions should pertain to the real question, rather than a preferred story. The point here isn't to be bogged down in philosophical details, but to make clear how uncommon it is for "change" to exist in the universe, compared to the expectation that a body in motion tends to stay in motion. We may disagree with Newton's laws or their applicability, but there is a reason why volition is very uncommon and never so arbitrary that "anything can do anything". Every "spooky force" would, for mechanical motion, be very weak compared to demonstrable inertia or known mechanisms of propulsion that can recur. It is not difficult to make the connection that thrust will have predictable effects on any body, without needing a "total system" to tell us thrust is possible. All of our concepts of physics have accounted for this subtle "error" by a simple fix. Measurements of anything are understood as measurements, rather than immutable facts imposed on reality, and so the perturbations in our measurements are periodically corrected so that the "flux" does not lead to drift. The parts that are calibrated are inspected and repaired for the machine to remain in working order. The substance that the measurement pertains to is a reality and a fact independent of our inability to make imperious assertions about fundamental reality. In addition to our need for tools to make the most accurate measurements, both sight and the pattern recognition faculty can be recognized as faulty and corrected, and many more-or-less "built-in" correction mechanisms are a regular feature of the brain. This faculty and stable measurement would be impossible if change was truly foundational to the universe, rather than change being the result of mechanical force which we read as the qualities of the things in question.
Here we are not concerned with changes in quality, which are not possible in mechanics. We only concern ourselves with mechanical "change" or motion, and find that motive energy is not so ubiquitous. There is only so much "force" in the universe, and so many means to channel it which are effectively "pre-made". For example, combustion engines require fuel which is produced by processes that condense some matter suitable for combustion into something available in situ. It need only be extracted, but only so much of this fuel is available.
Here the central "trick" of contradiction is revealed. Those who claimed property required a way to mystify the nature of wealth so that enclosure could make scarce something that was abundant enough in the universe. The natural wealth of the world is one case where reality presents "ready-made" substance and facts. Wood, coal, oil, or some combustible product of natural processes will surely provide fuel, by methods that are independently verifiable by science. The rise of coal and oil to build engines made clear a necessity of a monopoly on the fuel, and the need to keep this material away from anyone who would use it for purposes contrary to the chokehold placed on the human race. If humans could do what they deemed truly useful for their long-term security with the fuel, it would trivialize all of the claims that famine, war, and plague were "materially necessary". This of course does not solve the problem itself, and it could just as well be claimed that past famine and war were never necessary. The motive power of modern engines and electricity makes this clear in a way that can no longer be denied. It is further necessary for any modern state to harness this fuel for engines that will allow it to rule and marshal any sort of army, so aristocracy can't promote "anti-technology" as a solution to their woes. The truth was always in the world, right there for all to see. Aristocracy disdains science, but it has no particular animosity towards technology. Its methods of torture and intrigue are types of technology, and technology has been their ever-ready ally against the masses of humanity who have no interest in the aristocratic program. Modern technology presented a real problem of wealth that could not be solved with any technological fix because the facts of the world and the situation made clear that none of the onerous labor that destroyed the masses was necessary or desirable. To abandon the machine and the wealth it offered was political suicide. So too did the machines become a new type of wealth—capital—that did not cleanly abide by the laws of technology that had been the aristocratic method of retarding technological advances that did not suit its aims. It must be made clear that capital is not "true wealth" in the sense that the extracted natural wealth of the Earth is, or the parcels of landed property are. The machines are comprised of their component materials and the chain of laborious events to fashion them. The machine that is the human laborer itself came from component materials and extracted wealth. Before industrialization, and in practice up to today, the bulk of genuine wealth is in the land. What was valued was labor, or how to compel men and women to reproduce the cycle of society. Productivity in a scientific sense—the conscious and directed development of capital or the machinery capital represented—was never valued for its own sake. Yet, to anyone who cared about the outcome of the human project, deliberate action is preferable to "random" action, and there was no way to maintain the crass appeal-to-nature arguments of aristocracy. Every concept of knowledge, from the rulers and among the laboring masses and what little thought the lowest class could have about their hopeless situation, demonstrated that such ignorance would only weaken any claim to rule. It should not be presumed that political elites are ignorant of their genuine condition or why a political elite is desirable for those elites as if aristocracies were ignorant and had to be educated with the right ideas. That sort of insufferable stupidity is another example of the commoners' proclivity to follow any fad put in front of them. Each technological advance, and especially independent scientific knowledge to reproduce those advances, imperils everything the human race has hitherto known. What was necessary was to make mechanical motion simultaneously "infinite" to match the tendency of technological advance, and so cripplingly slow that clearly available mechanical motion seemed impossible—inadmissible.
Modern technology is nowhere near the "master key", or even particularly novel in a way that fundamentally changed humanity's social essence. There are, and had been before modernity, changes to the conditions of humans, and this was always actualized in what humans did. The change of modernity starts with humans doing things they had not done before, which at first is no dramatic break from history. And so, one tool of editing history, and the necessary first step, was established by Whig History. The other, the "antithesis" so to speak, was the German ideology. These tools were not effective or inevitable by themselves. They exist because there was an impulse in humanity that clamored for the evil and always had. The true heart of this was eugenics and the selection of "favored races", which was little more than an internalization of purified ritual sacrifice and its emplacement in natural mechanics. Those who committed this were aware that they were tasked with the mechanical work of editing history. That was no trivial undertaking. The eugenists always take seriously this mission, mandating cynicism only for any other aim humanity could want. For people who espouse nihilism and "natural law", they spring into action and zealously do things to hurt others. It is funny that this is what the human spirit really was, but it was so. What made a better world possible—and this was truly what happened, rather than a myth or illusion—was that humanity saw the human spirit correctly as a foul one and sought something in the world that could bring about salvation, so that humans did not have to be this. This was fundamentally a moral and scientific change, rather than a technological one or a mission of acquiring wealth. All of the endeavors of humanity for Empire had been wholly ruinous towards such a goal. The Empire, in short, was "contradictory" if viewed as a piece of technology. Empires are never technological propositions, nor are they fickle declarations of willpower that fail the moment someone tries to realize something so stupid. Such "contradiction" could only be insinuated by the same thing moving everything else—by mechanical force and scientific knowledge that related to a real world, rather than a preferred notion of reality or any such conceit. It could only be operationalized through a program of habitual, zealous lying, and that is exactly what all of the ideologues pursued as their singular aim. This is what philosophy had to become on its own terms. It is an evil religion foreseen, both as a boon to its evil and an omen of doom for the faithful and the world. But, this could only be realized through the agents themselves, and through an established history that constituted the world's genuine wealth.
The peculiars of how modernity began are things that the reader can independently trace. I have no desire to retrace laboriously all of the steps, as such an undertaking strays from what I hope to accomplish here. What is pertinent to this chapter is the notion of mechanical force and change. It is, in some sense, an economic view of physics and reality itself, where there can only be so much "force" built up in the universe, and it is harnessing this force or energy that becomes the prime aim of Empire and for those who are oppressed by Empire. This aim is for the oppressed a necessity. There is no life where the oppressed can do something they would much rather have done without answering the general fear that political society entails, even if that answer is "Piss on all of it." For Empire and the ruling interest, this has always been a luxury. The simplest answer to the general fear for the rulers is that they have already cleared all realistic fears, and need to insinuate new fears for the masses as a joke played on all of us. Had the rulers wanted to optimize their security, they would have seen the horrendous treatment of the lowest class, and the resulting immiseration of labor, as the chief risk, and also the most likely vehicle for insinuation. The simplest answer would have been mitigation and elimination of ritual sacrifice, and prosperity not of accumulation or technology, but of the soul. That would bring an end to the rulers' ability to predict or direct history. They would no longer "rule" in any sense that political elitism entailed. The question of rule would no longer have been subject to insinuation or projection of aristocracy. The simplest parallel in history would have been the democratic reforms of Antiquity, which were never premised on justice or fairness but on the self-evident benefit of arranging society and institutions for this purpose. The new democracy of modernity would have required eliminating the drive of domination and spurious authority. All of these potentials for democracy were methodically annihilated during the 19th century, snuffed out before they could exist as serious programs. In their place, the vanity of the commoners and technological interest would be substituted. Some of these programs suggested a temporary reprieve for those who shared an institution, concerned only with their own security which they believed would be best secured by public good and a vaguely defined "general will". Others—the ones that prevailed—were open and shameless in their avarice and malice. But, without any general theory of machinery and mechanics—that would properly be the domain of scientific knowledge rather than a "general theory of technology" for economic purposes—the latter program was not workable outside of the halls of the institutions that hold this notion. The former is rudderless. If it were to observe this situation, and especially the situation since 1960 for humanity, it would see much of what I have described and will continue to describe in these books. Humanity itself is the problem, and there are very simple solutions to this problem which require mitigating human contact altogether and seeing that the public good and general will are best served by humans simply having little to do with each other. The elite would get out of their own way, which is the best idea they ever came up with if they cared about mere rule. But, rule was never enough for a political elite. The objective of all of this was the spoils, rather than any duty the ruler had regarding the ruled. This has been backed by historical precedent. At a crucial period during the late 20th century, all remaining opposition to that precedent was defeated by actively selecting against it generation after generation. This did not happen accidentally, and it was not a struggle between two camps who did not know the full consequences of their action. We see now that there was no serious opposition to aristocracy and its core interest, and eugenics operated in the first historical epoch it could. Eugenics could only work by generational modification, carried out zealously as the sole remaining aim of the human race and its project. It was this that marred the technocratic program from its foundation, rather than the drive of eugenics being the only reason technocracy existed. Eugenics claims that it is identical with technology and all progress, following from Germanic ideology. More often than not, all of the technological advances happened despite eugenist notions of progress, and the eugenists could never work through their opposition. Doing so would sacrifice the entire purpose of their project, and if that happened, there would be no plan—and there never really was a plan other than eugenics in modernity. Those who had any other mission would be isolated and neutralized, or their aims mollified until they were sublated into the only permissible, admissible ruling idea—the eugenic creed. It is not merely for eugenics or with eugenics that this paralysis of motion began. The aristocratic project throughout human history relied on the same impulse. The thrill of torture must be maximized—that is the true heart of aristocracy, carried out in every thought and deed its filthy influencers mandate, and backed by the greatest preponderance of violence—pointless, demonic violence which gloats of its brazen transgression—in any human society. Despite this total monopoly on all permissible ideas that would be promulgated, eugenics never accomplished much because, for most of human history, there was no mechanical motor to reach most people. They carried on with their business, only disturbed by the entirely malevolent demands civilization or barbarism placed on them, for no other way was permitted, and all other ways were "savage"—in other words, retarded.
It is retarded that is the verdict of how the human race committed its fundamental, essential guilty act. This is not merely a statement that humans are retarded or did not know what they were doing. Human actors are always deliberate actors—guilty until proven innocent—and cannot claim that they didn't want this despite millions of warnings given by the world and by other humans who saw the course they were on. There was never any serious concept that it could be different. The one class that would have any inclination for that was the class that was the torture victims which gave civilization its reason for existing. If the lowest class were to save humanity, they would be preaching good for the sake of the thing that is the primary cause of their woes—so primary that it should be argued that the woes of the lowest class lay entirely with the ruling order and those who enabled it. Guilty until proven innocent requires any reasonable cause to raise a charge of guilt, and who has fomented this insinuation and cackled with glee at our suffering? Who has stoked it day after day, year after year, and generation after generation, knowing that the ritual sacrifice is the lifeblood of aristocracy and their running dogs? Nothing of the lowest class warranted that aggression that was purely the volition of those who commanded this machinery. Very often, when the lowest class refused to play their role of "eternal failure" the ruling ideas required of them, it was necessary to "teach the controversy" until history was corrected as the aristocracy saw it. The lowest class is only guilty of their expected selfishness and miserable outlook, which unlike the insinuations of aristocracy has been entirely warranted. The guilt of the human race collectively is proven beyond a doubt by history, but before any proof of guilt is relevant, the outcome and intent of the action are relevant. Historical actors can be moved by a great many things and manipulate energy despite history, but of all of the outcomes and intents, two are prevalent. One is the inertia of past events, which applies to everything. The second is an eagerness to use that inertia as the eternal excuse, which requires active regression and attacking anything that is "against nature". Of the actions members of the lowest class carry out which are not their marching orders from aristocracy, not one of them upholds this dubious "natural law" which is always invoked by aristocracy in all things. Only aristocracy is permitted to move history in the ruling ideas, and this is declared from the outset as if it were self-evident. Of course, "moving history" in this sense is not how history works. Mechanical agents only affect that which is close to them, and never operate through "spooky action". This is not necessarily true of all types of agency. While the void between things is relevant to speak of proximate causes, distant things can affect another thing simply by an exchange of information that is mutually observed between them. What is not possible is a claim that mechanical change operates in this way, or that the exchange of information is coequal with mechanical force and the inertia of those things. All of these mechanical forces are in principle knowable, and it is the trick of the bad philosopher to insist on that old, stupid koan "unknowability". The trick relies on manipulating which information is admissible when judging history and science, and this begins early in education. The trick "works" because there are indeed genuine barriers to "admissible knowledge" in science, which are not equal to admissibility when describing nature or the world itself. Science must make clear that irrelevant mechanisms or discursions do not impede the necessary inquiry into truth, and that any objection raised must prove its innocence, rather than such an obvious waste of the court's time being allowed for tactical bullshit.
The true question for mechanical history is not how we think about it, but what actually happens—or "happens" since causality and time should not be granted explanatory power they do not possess. Discerning what actually happens needs little theoretical exercise for most of our purposes. The very existence of the world presents to the court—whoever lives in the world and speaks of such a thing—a wealth of pre-existing scientific knowledge that is trivial to reproduce and communicate. It would be far easier to say what happens than invent a linguistic game where the trick is to monopolize the power of Lie. But, language is not the tool for understanding. Any language, no matter how well designed, entails barriers to this mechanical understanding of what actually happens, and the universe itself has no "language". Language, and thus all of our symbolic expression of information or knowledge that would be our tool for sharing science, is marked by "negative rights" entirely. Other than facts about language itself as a tool, language has no authority to make any truth of its own. It is common to envision in mechanics "communication" of actors or agents, and this has been reproduced in all of our models to describe what happens in mechanics. The mechanical action is indeed "what happens", so far as history is concerned. It is language about history that creates the potential for misunderstanding. This has to be understood with the caveat that the history of annals is all artificial history rather than natural history. Natural history, for most purposes, is a summary or model of those artificial histories that we have misnamed "Nature", though the proper purview of natural history entails questions and answers of a very different nature. Natural history is effectively trans-historical since "all is the past", even if the tense given is future tense or outside of conventional temporality. But, to say more of natural history other than general laws of motion, which would be necessary to speak of historical events happening before there were observers who behold mechanical motion, the present tense is implied to exist in the past and will exist in the future, with no necessary "past timeframe". Done carelessly, this can give the illusion that the past can be freely abolished and history can be arbitrary. This conceit is then dubbed "mechanism", and all fault is placed on mechanics itself, rather than the true culprit which is the conceit of knowledge itself running amok.