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If science is to be "the motor of history", it does not deal with generalities or any argument appealing to nature. Those generalities are relevant to our models, but history is carried about by the operations of definite machines rather than natural forces waiting to be theorized or discovered. The "theory of history" where nature is relevant only tells us that men make their history more or less as they please because the only natural condition that is relevant for a theory is that nature created, by various means, human beings who care about this matter. This is not merely a care about political outcomes, but all of the things a human would do through any volition that would be necessary if humans are to be historical actors at all. Very often, the motivations of humans are not political. Most humans are trying to meet the needs of life, and politics is wholly ruinous towards that save for one thing. Political society implies an ordering of affairs that cannot easily be contested, and this will be what humans, due to their history, use as a personal guide to navigate a hostile situation. The world is not in the main hostile, and it is not fundamentally or naturally hostile towards humans at all. In productive matters, every competent human endeavor has seen the operations of the world as beneficial and the only reason humans accomplished anything. Without stable weather, recurring patterns of events in nature, and the definite products created without human intervention, humans would have nothing to inspire their genius to create technology, and no substantive data but the miserable virtues they stole from the world and made through their haphazard machinations. This benefit applies to humanity's enemies equally, for life is fair, and aristocracy cannot stand that. Sadly, humanity's greatest enemy, consuming nearly all of its productive enterprise in a fruitless struggle, is other humans, rather than the world's natural obstacles and the maladies that were a consequence of the world.
There may be an effort to read the "circle of life" onto natural science and see the markings of a conceit of knowledge for human language in the natural world. Most of the world though is just the motor energy of things, without any "system" or natural order—yet it moves. We attempt to harness those things for our benefit, and so we systematize at a very early age, and very early epoch of human knowledge, natural events to make sense of them. Earlier, I terminated this inquiry with reproductive and the vague search for natural sciences, without elaborating on the details of the natural world. In the second section of this book, presently at work and read by you, I suggest first a general theory of operations, rather than a categorical listing of all of the areas of natural science that are useful. This is done without any witting awareness that we are doing so because of what human beings are and what their knowledge is, and it is only after the fact that we might remark on the absurdity that such random things recur so regularly. The only "natural plan" is made by us, in our efforts to bend the world to something more suitable. The reality is that far more often, competent human beings adapt to natural constructs generally just as they adapt to specific technology or situations, and this contributes to a human's general order of operations.
Absent any pre-existing order, humans only have themselves and their wits. The story of Robinson Crusoe is lampooned by everyone except the most incredulous Whigs, but there is truth to it that makes clear the peculiarities of English science compared to the scientific thought of other cultures throughout history. Those distinctions are irrelevant to the novice human, who is not born with an ingrained sense of cultural superiority. The strange conditions of the English before their empire began may give us some insight. The English were never great conquerors and were the first persistent Roman holdings to be lost to the Western Empire. England would also become the most barbarous of the post-Roman countries and was always somewhat detached from Roman society for geographic reasons and the rebelliousness of its tribes. The English break from Catholicism is very different from the break of the Protestants generally, whose doctrinal disputes were part of a great continental power struggle over the fate of Rome and the church centered into it. Anglicanism has no great doctrinal invention and a hilarious disregard for even the appearance of Christian probity. It instead begins because the king wanted a divorce, and the Pope did not grant that divorce, or at least that is the story on paper. It is more likely that the Pope's spiritual authority did not resonate on foggy Britannia the way it did in closer proximity to Rome and nearer to Papal armies, and so switching out the Pope for the Archbishop of Canterbury did not strike the English as particularly weird or out there. Witchcraft, pagan revivals, and festivals, and some of the old Satan from many centuries before persisted in the hinterland, only enforced as an excuse when someone had to be blamed. Several oddities placed England in an unusual position in European and world history. The impassibility of the English Channel is a comfortable myth, adopted only after the British Empire was secure. What geographic barriers did mean is that activity on the continent was always distant enough that the Britons could remain isolated, and conduct social experiments that were likely to lead to conquest on the mainland. While a navy could be built, it was still an added step, when the wars of interest on the continent were with other continental states—and the "states" were for a long time little more than glorified warlords and their court with added finery. The English disdain for Christianity compared to continental norms, and the ease with which the English accepted brazen perversions of Christianity, did not appear by pure happenstance or fate producing the men and women who would by the 19th century be the vanguard of a peculiar anti-Christian view. That anti-Christian view, which was not confined to the clique that produced Charles Darwin and the eugenists, was premised on the unusual notions of science that were popular among the British but were viewed with suspicion by everyone else, or whose notions of both science and opposition to Christianity persisted for much different reasons. The English antipathy for Christianity was not equally shared by the Americans, whose founding story was the story of Puritans holding slaves and indentured servants. I have to think that sticking a finger in the eyes of the now-hated American rabble had something to do with the peculiar direction of British anti-Christianity. In the sciences, though, the Americans are thoroughly the inheritors of the English habit of science, albeit with fewer luminaries to call their own. America remained after its independence a country of agricultural interests, whose aims were to acquire land on the continent. Their intellects were more given to those pursuits rather than the approach to technology, which usually did nothing more than copy British inventions and make a few adjustments to them. In any event, America and Britain would remain so closely tied economically that British science and its universities would always loom above the American universities, with the most prestigious schools in America distinguishing themselves starkly from the "moo universities" that were established for most of the country. One stark difference with the Americans is that thought their methods of science and thinking were borrowed from their forebears primarily, strange creatures like the "boffin" or quaint English professor were anomalous and further removed from the typical American, who was seen by American rulers and the English generally as a loathsome, corrupt, opium-addicted lout who had to stay on a plantation. In other words, Robinson Crusoe appeared to the Americans like some moronic tale They were on the "savage island establishing civilization against the intolerable aliens", and so they had ample evidence that history did not work that way. Their operations to fight the Indians and, when the time came, each other, did not allow indulgence in such a story of civilization. There is more to say on this topic in later chapters, but it is helpful to point out now that many of the models and formalisms of nature are written by people for whom actually establishing the roots of civilization is seen as landing on an alien planet in fiction. The reality of such an endeavor is never so simple. The very different establishment of modern Israel, which would be sold to the public as an alien invasion of a savage country to bring civilization, is another story to tell, that is outside of the scope of this book. The more recent antagonisms in this history did not arise purely by happenstance or geographic fate. But, English approaches to science and the arts that came into prominence as England broke from Catholicism can be contrasted by examining the literary tropes of the European polities, explaining much of the model that became British empiricism, and the seeds for its descent into controlled insanity during the late 19th and 20th century. I do not have enough time or skill to dissect the distinctions between the English from the French or the Germans. The French nursed a long-standing grudge against English institutional science, that was on display in the French Revolution and numerous attempts to disprove Newton's laws of physics and their differing economic views that were exchanged in the late 18th and early 19th century. The Germans, as I often mention, do not possess a proper word for "science" as we would have it, and deliberately disdain the very idea of science in their institutions. I have made my jabs at German ideology and institutions often throughout this work, and their origin has much more to do with the establishment of the 20th century polities than the modern encounter, for Germany as a unified state only exists after 1870. I mention these things here so the reader might be introduced to some of the differing milieus in which a young person, who doesn't know who is whom yet in the great drama of human history, would learn about formal science.
For most of history, institutional education in the sciences was vaguely defined and demoted in priority for the vast majority of educated members of society. What we would call applied science today was disdained work, and those who specialized in this had few people to sell this to. The home remained the chief site for applying science and agricultural techniques throughout the world and remained laggard for centuries. There were few impulses for improving agricultural yields. The peasants had little personal use for surplus, and the lords both confiscated that surplus and disdained grain merchant activity, as did the peasants. The direction of estate labor since Roman times had been to eliminate tax burdens by keeping as much economic activity internal as possible. No trade, and there was no tax paid to the imperial bureaucrat, who would be replaced by the warlord who was even more sadistic than the Roman bureaucrat. A better harvest might grant short-term gain, but the aims of the peasant were not industry, but security—anything to pay less to the lord, work less, and maintain what few things the peasant had left in this world. When the peasant has some idea, he disdains to share it or showing it, and a shame in himself is the standard feudal and neo-barbaric impulse drilled into him by the nobility's repeated abuse and the clergy's demand for self-abasement and fealty to the forever-absent gods. There is no convincing evidence that the ordinary peasants, anywhere in the world, had much interest in the gods of the nobility, beyond token fealty and whatever lessons they might learn from the Bible or holy text of choice for a given society. Even if they took an interest in religion, it was more as a sporting curiosity, or because they feared punishment for heresy or numerous religious crimes, and so a religious injunction to learn would have done little for the suspicious peasant. The merchant has numerous incentives to disdain science. Science is uncertainty and disruptive to established mercantile activity. The merchant wants labor to be paid as little as possible, and perpetually in hock to the bank. If labor translates any currency they have to wealth, the laborer will pick security over any other priority, and move to detach himself and his family from the mercantile arrangement altogether. This usually left science in the hands of the odd people who advanced it often as a hobby or specialized activity that had to be conducted alongside whatever obligations they owed society, rather than as a profession unto itself. The change in modernity arose not from any social program to promote the sciences. Every attempt to do so, no matter how well-intentioned and well-thought it was, was usually ignored as people did whatever their imperatives suggested they would have done without the policy. This is not for a total lack of trying or cynicism about the goal. Doing more things, doing them better, faster, smarter, and with more thorough knowledge, was always intrinsically valuable if it were seen on its own as a goal. It was only through many negative checks that science was disincentivized as a social or public matter, and it was not easy to introduce more negative checks against scientific thought through minute policies. The only way the rulers had to do this, which was only haphazardly known to them, was to create conditions of war, plague, famine, and so on, that would set off a cycle of yet more war, plague, and famine, with some effort to place the brunt of suffering on undesirables. Many times the undesirables were the odd sorts of men and women who accumulated scientific knowledge for purposes that were both esoteric and very practical, and so this had a much greater chilling effect on scientific thought than its utility for aristocracy to reduce the numbers of the poor.
For science to be "the motor of history", it has to be seen as a very poorly designed motor in human history. But, there is no other that adequately explains why we are here in a way that can be independently verified. Anything from human will or genius or the inevitability of humanity's institutions is either itself a thing science studied and developed, or highly suspect as a legitimate source of truth. There are trite arguments that "history is written by the victors", but no one is victorious for long, and their victories never amounted to nearly enough to write history as they, please. Inevitably, someone would either call bullshit—since the smartest person in the room, in the final assessment, is going to be "me" for humans defending their integrity—or the history written by victors 50 years ago must either be rewritten, or the vectors would have to abide by a written record that does not disappear as an imperious mind wishes it did through this actual of intellectual ritual sacrifice. Even with scant records, too much survives for too long among too many people to stop someone from questioning that stupid aristocratic koan. It is further complicated by a reality that philosophers scorn—that history is more often never written, but is transmitted orally by people who have no reason to indulge in the habits of assholes who think they move history by clever schemes. For the vast majority of humanity, history is personal history, and they are going to remember the marked disasters the nobility brought to them like war, plague, and famine. So, the claim that history is institutionally mediated is a stupid trope. It is also not a trope seriously believed by nearly every literate person since Antiquity, and this understanding is reproduced outside of the Greco-Roman inquiry into history. Very often, histories are written in the first place not to persuade the masses or teach the aristocracy a bunch of cope, but by those who need to transmit something that withstands historical revision, and can be cross-referenced with other historical writing, including writing that will not be written for decades, even centuries, after the historian writes. If the historian writes about events centuries before them and far away and admits his or her lack of knowledge and need to speculate about what might have been, he or she will likely make the simple connection that another writing centuries later will ask the same about the very work the historian does. This is not a habit of the aristocracy in writing their histories and fables to each other, nor is it a habit of fables told to educate children. Children are often lied to or given simplified versions of events, but any worthwhile fable prompts the child to learn what it means, rather than having a goodfacts interpretation beaten into them by shitty Fabian education. If this habit applies to the written histories for various matters and is so necessary that it enters political history despite the habit of lying in politics, it would be so for science. The would-be scientist is interested in what works, rather than what is "supposed" to work, and this is not a monopoly of certain sciences or a scientific mindset necessarily. It is rather than the most basic science that entails a fidelity to truth that works against the tendency to seek more oppression. Even the science of torture itself is a science rather than an empty set of koans that are insinuated. No insinuation would be successful without knowing the entity who will only be lied to forevermore, and detecting through an inquisition what secrets the torturer needs to hold sacred. In the mind of the torturer, the torturer alone controls the reality the victim will be made to accept, and must for torture to be more than a performative act. Anything less would shirk all that ritual sacrifice granted to the torturer's profession.
Very often scientific progress occurs less by any fully thought-out progression of history, but by whatever is possible despite "historical progress". Technological advance is iterative—new machines allow mankind to build new machines, usually by advances that are evident from the initial invention and the situation it was built to solve. Usually, the meaning of "science is the motor of history" is that technology, and the command of it, can command history. But, history does not work that way, as I have said many times before, and science is concerned not with machinery or the utility of operations for some ulterior motive, but with the truth. Saying "the truth is the motor of history" appears to be a tautology, except that we forget one crucial fact about humans. This is that humans are liars, and have no interest in living by the truth. Their very existence and the rituals they hold dear are seen by truth as worse than pointless. They are the problem, and those who decided what would be allowed for humanity knew that the values of truth could only be allowed so far as they affirmed ritual sacrifice and the insinuation it spawns. There is a truth to this—it does work on humans who are inclined to say yes, absent any sobering influence, no matter how ruinous it is to anything they would want but the projection of power it leaves on them. It does not work universally or for all things, for there can be a situation where a human turns their back on the essence of their race—the ultimate "race treason" that many humans freely admit is their true desire, but that those who decided what the race would become insist is worse than death. For the power of the sacrifice to be maintained, the power of pure, weaponized Lie must be taught to the true believers in aristocratic values from the earliest age, and projected as much as possible. Nowhere does the aristocracy or their running dogs do this out of a belief that Lie is something for them, and there has long been a habit of dropping hints or feeding, drip by drip, revelations to make it appear as if aristocracy and their fellow travelers have prophetic power and command of world events. In practice, aristocracy concedes that they must allow some semblance of science to continue among the lower orders. Their claims have only been to shepherd the flock to defeat and to never allow science the place of highest privilege. That has been successfully forestalled for the entirety of human history in the mainstream. Even if there were fewer fetters, there was simply no way for the scientific treatment of history to be communicated too far, due to a lack of media or propagation for a lowly man or woman to say much. Most humans do not have personal printing presses, and such a technology—or anything approaching it—was not available until the late 20th century. That is what the commonly available electronic printer attached to a computer is. It is also well known that every printer will leave telltale marks, unless modified, of which printer in circulation printed a particular page. This is less useful because the printers and computers themselves are never too easily controlled by mediation or institutional authority. But, even with this, print, or the electronic equivalent of such, can be suppressed, and fear is instilled to make forbidden material unseemly to possess.
Science precedes any mediation or artifice that comprises artificial history. This is to say, any talk of reality itself being mediated, while attracted to a systems view, is only intelligible because there is a science to make sense of the technology that is media. It never works the other way around. All of the tools used by a scientist are only useful if their purposes are known, and reverse-engineering all tools is conceivable. Logic itself is such a tool, whose validity is premised on both a world where this takes place and a dialogue regarding logical premises in that world. We may argue whether a particular logic matches what would be independently assessed. Logic has changed remarkably little throughout the ages precisely because breaking such a useful tool is not done lightly. Nowhere is any tool taken for granted as "super-scientific" and beyond reproach, as if the truth were on trial as a humanoid defendant. That is not how ideas or thinking actually work, where they are only imagined in the guise of men as totems for consumption, with all of the concentrated Lie that humanity has been known to summon for their purposes.
Someone may argue that science is only conducted by knowing entities like humans that are already arrested as an assemblage of technology. This denies that the assemblage was not accidentally constructed, nor was it the design of a mind necessarily. Life-forms exist because they can exist and perpetuate themselves, and nothing in the world stops this. The parts of a body existed at first without the intent of a "human" or "scientist", but because this is what those parts can and did do. In history, humans are only deliberate actors so far as that is what the entity does, rather than any conceit that the human "moved" history. None of us chose to be born nor would be held guilty for that fact alone, "guilty until proven innocent" is remembered as the law of the world and the truth. Only by science and truth can a lack of guilt be proven. The claim that it is the other way inverts all sense of history as a worthwhile proposition. Otherwise, the verdict will be "guilty" before any presumption of innocence is a conceit men hold, and there is no trial. This only applies to specific charges or assertions, rather than a judgment of the lack of guilt for crimes of Being. If the charge is a crime of Being, as the Germanic ideology desires, then judgment is arbitrary and dominated by the will of people whose judgment of truth or anything good must be highly suspect at the least. That invites all manner of skullduggery and insinuation based on charlatan's tricks. It may pass in a court of Law, for Law only exists for humanity's purposes in the world. It does not pass even the crudest test for scientific truth if such a thing is wanted for any purpose. Humanity grants itself presumptively mercy by choosing "innocent until proven guilty", but this only leads the vicious of the race to do what they please with the law—and given the first opportunity to do so, they choose the same course of action when science, truth, and knowledge itself were subjected to this lawfare. History has judged that humanity can't not do this, and humanity is clearly guilty of that charge. We can re-examine the evidence if we like, to prove "not guilty", but the facts will always tell us the same verdict. However cruel guilty until proven innocent seems, at least it presents the potential that "not guilty" is a verdict on specific charges. It is specific charges that are the judgment of any scientific history. Whether we trust that judgment in matters of human law and politics is our choice. There are immediately obvious problems when granting to science undue spiritual authority in this regard. The first is that whatever the parts of humanity did to constitute the human, the human operates on its own power, for its own purposes, and technology is a fact. It is never the dominant or assertive fact that "moves" history in the way that is insinuated. A history of technology and artifices is useful for us and the typical way histories are constructed when judgments pertinent to humanity's affairs are at stake. Even here, the technology has to be understood as a general rule, rather than taken for granted due to some conceit of what technology was supposed to be. All of the artificial histories humanity constructs in technology are at first suspect. They are proven innocent enough to continue after enough inquiry. After this, baseless "imminent critique" is unwarranted and must be charged with the utmost contempt for any proceeding.
What this means—disregarding for a moment the volition that genius entails—is that history is constructed not from the conceits of universal or general rules, but from specific events. We build a model to explain history for our purposes since nature did not produce ready-made facts for consumption. What is built for us is the experience of many who came before us, whose teachings are passed down by communication. We do not uncritically accept any pedagogy, but eventually, there are those of humanity who overcome the race's penchant for lying because the truth is more expedient for their continued existence. A world that celebrates the power of Lie has an outcome even a child can figure out. It is more often the goal of pedagogy to tell the human to turn off such a reflex, as it does not conform to the expectation of untrammeled lawfare that institutional, political society recapitulates in every idea that it admits as valid. The truth, simply put, has no value simply by being the truth. The truth is useful because events do happen, rather than the events being incidental to Being and "super-truth" being a superstitious matter judged only by a vaunted few. The necessity of pedagogy—since scientific knowledge is communicated for us to formalize it—is due to facts that limit the likely knowledge a human being individually accumulates with no orientation and only their native faculties to judge the world. We know this condition, rather than assume it exists because it is elegant or preferable to believe we can move reality by thought alone. All systems thought, to be a valid description of the world, originates from a truth that such a thing as a "system" is possible—that there can be parts of some thing, rather than a vague "Being" or "totality" which is insinuated by wordplay. If that is true, then the parts have no more virtue of an essence than the imagined system-as-vagary invoked by the sniveling invocation of "the system". What allows these parts to exist is that there is a scientific view of specific agents, rather than science stopping at any arbitrary division that conveniently defends ideology. If they are parts, they can be dissected, and those products dissected, as much as we like. What is useful for us is contingent on the preceding existence of the scientist. Humans inherit a world that was already populated with objects, rather than a thought experiment that was chosen by them or made by some architect. If anyone were an architect who constructed society as an immaculate totality, it would not change that this architect had its own history, even if it is a history that does not fit our notions of such. A human architect or law-giver is very much a temporal and mortal entity and usually does not need to pretend it was something other than that. The law-givers of human history had to present as men rather than essences or spirits to suggest that there was a tangible entity in whom temporal or spiritual authority was invested. If someone were to invoke God or a thing tantamount to it to describe science, they would not cite such a deity's intervention into obviously temporal matters that we know well and insist that the deity overrides our native sense and reason by imperious decree. What use would such a deity have for that imposition? That was never what "God" was intended to entail, but many a fag obsessed with such an excuse—and they are fags—uses this sleight-of-hand to place the imagined stopper where science must stop, until such a time that science can be re-defined as something entirely alien to the genuine concept.
What marks the history of humans is that they are very aware of history in everything they do, and were the first to build this symbolic language that allowed us to write and communicate history, and work out models of history in those communications. To say "science is the motor of history" is to really say that humans are always "aware" that they affect history, which affects their actions which become history. Rather than this creating an infinite feedback loop, history is made only at the decisive moment where volition is asserted in nature, rather than how volition is "supposed" to work by any plan. How much humans affect history depends on the subject of history in question. The effect of humans on the universe as a whole is not merely insignificant; humans cannot really change what they are or edit the past, and the weight of the past is such that humans are condemned, if not fated, to do little more than what their preprogrammed directives tell them to do. When those directives and imperatives are themselves the topic of history—determining what humans did when and where—there is nothing greater in human history than the volition and purpose of the human itself, for that is the most immediate effect on a human body, and human bodies act concerning other humans more than any other entity they encounter. This fear of humans is not trans-historical or equally applicable throughout humanity's existence. For most of humanity's existence, their effective command of the Earth was far less than their conceit about themselves. Human sociality was the predominant motor for judging what a human would do—they act in accord with other humans' behavior, and in particular the humans closest to them whose influence would be stronger. However, that society had remarkably little effect outside of the extent of their tribe's technology and the relations an individual human had. Even if a human were close in proximity, many humans have little to do with each other compared to what we know to be possible. There has not been any prescribed priority for which humans we regard in our actions, nor any prescription that there were non-human sources that could be valued above the interests of particular humans, or that humanity as a race held a special quality that granted the race and the race alone a right of transgression. If the claim of humanism is a right of transgression, that is faggotry and nothing more. But, the claims of humanism were not that. The civilized and barbarous alike knew the folly of this type of thinking which placed humans at the center of the universe. A child can see the absurdity of such arguments, and they were never made as if they were serious. Such faggotries are Lie and nothing but Lie, concentrated and directed against those selected to die. They are uttered with that familiar sing-song cadence of contempt that presages ritual sacrifice.
The basic units that humans work with are those that are familiar, rather than things that are fundamental to nature or a model that describes natural history. The first words human children learn are those related to animals, to things they interact with, and a few very important keywords like "why" and "how" which begin a greater inquiry. It does not require a philosopher to formulate the concept of "why", but well before the inquiry is established in language, it is carried out by the infant who must navigate this world with the faculties available to it. It is essential to the eugenic creed to terminate this infant development as a real event and abstract it into genetic destiny. The very conception of life is an act, and though the agents are very small and simple, they quickly develop into a much larger organism when it is born—when it first contacts the world where this inquiry can take place in earnest. That is what it means to be born—to exit the conditions of gestation where life must be shielded from all of the dangers of the world. The eugenist aims to expose the infant before it can see the world—to "negate the negation", and correct history as the eugenist would see it. Such an instinct is unnatural to the conditions that allow life to exist and carry out any inquiry. It is unnatural to the existence that is investigated with science, and intended to be so. It is the very essence of a Satanic ethos, and the eugenist proclaims that this epitomizes pride and glory. The same developmental process may be imagined for all of the things that are first assembled as entities in the world. This is inaccurate, but for the units that are likely for the developing mind to understand the world, they will either be tangible things, or concepts that relate to tangible things, like asking what, when, and why about various objects. Every human language is dominated by nouns in its sentence structure, rather than imperatives about which little can or needs to be said. The function of this language—and this extends to thought generally—is to understand the world, rather than cajole it in line with ill-thought imperatives. The imperatives themselves require a world that is to be moved, rather than imperatives barked without any context or purpose, as mindless as Malthus' breeders. What results is that this investigation contains simpler concepts, which did not conform to the overarching "circle of life", but existed on their own power and for their own purposes. The house that a man lives in will stand without human occupation and will remain a marker of human presence, that could be reverse engineered if such a construct were found long after humans are gone. It would fall into disrepair, as many constructs of men do over time, but this was implicit in the difficulty that building a house entails. If it were freely reproducible, it would be trivial to deconstruct such a thing, but for most of us, houses are not cheap or trivial. They are likely to last for most or all of our lives and will be passed down to another person. Their presence in the city is not incidental, as if they just happened to be there by some unknown process and random actions agglomerated these structures in the city. It is obvious that this denunciation of the Darwinian thesis on natural history is correct and judged not guilty by the maxim "guilty until proven innocent". To defend their hold, the dogmatic Darwinian, like all ideologues, must attack, attack, attack, while maintaining the hypocritical dogma "innocent until proven guilty" when their guilt has been written on their face since Malthus. But, that is not my purpose in recounting this yet again. The purpose is to speak of how scientific thought begins for all things. This is an imperfect analogy when formalism is needed for a better model, for all of the things analyzed with science produce findings that can be linked.
The wealth of the world presents to us not as an array of commodities brought to market, but as agents which do things, starting from the cruder and simpler understanding of things to the more esoteric. The study of commodities and markets never made any claim that the commodity itself was the true wealth. They are very clearly products of a limited class, rather than a general class. Wherever there is a commodity, there is a process that brings it to market. A child can ask that question and come to a suitable answer regarding the productive process. Everything about the technological settlement bringing those products in "ready-made" form is a barrier to what was useful, but the technology itself did not appear out of nothing. It too was constructed by processes in the world. The tools or forms that are operated with exist without any "essentialism" or "contradiction" about them and this was always known. It is possible to construct a narrative that plays with sense-perception about the form of the commodity, but long before such a trick and cajoling is effective, the true purpose of the machinery which is a "market" is known to everyone. No one was ever convinced the objective of the market was to give people nice things. If that were the goal, a machine to optimize this problem would be trivially solved. The market was never a selector or moral force in itself, as if the market promoted anything righteous. Markets are premised on unequal exchange to exist, and no one was ever convinced that free trade was fair trade. Justice or right in exchange is settled not in the marketplace or by debate in the forum, but by Law—and we are well acquainted with Law gone amok in our time when it is not sobered by any reality outside of its control. Far more than suicide or total willful resistance to the law has a sobering influence on the market. Whatever the political imperatives of the setting and the exhortation to feast on more and more blood and suffering, none of this market could continue if the necessary useful goods did not reach the participants. Those who starve will struggle, perhaps hopelessly, but they will only internalize "retarded" when a machine mandating this is naturalized and impressed on reality. Otherwise, however ignorant someone is, they simply do not care about the moral posturing of those who should have been ignored—if evil could be ignored. If someone needs food and food is there, they will take what "justice" insinuated they could not have, and care less about any notion of the public good, that was never a thing taken for granted. Someone upholding justice will have to protect their wealth from those who have always seen their useful objectives as a higher priority than a conceit about reality. Someone might argue the fairness of wealth and right of property, for entirely acceptable reasons. The simplest path to food is security in the form of claims to wealth, rather than claims that science will find the truth of food for all. If that happens, then the reasonable conclusion is that it is wealth rather than technology that is the objective, without any necessary middleman of commodities or the market. Yet, unequal exchange remains, because the true moral high horse was never a false fairness or false egalitarianism, but the need for unequal social relations as the objective for their own sake. If this is true of the market, it is true of technology generally, and the course of science in investigating the world. The market is just one institution, and not even a particularly dominant one in humanity's affairs.
What results from scientific thought is a general theory of technology, rather than a notion that technology is coterminous with science itself and proper science must be subordinated to the institutions. This applies to market societies, but not in a way that is immediately self-evident. Market societies arise ultimately as a consequence of Empire rather than Law. If Law were the culprit for humanity's maladies on its own, the terror of deprivation takes on a very different character. Rather than wealth and property being the pretext, Law would suffocate the condemned by neutralizing entirely the scientific treatment of facts. Facts instead become institutionally mandated things. Those facts are then imposed on reality, reconstructing entirely an artificial history and claiming "this is nature" and "this is science", fusing the claims and entangling them. A morass of wordplay is always available to defend this. Nothing about socialism required this or was expected to lead to this, and the same logic can be maintained within a market setting so long as the market is effectively "gamed" to produce a planned verdict. Everyone who participates in the game of Empire must make judgments. The exhortation of the sniveling Fabian is "I don't judge", as if this were something to be proud of rather than an embrace of the utmost faggotries of the human race.
The general theory of technology is not limited to the market or political matters. Why the general theory of technology exists is not for an ulterior motive that is apart from science. It exists because, without this general theory, the scientist can only operate with entities "in-kind", and only relate them through suppositions and superstititons. This use of supposition and superstition is necessary in the formative stage of a general theory of technology. Absent a better argument, the entities of the world appear as spirits that do as they will, rather than clockworks operating in accord with a general plan. The general theory of technology need not be a total theory. The only presumption is that science could in principle construct a total theory of the world. It does not claim that all theories of technology must be "total systems". A general theory of technology that we operate with can accept what it does not know or cannot confirm, or that two bodies of knowledge and things are entirely unrelated. No imperative requires that there be any equivalence between the entities, or that there is necessarily an economic relationship. That was never the claim of classical political economy, either. Economic activity in its entirety always pertained to a limited class of activities that interface with the market. It turns out that one such activity is tied to human behavior. Humans truck and barter for various motives, but none of them constitute a grand ulterior motive, and that was never the purpose. The purpose of an inquiry into political economy and the wealth of nations is to apply the methods of scientific inquiry to this aspect of political society, that had historically granted itself sacrosanctity against science. This can work for the ordinary laborer, and it could work for those who seek to oppress labor and maintain the rule of aristocracy on new terms.
For this general theory of technology to function, it is a study of history, and no ideology has a monopoly on proper history. By commanding history and setting arbitrary rules to muddy it, aristocracy hoped to quarantine and exterminate any scientific thought, including their own. A world of raving madmen was what aristocracy and its impulses always mandated and always held for itself. There was no other world for them, and it was this that held untrammeled spiritual authority. The closing act was to declare it was natural and unmentionable. This is of no use to us and has been expounded on at length in these books.
The general theory of technology forms first from a very basic inquiry into the world, rather than for a stated purpose. Children ask "why", among all of the other questions, starting from a few forms that were so basic that they are not formally ascertained. Only the composites of them that form recognizable entities are the first words and ideas that establish this theory. The inquiry is not blind, but for it to persist, the inquiry must at its core persist for itself. It is guided by a moral interest in truth, even if that moral interest is beholden to some ulterior motive. It is only generated by human beings, or any entity conducting science, by some generative force that would do so as part of its existence. A computer algorithm does not conduct "science" in this manner. It may operate independently, and its motor is a power source. This computer might be sophisticated enough to reproduce all of the faculties humans possess. If it is conducting science much as humans do, though, that is a very different proposition from "computation", which was always carried out with an implied ulterior motive. Whether this machine could reproduce the same impulses that drove humans to dream or acquire this general theory—whether it wants to—is not relevant to the conduct of science itself. A dispassionate scientist is still a scientist. The true distinction is that the computer does not actually deal with the sort of knowledge that science entails. It instead commands information and forms, which it does not natively comprehend in its hardware, nor possess any intrinsic impulse to piece together into any general theory. The theory of the computer is quite the opposite—that it will carry out its directives in a desultory manner, and fail to make any connection other than what its directives commanded it to compute and record in a register, without the computer "knowing" anything that was computed. Nowhere in the computer is the nervous response to a worldly environment, coalesced in the entity that is the human body, continually active out of necessity. The computer is specifically designed not to do this because that would interfere with the purpose set for it, and nothing in the computer could "accidentally" construct something that is the product of a life's history ex nihilo. If we envision a machine conducting science, we speak of an entity with such nervous activity interfacing with the world rather than an abstract notion of such. But, this itself doesn't grant the living entity any special right. Humans can shirk this scientific activity and claim their pseudo-scientific activity is science, or even "better than science" or "the real Science".
The point of false humanists advancing the specifically human quality of thought is to abrogate anything that humans did that was worth anything in scientific merit. A machine that does this would not be treated as a computer or a "calculating, rational agent", but as an entity much like living things. This is not merely an assertion of what someone prefers to believe about their being or an empty assertion. A human might imperiously declare "Computers can't think because only humans think", and invent all manner of faggotry to justify a smug conceit. This misses the point. The operationalization that scientific thought entails is not identical to "science" as a pursuit. The human scientist uses technology, including the technology of its body and sense organs, for this purpose, rather than the tools themselves being "precursors of science". We can envision such a rational of generative thought for anything, sentient or not. What is important for the human scientist is that the human scientist cares, and has the language for this endeavor to be carried out more thoroughly than it would for an animal. For the animal, "science" is largely derived from instinctive learning, and its concept of the world does not change too much. The ability of animals to learn is not taken for granted any more than human learning would be, and this is another sleight-of-hand trick of the charlatan to throw mud on scientific endeavors. If a machine cared about this outcome for reasons similar to our own and was connected intuitively to the world science pertains to, then it would be equal in this task to us. It does not take much to see, upon analyzing the human and such a machine, that they are very different constructs, and so their respective frameworks for developing their concepts of the world would be different. It does not change that they would both conduct science, and the computer is not doing this by the nature of its operations. The machines can use computers, and computers can use each other by the directives programmed in them. "Using" in this sense is not a monopoly of humans or their thought. It is quite the opposite—the computer would only be able to operate if a general theory of technology were possible, and this is why the advance of computation was the decisive invention demarcating liberal society from technocratic society.