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The biological nation is neither free nor slave by nature. Such concepts are wholly inappropriate for natural history. Social engineering describes the origin of basic "germs" of the society. It is very uncommon, and a grand totalizing enterprise, for social engineering to create social institutions out of whole cloth. If a social engineer attempts such an undertaking—that is what the technocratic polity would be tasked with in the 20th century—they will have to accept the expedience of using what had already been developed, rather than abolishing or sublating the old entirely due to a mistaken belief that history can be changed in that way. What are those more developed concepts? Social engineering always entailed toil at its root, and the default assumption, as is the assumption of nature, is "guilty until proven innocent". Humanity, or any other agent, is slave before it can contemplate freedom, rather than freedom appearing out of an innocuous primordial spirit. From the moment social engineering is undertaken, the authority to decide what is to be done is what allows this practice to commence. In some way, artificial history must begin with this social engineering, or else history is entirely dyusregulated and there are no intelligible germs to say anything about. The "oppression" of doing this need not be so vaunted or so horrible that we lament that it came to this as if such an origin necessitates total and absolute slavery forevermore. There is nothing in social engineering that comprehends the word "freedom" except as a condition contingent on a lack of some condition. It can be said that someone's hair is free of lice or someone is free only so far as a particular condition is not imposed on their existence. Yet, freedom and liberty are essential to any well-developed concept of society, and the need for such a thing beyond the lack of some imminent condition is understood in the most primitive conditions. The free society is not the ontological opposite of a slave society. Freedom in human society pertained to a very different interest. That interest required security to be realized first, and so the obvious method to break an existing free society is to destroy all potential security and insist that this vulnerability cannot be repaired. We can dismiss the games of the "right of transgression" that is common to human behavior because there were always material limits on how often transgressors could act, and what they could do to another. Once established, the security of some agents is not something they would have any good reason to surrender for nothing. Security is not something to be bargained away as casually as any other good in a marketplace. The market as a stable interaction is not possible if the participants lack any agency, which requires mutual security. Otherwise, one party would simply take everything of the vulnerable Other, and the vulnerable party would never submit to such a setting or believe such a thing would produce anything other than what mercantile exploitation had always produced. Once established, the bare minimum for a secure and free society operates on entirely different principles. It is already known that the goods that appear at market are never universally exchangeable by some common unit. There are always ulterior motives of utility for the goods themselves, and while a price in money or some credit is always the terms of exchange, the purpose for the market society existing is that the wants for those goods exist outside of the market. It would be the same with any other interaction in life that would be subjected to moral valuation that can be manipulated by social engineering. The market actor is in some way engineering society to be more favorable to them since the alternative of outright theft and the toil of working for oneself are things to avoid. If market actors could produce their wants without the market exchange, both would agree to that, and see the end of exchange as preferable. Here we step back and remember that the market is an instrument that can only exist because some part of this is deemed lawful, whether by the laws of a state or a convention between people that allows trade of any sort to proceed. Nothing about the market said anything about "fundamental nature" in the way that was insinuated. What was really at stake with the various "modes of production" throughout history was not exchange or the money-token, but a battle to strip away freedom already known, or to establish liberty that had yet to exist. That liberty was never uniformly good, for liberty included the liberty of the oppressor to transgress decencies established. All of the traditions expected in any human society only applied to the free men and women of that society, and the freedom granted to members of society was never equal in obvious ways; but in all cases, freedom and slavery could not coexist. Social distinction ran rampant, but the distinction of a slave confined the slave to the classes that were exploited, and that could not be reconciled with a free society. It is the free society that allowed human polities to develop. Social engineering can apply to a free society just as it does to a society where the slavery of men is the status quo and expected. If social engineering in a slave society is already problematic and faces resistance, social engineering in a free society faces new challenges that have no meaning if all men are naturally and eternally slaves, as the ruling idea of the eugenic creed must violently recapitulate.
What forms the free society? The free society proper is forever a work in progress, for societies are never "100% free" in the way their members would like. Some oppression remains, and there is no teleological goal that ensures that the free society will remain free or become inexorably "freer" by some metric. Freedom is not a superstition until it is made into a superstition to eliminate the concept. If freedom exists only as a fantasy, it is not a real condition that should inform the behavior of anyone here and now, and it is not a rule that freedom as a mere idea is desirable. Freedom entails consequences and costs. Where freedom begins is not the traditions established to secure the free society, but a coincidence where two agents can coexist. This should not be confused with political friendship or membership, for a free society is not a political proposition or something secured by the state in any way. Freedom can only exist in wider society if it is to be a meaningful proposition, even if the state and political class declare that your freedom is invalid and inadmissible. If freedom were a condition litigated "from above", it would be worthless. It would not even be worthy of the vaunted title of shit, for shit has many uses we have known of. That is not to say the legal freedom granted by constitutions "from above" is meaningless or that it descends to the level of faggotry. Usually, the freedom of legal rights exists because the free society is already conceived in the base of society, and the men forming the liberal state not only accept that this condition exists without their intervention but believe that liberty for the political class is desirable for some outcome. The liberal political class can view their relation not as one between lords and serfs or masters and slaves, but between patrons and clients, with the added potential that new members of the liberal polity can be drawn from the lower orders so that new men replenish the ranks of the state's officers. The democratic society in any worthwhile rendering is never reduced to patronage relationships and very often democratic societies worked against tradition, but at a basic level, the liberal society could only exist because there were men who had no special claim to anything yet believed, for perfectly understandable reasons, that they could and should rule the world, and that there would be others who think the same for their own purposes. No assumption had to be inserted where all men must clamor for the same conceit of ruling the world, because the liberals themselves had no agreement on the question of what it meant to rule, or what the full purpose of their project would be in the end. The technocrats of the 20th century had a similar disagreement on what, if anything, the goal of their enterprise was to be. Only the purest aristocratic conceit insists that all men must be one thing and only one thing and that one thing is always the lowest example regardless of efforts to promote a uniform, singular good. Some distinction between men is expected, and that distinction is not one where a paramount value dictates the place of everyone else. A social engineer reorganizing what people are would first ask why people are distinguished, instead of asserting that there is a form that made it so and people are inferior models of that form. In some way, the distinction of social agents was established before such a thorough engineering, and social engineering only takes place for a limited number of interactions that happen at the borders of the agents rather than within them. The individual's constitution is a very different matter, where there is no argument over "freedom" or dickering between the organs of a body; but, any entity constituted in such a way has far more immediate reasons for being what it is, rather than the social behavior of a "biological nation" operating at infinitely small scales, or infinitely large scales. Freedom and the relationships appropriate to it, which are often called "transactional", only operate at the scales appropriate to the agents in question. To speak of a relation to something much larger and alien to an individual's existence, the same transactional relationships cannot be assumed. God, for example, is not the patron delivering something to His clients, and neither is the person bargaining with the organs or cells of a particular body, whether that is the person's own body or the body of another.
The first relations between people in a free society are the first signs of Law existing as a meaningful force in the world. If we recall the concept of the Law from the previous book, Law arises because the alternative of struggle would lead to a mutually destructive and pointless enterprise. The purpose of the law is that the law is not relitigated or reimagined for frivolous purposes, rather than the law being elegant or natural. At first, the law is an affair between people, rather than a formal institution of such. Once established, laws can be interpreted as acting without the accord of either party, for Law was never proprietary in that sense to be Law. For example, laws of motion and recognition of laws between two aliens by a third party present something by which the law between two persons might be compared so that both are aware that this law is relevant to the world rather than the law being merely a contrivance.
At first the law may be seen as a relation between two social equals, for there is no ready-made legal distinction that can be enforced or that would be relevant to the arrangement. The two entities are until their existence is circumscribed by the law, on the same footing. This may be imagined as a simple "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" arrangement. Usually, but not uniformly, the relationship between the two is between the patron, who has something to offer that holds the authority to adjudicate the law, and the client, who accepts the authority of the patron on this matter while retaining its independence. The patronage can pertain to anything the patron offers, and it is not a guarantee that the patron is a social superior. Someone funding an artist may be the patron for the patron offers the funds, but the artist may have so many such patrons that each patron individually has little say. The artist provides some work of art that is apparently pleasing to the patrons, and the patrons themselves cannot produce this. For the artist, this gift of art is not a transaction from the artist to the patron, or something as crass as pure monetary exchange. The patrons could live without the artist well enough, but the artist might between hundreds of patrons enjoy a standard of living greater than the patrons individually, and enjoy greater prestige in society. The artist would never be confused for a patron, for the artist lacks any authority to adjudicate in the way Law prescribes. But, outside of the patronage of the arts, in wider society, the artist may well be the social superior of the patron, and nothing about this changes the patron-client relation between the artist and the patrons. At any time, the patrons could terminate this relationship individually. Perhaps all patrons of the artist would abandon an artist, and the artist would lose that necessary revenue stream while retaining the prestige of being an artist and any appeal that might have to new patrons. No one can take away the artist's historical prestige if the artist had any to begin with. It would be necessary to shame the artist with something more than the withdrawal of patronage to destroy that, and perhaps the artist will, after a successful run of patronage, find some new line of work, or wallow in obscurity, having had some time in the good life. I use this example to illustrate something that subverts the typical expectation of patron-client relationships, where the patron is unquestionably a social superior that the client must pay to persist in society. If, for example, the patron is a lawyer, and the client is asked to exchange something for the favor of legal representation, the client without a lawyer is doomed. It is the legal service that is the good the patron offers, rather than the lawyer being a starving artist begging for social esteem. Again, it is not a given that the lawyer is a social inferior to the client, for the powerful need lawyers just as much as the poor. But, the legal authority of the lawyer is not questionable, and it is that which grants to patronage anything more than a mere exchange of value. The merchant selling goods is not a "patron" of anything, so far as the merchant fulfills the mercantile function only. The merchant may treat his store like a fortress against the "thieves" of the masses, but the legal expectation is that the merchant only exists to offer goods that other people produce. Angry customers can sue the merchant for a variety of offenses. What grants the merchant prestige is not that he is a patron working with clients, but that the merchant has a hoard of properties to sell in the form of commodities or whatever else the merchant offers to a paying customer. By no means is the merchant obligated to welcome any and all buyers without restriction; but, no law enshrines the merchant's favoritism in selecting who may buy goods at his store, until one is written by the lawyers who make a partnership with the mercantile interests of society.
Lawyers were not always a fact. They arose because there was a coincidence in history where the lawyer was an expedient for something. Not every interaction between people is a legal matter. Animals do not think they're appealing to a "lawyer" for any ritual, and rituals among humanity are something above and outside of the law. The lawyer's profession is always dubious, for if affairs could be judged between people without an aribtrator, that would eliminate the direct client-patron relation that would introduce a "man in the middle" between the two parties and what they would have found mutually beneficial. The law directly offers no security and spares none with any mercy. Law contains many traps to ensnare the gullible who still believe that justice comes easily to creatures as foul as humanity. Where then can any security exist in this arrangement? If it arises entirely from disciplinary forces outside of Law, then Law could be abrogated completely by a will "above the law, above God" that asserts that it alone can arbitrate justice, better than the plodding and weak Law which can be infinitely relitigated and engineer lockouts. That would appear to be the natural and only possible course of the law—that all can be corrupted, "every man has his price", and every venal aphorism becomes the unwritten supreme law of nature. This never actually happens. Even the worst of cases, the unwritten law of the venal becomes a new legal code itself, with the same weaknesses as any law, which the aristocrat must recruit an army of specialists to adjudicate and enforce. The worst of cases does not need to happen, because it eliminates any purpose of having a law at all. The only conditions where the aristocratic vision can be realized are cases where there is an untrammeled will with no barrier between it and the flesh of the subjects.
The lawyer does not think economically. The tokens of mercantile exchange are never assessed by the lawyer as an argument of inherent worth. The lawyer deals in only two values; truth, or fiction. Everything the lawyer does has to rely on truth or twist interpretations of reality to invent facts that the court must admit. There is never in law any necessary bargain price for an adjudication. If there were, the lawyer, seeing their monopoly, could raise the going rate for legal decisions as high as possible, and the bearer of money would have no choice but to pay, or fight the court with force. Such a decision is outside of the law and the affair becomes one of battles and social engineering. The lawyer can, shall we say, very creatively interpret reality so long as it matches lawful behavior. The clever lawyer understands that a law code that is incompatible with life is great for the power and prestige a lawyer can hold, and so law codes are written in such a way that no matter what, someone can be guilty of some crime, and the lawyer always must be paid off with whatever bribe they can extort. The value of the bribe is not the purpose. It is the defense of this legalized bribery as a practice that the lawyer's efforts revolve around if he were to think of his profession as a way to attain power over society. If the crimes are beyond the pale for a society and the lawyers can bring down judgment, no bribe, no bargaining, can spare the poor soul, no matter how innocent. Now, you may say, wouldn't such a world make clear the absurdity of law? Yes, it would, but once established, Law does not go away because we wish it were different. It is only ever supplanted by a new Law, or new lawyers come in as lawyers are mortal creatures like the rest of us filthy humans. Even when force of arms may break the court, it is a historical fact that such a court existed and passed judgment, and the new court may decide to uphold those old rulings and the old records. Nothing about Law obligates the lawyer to any goodness or "true justice". What informs the lawyer, though, has nothing to do with a lust for power that is essential to the profession, or mindless expansion of every avarice. This monopoly of the law to offer patronage is one that the lawyer would like to see continue by any means. If those means somehow align with an orderly society so that clients are offering their loyalty to the patron, that might produce from the law something resembling the poor man's concept of justice. There would be, at least, some sense that the law eventually relents on its tireless persecution of the slave race called Man, because the lawyer has some bigger case to attend to, and lawyers are not limitless in their supply. Lawyers will always want to limit the supply of legal professionals to something that makes their patronage scarce. If there were robot lawyers that could be reproduced infinitely, it would be terrible for the legal professional, and all of the patronage of the lawyer would go to the commander of these robots. Since the commander of the robots very likely is not a lawyer and would not stoop to such a dubious profession, the world of robot lawyers either functions as a total and abject barbarism—something we have already seen arise in the legal code—or the legal robots form a cartel managed by political imperatives, and among them are economic imperatives. In other words, the utilitarian madness would run amok, and this is what the current efforts to impose such a condition on the profession intend so that Eugenics is the only law and the sole commander of this patronage. The legal professional who is specialized in the role and purely serves the function does not hold all patronage, but all patronage is subject to lawful behavior or something that amounts to it. It is the business of Law to interdict this patronage at its will so that patronage does not lead to relations the court disdains. No other profession or institution is in a position to make this patronage and client relationship a business. Perhaps the mafia don can trade access and favors and abide by his own law, so much so that the mafia is the true court of the land. That is after all what the lawyers truly are and always have been, once their finery is exposed. But, if Law is supplanted by a parallel Law and becomes the predominant such force in a society, then all that has happened is that the legal profession and institution were overturned, and the mafiosi are now the esteemed and honorable court.
In the biological nation, nothing about this is ready-made, and for most life, no one thinks that life is litigating anything. This is a practice between entities capable of this discourse, and it begins not with an untrammeled monopoly, but at the edges of interactions between agents. In primitive society, the tribe, however, it is understood, is the lawgiver. At a lesser level, the leader of a band, the headman or the mother, sets the law for the primitive household. No virtue grants to any entity a justified privilege to do this. It is not inherent to the mother that she be the judge, jury, and executioner, but in the court of her family, her young children who are dependent on her nurture aren't going to enter a legal dispute so easily and win. Absent anyone to tell her no, the mother can begin with what she can control, and acknowledge what she can't control about her children. Such is life. The mother sets this law not for some high-minded conceit of her indispensibility or a crass trading of favors, but because such a framework would be necessary for creatures with the faculties of humans to navigate the world. Children would, if left to their own devices, assert such a framework for themselves and the limited domains they operate in, but interpersonal relationships among humanity are things an adult would have far greater knowledge about, and the mother likely has concepts of normative social functions that the child has no way of knowing by instinct. She can, if she has given up on a child, withdraw the patronage of humanizing the defective, throw it to the wolves, or encourage predation in the family unit as a way of ruling through fear. She might have some idea of what function, if any, the child would have in her world moving forward. In all of the ways she hopes to "mother" a child, she is setting down the law, so that her direct labor is less necessary in the future. Even if that is not her intent, children are picking up their cues from their immediate surroundings, and consider for themselves these social relations which are distant from them. Nowhere was a slavery automatic or "just so", no matter how many idiotic German philosophers are there to tell you it is.
Nothing in the nation naturally creates this patronage. It is always a choice that is sensical and acted on by the free will of the participants. If the relationship becomes obligatory under fear of torture, it cannot mean the same thing. This is something different from saying that legal compliance is wholly voluntary and the fault of the subject for failing to comply. It is inherently bilateral, even when one "patron", such as the class of lawyers, demands oaths of loyalty of the subjects to the Constitution and the republic for which it stands, with the consequence of refusal being the removal of all restraints against legal violence, i.e. that the withdrawal of legal rights means that the subject is now guilty of trespassing, stealing the Law's oxygen, and multiple Crimes of Being; and because all legal rights are suspended, in Lawful society, the outlaw can be tried multiple times, on the most spurious grounds. Guilty until proven innocent is the law of the world, and if the law of Man knows no mercy, the world will not intercede out of some sense. The world will simply proceed, and the law of Man is itself guilty until proven innocent, but this has never disciplined its behavior. The law of the world is not "law" as such, but an understanding of all who think seriously about this condition and why any Law would exist. Those who speak of law forget this at their own peril, and no competent lawyer can forget this even if the lawyer doesn't fully comprehend why it is so. Yet, the very premise of Law makes this all a voluntary act of everyone involved, however much terror backs up the legal institution. If we embrace the savage law of Crowley from before, the will is the extent of Man's law. But, this is not the true genesis or fount of Law as a concept. Man's will is fickle and impressionable, for Man's origin is vile and fact has proven this so. No relitigation will change this. The will of men to volunteer to the law can be envisioned as two exhausted beasts who tire of the chase and siege, where one or both finally say enough is enough, giving up the chase and seeing that these encounters will not be avoidable forever. Under proper Law, there cannot be "two worlds forever apart", even with careful engineering to mitigate all points of contact. Law will always have to account for the possibility of some future encounter, no matter how unlikely. If no remedy exists, then one is asserted by some force "behind the backs of the producers", but it is not too great a secret how these matters are resolved in reality.
In practice, Law has limited its scope not because of any restraint of the participants, but because no legal code could account for every potential of the world or anything close to that. Law was communicated by language and symbols that men understood, rather than anything in the universe insinuating such a thing existed. So too are the patron and client relations far from totalizing. The two remain their own entities, and they can only communicate with each other regarding this in the ways that are allowed. If there is a very close union of two persons—more accurately, two beings and entities with a real existence—patronage and Law do not describe the interaction. A union of man and woman is not reducible to the patron-client relationship of one to the other, or some dickering between them that is transactional and legalistic. It may be represented by an institution like marriage or expectations of how this relationship works, and the man and woman involved are not fixed to have any particular opinion of the other or what their interaction should be. But, the conjugal act cannot be abstracted, nor is its consequence something that can be conveniently regulated by legal pretexts or social engineering. Those strategies would be ruinous to any environment where man, woman, and the children are expected to cohabitate and cooperate in the way a family would. The same can be said of extended families or arrangements of humans for various purposes, and in the end, the real interactions of a nation are not reducible to social engineering, patronage, or legalistic pretexts. These concepts are ways for us to organize knowledge of what is happening so that human Reason can navigate the situation. There are no assumptions that can be made about this happening "by nature" for any animal or entity, but it is a reasonable expectation that nature endowed humans with brains and an interest in the world beyond carrying out the most crass imperatives. What humans do with this gift, for themselves and between each other, is left to them, and it does not regard anything as necessary from the genesis of the person or the "biological nation", or whatever substitute for the nation is imagined like a "race" or a "polity". All of the arrangements beyond social engineering occur because someone, somewhere, wanted to continue them, and could act with volition regarding the matter. It would not be possible to encapsulate all of these interactions into a crass "naturalistic" excuse or pretext, to say "Nature says you had to do this, nature says you had to do this". Nature prescribes for human beings very little in the way of encoded instructions, and where such things exist, they operate at a far lower level than interpersonal relationships or the interactions humans have with objects like their tools.