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19. The Ecological Claim

Two great problems face economic management. The first is that in some space and time, there will be something that is not managed and cannot be physically reached, which becomes an unknown that in one way or another must be conquered for management to continue. Cooperation for many reasons is anathema to the philosophy of management, without either the unknown being corrupted by the manager, or the manager failing to defend against the unknown, which will force either a change within as dire necessity to adapt, or the unknown conquering the manager, either because that in the unknown follows a strategy of conquest, a similar strategy of management, or because the unknown senses correctly that the manager is a threat to its continued existence. The second problem is the very threat from within that the unknown from without makes clear. That is that within a space, the manager does not know as much as is desired, and an increase in knowledge generally creates more things for a manager to command and control. Control of technology as a general trend is not possible in an imagined society where agents are free to act, for even if the law prohibits men from developing technology anathema to the ruling interest, technology must be created to suppress the interest of the ruled or the managed from breaking that law, and can only do so with regard to other men. That technology to suppress the ruled from rising is itself replicable by the ruled and comprehensible. To arrest all potential ideological inclinations, such that the structure of society absent a space remains constant and creates a natural incentive for men to never allow technology to upset the status quo, is the stated aim of every aristocracy. If that is so, it is tantamount to ruling forever. This relies not just on forced ignorance but the elimination of any possibility that independent movement is possible. That is not possible within an unbounded society, where people can leave to some place and there are no true internal barriers. A society that truly is open and without barriers would have too many places to hide, unless an effort was made to ensure that the society was open only to the wishes of those who rule, and the open society was in actuality enclosed in parcels of land. Those parcels may be mentionable, but the strategy of the Americans was to make any mention of the boundaries unmentionable, and this follows the purest form of aristocratic conceits about government and how they can rule.

We do not need a metaphysical explanation to naturalize the concept of ecology, or the localization of economic behavior to particular times and places. Life on its own terms, or any other entity that would be an economic agent, must exist somewhere in the world to be a real agent. Even if we imagined a virtual economic agent in some imagined space, as we do in models, those models suggest temporality in an imagined time and space in order for them to be operative. The assumption that there is no distance between economic agents implies there can be no differentiation between them. In short, the assumptions where distance is destroyed, and "all that is solid melts into air" says more about a metaphysical assumption in philosophical conceits than it says anything about an economic logic. If that is implicitly accepted, where nothing exists in time or space, then the outcome will always be regression to a primordial unity which never actually exists, and appears to us as some foul impulse we attribute to money token or some ritual involving the commodity. It never really was about the money or the commodities though, but about the destruction of any temporality by some philosophical tricks, and this was a presumption that never was inherent to modern economic thought in any form. The concept of free trade capitalism was aware of the extent of the market in given locations, and the construct of the pin factory is an enclosed space engaged in production, that allows social labor to be possible and thus generally alienable labor to be appreciated by management. The idea of an economic thought that does not take place in spaces, or with actual bodies that persons inhabit and operate through, is one that is only useful for abstractions. We mentally assert our own understanding of the marketplace and have a sense of what connects to where in a world market or a world system. This concept didn't fully form until the last third of the 19th century, and it has proceeded ever since in stages. That world market was the first global integration that had been attained by mankind, and it is at this time where the world market was defined as a world market. The boundaries of domains on Earth had been effectively decided with a few exceptions, and the extent of what existed in those domains was known with enough accuracy for a general plan to be conceived and reasonably implemented. What was missing was a general theory to understand those domains and how they could be commanded. It was not sufficient to command people in the abstract, where the command was only in theory. Only in practice can the goals of economics be attained, and this takes place in the machines, which include the bodies of humans, which are by nature tied to particular locations and times. It is here where ecology supplants economy as the understanding of human affairs, and the former question of trade and struggle becomes a political story half-believed by those who seek empire. This ecology was not a modern invention, as if humans were too stupid to do this in the past. Its thinking is superimposed on the past and applied retroactively, and those in the past did have an attachment to spaces and times out of necessity. The ideal city-state is a city-state with known boundaries and a description of its faculties, rather than an imagined point of light. It couldn't be the unknowable that the most crass and degenerated economic thought insists it would be.

To say "we live in an environment" is a trite saying, for the environment of life is not philosophically fixed. For one, living entities that think like us do not merely occupy physical space, but the virtual spaces we constructed in ideology and our systems of knowledge. We make claims not just to a location in time and space, but to ideas we hold to be outside of both, yet which are in some sense property we have claimed. The abstract and transcendent are no exception to the claims of economy, and many a religion have begun as a way to make money, then run off with the money bags like that guy who sold Springfield a monorail. It would be quite impossible to speak of economics as anything other than a resource calculation problem if life were not motile and reactive, and if there were not transcendant aspirations suggesting moral aims beyond the mechanics of life. That economic task is likely why central nervous systems could adapt around a locale with a preferred orientation in the first place. That task would not have been designed from above, but arose organically, starting with simple nervous systems for sense and reaction. It necessarily implied something to sense that was in principle without boundaries that were inherent to the organism. Any boundaries were implied instead by the mobility of the life-form - and so fish can only exist in water, where there is sufficient food. They were contingent on a world outside of the life-form that was itself without any such boundaries. Obviously fish cannot survive in outer space, and gravity binds life to the Earth. None of those limits are essential to the life-form, nor were they decreed as an imagined division like political borders. Political borders in the modern sense are in principle legal declarations that must be enforced by people who can do so, and this has meant a flow of unsanctioned immigration since those borders have been established. The true purpose of political borders are to establish the claims of states and institutions, rather than resolve an ecological question, and no rule fixes those borders in place, where they are beholden to any natural law to decide where territory begins and ends. So too does the claim of the person to the space around it not exist by willful assertion. Even the claim to one's own body is immediately suspect without the means to defend it. The body provides only the smallest natural defense against this by taking up space, and it has always been the claim of states to control not just movement of the people, but life and death altogether. That is a political claim that is beyond the scope of the present writing, and because we do not consider ourselves with direct political or institutional claims to any space or ecology, we would only establish ecology by some natural principle. That natural principle is not inborn but emergent from the actions an agent can take, which are always definable but highly varied. That means life's natural habitat is whatever it adapts to and wherever it finds itself most immediately. Life possesses everything it touches, or tries to. Its impulse is a greedy one, but not one that refuses to share or form an understanding if it can do so. Only after the extent of its body and short reach to its surroundings are established does it consider the rest of the world, and life cannot consider that world as what it is. Its thinking concerns ideas rather than spaces where clumps of matter make forms, and so it will develop its own wider sense of where things are. It is less that life is locked in by its biological faculties, which it doesn't rationally understand natively as limitations, but that life is locked in by its tendencies and preferences. Those preferences prefer territoriality because that territoriality is security in the real world, and it has an incentive to seek that which aligns with its goals like survival, comfort, or what it senses as moral causes. Territory is not worth anything if there is nothing valuable in it or holding the territory doesn't hold some perceived benefit, for holding space just to say it's yours creates liabilities and gains nothing. The claims to spaces are in every case an expense of life rather than a benefit. Only due to the security of a particular territory does this ecological understanding of a limited space benefit the life-form, and it was never something they would choose to do for themselves. It is something imposed on them by the outside world that they must abide, and only the ability of humans to alter their environment in limited ways can affect this. All of this recommended ecology and the constraint of spaces to those who governed, rather than any economic benefit to doing this. Economically, barriers to movement were seen correctly as liabilities in a productive sense. Only by security, or the deprivation of it, did this constraint - or any constraint - make sense. If space and distance were not a concern, people would choose to live in the best environment they could, and move where they need to obtain goods. The proverbial bourgeois man in the desert specifically eliminates temporality and meaning from the economic problem, presenting it instead as slaves fetched from the ether to provide the master's resources as if by magic. In other words, the conventional utilitarian view, at least that of the German economists, is retarded.

There exists not a natural habitat for every life-form, but built-in tendencies which favor it in a niche, and prohibit it in others. If the life-form is not essentialized, and the life-form is seen as a technological construct, then its constitution - which itself is a habitat or space for the constituents of the body and all off the microbes and parasites living within - is a product both of environment and its own power and accumulation. Proper study of the environment, and thus any proper ecological view, would take this into account. In practice, this is exactly what is needed for ecology to become a true ruling idea, and this is what is suggested by pseudoscientific "climate simulations", run on the then-novel computers of the 1970s. These simulations for a variety of reasons are ridiculous from the outset, and that skullduggery can be described another time. The mechanization of thought - or rather, information processing, which eliminated the conceits humans had about their rational faculties - made today's ecology possible as a serious discipline. It was decided long beforehand that no inquiry into political ecology would be permitted, unlike the critiques of political economy which came from all directions against the established order. From the moment ecology is launched, it is an imperial monopoly, and the cargo cult of imperial science screeches like madmen if the holy ecology is disrupted. Again, the particulars of this must wait for a later book. If we may for a moment ignore the screeching and mystification of all things economic and ecological, we see this for what it is. It doesn't say anything that must be respected as natural or scientific law, regardless of the political claims saying this is totally normal. Reality and sense have told us that this ecological concept is at odds with basic facts of what it means for political actors to exist in any way that can be construed as political, moral, or possessing any initiative of their own. It is imagined that every parcel of land, every ecology, is not an actual space, but a machine designed by narratives and myths alone. It does not conform to any machine we would analyze, even an abstract one in the world of forms. By actually useful engineering knowledge and all we know about the arrangement of industry, no ecological crisis can be said to happen. Even if the ecological concept attempted to pertain to reality, it couldn't until it has adequately accounted for what life itself does, and what machines actually do. It is no surprise that alongside ecology is eugenics, mystification of the computer and information generally, and all of the imperial shibboleths. A better, seemingly scientific ecology would not fare much better, usually devolving into recapitulations of communist ideology in its less admirable presentations - the kind that involve maniacs jumping up and down like retards about revolutions working like magic because they weren't the political experts who knew anything that was really happening. Eugenics embraces the lie, while most technocrats go along with the lie because it is suitable for controlling people. Life and the mind must be essentialized and fixed for ecology to be sensical, and therefore for economy to suggest anything other than a quasi-religion regarding money and debt. If the life-form itself is arrested and managed, and thus its thoughts are all controlled, that is the only condition under which ecology in any form is sensical.

Ecology arises not as the inborn limits of anything, but as a result of struggle for life, which is in some sense a political struggle for the status quo. Yet, even without politics as such, ecological niches can be found and the parallel drawn to political struggle, even where politics as such does not apply. For example, we can speak of ecology within a simulated computer game, or an ecosystem of ideas in an abstract library or forum, which may be realized in communications. The realization of a communication forum is a very different ecosystem from the theoretical and abstract forum that constitutes what we see as the shared knowledge base and development in society, but both are ecosystems in some sense. Ecology at heart is not a discipline of living things or natural systems, but a discipline of information, philosophy, and communication of ideas. In short, ecology is a product of ideology and necessarily so. It is that which Marx's work on ideology and political economy indirectly reference, though not in the form imperial ecology took and with some knowledge that this was a mental trick rather than a natural science like physics. Ecology is not identical with sociology, for societies are not intrinsically managed by anything and exist only in the real communication between agents if they are to be the subject of scientific inquiry. Ecology really has nothing to do with society, the human subject, or the natural sciences at all, including biology. It is instead a conception of management and a way to obviate and naturalize politics and governance, and it is not the only such tool. It would be quite impossible for any real management of people to take place without fixing human beings to particular times and places, and thus functions they would fill in that ecosystem. Far from ecology concerning life and its natural limits, ecology concerns a thing which corrects for the anomaly that is life. Life is destroyed by suggesting it is something very different from what it actually is, or even how life was historically understood. Before ecology, life is understood as assemblages of organs that act on their own power, rather than some substance or material we regard as living. Life in classical anatomy and the earliest biology operated on its own power, as this made sense to us. Even if we imagined small corpsucles, which was not an easy thing for someone to do before the 18th century, our image of life was that it was sophisticated enough to operate independently and did not answer to any master intrinsically, or abide any economy or ecology. Life persisted entirely on its own terms within a world that preceded it, however creation and the origin of life were perceived.[1] Ecology mimics not the extent of life's functions and the reach of its technology, but its claim to territory and genesis. The "tie to the land", even in non-thinking life, is implied not by anything in the present, but by the genesis and past of life. This much is true, for no one chose the situation they were born into. For humans, exposed infants are nearly defenseless, and if by some chance a friendly she-wolf offered her teats to the child, there were too many humans around who would make sure "nature took its course" - and usually the exposure of children meant not release into the wild, but extermination in ritual sacrifice to purge the soul and genesis of any mention of the undesirable. Left to their own devices, the wild child will probably starve without regular sustenance, but the legends of wild children exist as a warning to primitive society - make sure "nature takes its course", and that no other clan decides to take in the child and increase the numbers of an enemy. Maybe your clan did not want the child and declared it a living abortion, but another clan might seen a warm body that is good enough, and the infant would not be able to complain. While giving the unwanted child to another could be a custom, "once retarded, ALWAYS retarded" is an ancient rule, and the idea of redemption is considered in constructing ecology. Redemption must not be allowed, or the conceit of controlling a space is lost. Any sin assigned to the condemned must never be forgotten. Economics does not regard this one way or another and intrinsically valuable, for economics concerns itself with either the potential futures or things outside of time. Ecology must, and serves to establish a past which the present abides.[2]

Economics has no way to establish the starting point of exchanges or answer the question of history by its theory alone. It could make do with some common sense observations, like the noted propensity in people to trade, and surmise based on some historical guesswork what could have happened. That guesswork of the origin of exchange passes through many hands, each with their pet theory or supposition of where exchange in value began. This takes up a considerable part of Marx's contribution to the critique of political economy, which is a useful introduction to the problem being posed.[3] Exchange in a sense of exchanging abstract value - something meritorious that would be managed - did not happen out of a vague sense that this is what humans naturally did, as if an abstract unit of exchange were a self-evident truth. This was never a claim of classical political economy, and when a law of value was placed on mathematical footing by Ricardo, this was a violent assumption rather than one proven by any facts. It is not an unsafe assumption, in that there is a generally understood concept of value in market societies, and this is what money represents, and it is that which Marx elaborates on. The difficulty arises because what is meant by "exchange" in classical political economy had to be generalized, even though the exchange of money or units that would be recognized as economic units of moral impotrance did not explain everything humans did. No one, Marx included, contested that exchange had always consumed the entirety of human effort, nor did the imperial utilitarians suggest that all behavior was economic behavior as such. The activities that qualify as exchange are always limited to that which is morally relevant and understood to be explicitly an exchange with religious importance in some sense. That is, the ordinary business of people like sharing a salt shaker was not an economic task, and the reproduction of the home through labor was not economic in the same sense that markets were economic. The home-maker's economic task was never a political task in the same sense, but certain involved management of resources that were limited and contingent on interfacing with an outside world. The home and the family were contained ecosystems where the laws of political economy very much did not apply, and this was true of industry at a basic level. What happens inside the factory or the home would not be subject to the antagonistic relationship that the market or forum or city in general implied, because doing this would be highly counterproductive to any genuinely productive aim. They were disciplined by political economy and the market, just as people are, but politics was not conducted inside the body or inside the family. Politics concerned the state and wider society, and really concerned a view of society at the highest level. No economy could be contained to a single nation that was hermetically sealed. What economics can tell is the nature of exchange generally, and the rationales of agents within an ecosystem. For example, there is an economy of the home which is entirely elided by matters discussed in the forum, unless the politicians are coming into your home and your bedroom with state agents to tell you how you're going to live from now on. Naturally, this is exactly what would happen in modernity, but it was never a foregone conclusion and never applied blindly or equally from family to family, or person to person. We unite all of these ecosystems to think of economics properly, for no system and no institution is truly apart from others; yet many of these systems never actually come into contact and pertain to far different matters, and so a common unit of value cannot be found between them. This has less to do with the inability to assign any value that is objective. In fact, all values are objective in some sense if they are to be proper economic values. The feelings and sentiments of people and the judgements they make are all things which happen in a real world for them to be relevant. What is not possible is a crass reduction of value across societies that do not believe in the same things or adopt the same practices with regards to currency, customs, acceptable behavior in diplomacy, and so on. What happens in a home or in a workplace is not what happens in a market, or between cities or states which have very different priorities regarding commerce. All such institutions have to manage their own affairs - their house must be in order - and in some sense the behavior of institutions is economic for the institution to exist. This value is particular to institutions rather than the actual minds or entities engaged in economic behavior. An institution being what it is, it is always identifiable, as are its members. The agents cannot be pinned to any particular time or place, but there is no real ambiguity about who is and is not a member of an institution. Any ambiguity is purely a failure of our knowledge rather than something unknowable, as if membership of institutions were governed by a crass interpretation of the uncertainty principle. Social information is always something we can discern very easily, and humans spend great effort figuring out who is a member of what group, what institutions are, and what of them is relevant to their actual lives. The value our actual mind assigns to these institutions and the value judgements of institutions is another matter entirely, but for the economic task to be carried out, the mind does not get to unilaterally assert what it wants. It can only do so within the terms institutions - including their own person, which means their history and prestige which is attached not with the body but with their name and record - allow economic activity to proceed. By default, institutions are not constrained by any concern of space. Institutions by their nature are established specifically because they are divorced from space and time, if they are to be going concerns and stable values. Any spacial or temporal constraint on an institution is not fixed by a law of nature, but a decision of the holders of that institution.


There are five constraints which establish ecology from the observation that economics is possible. The first is the social agents themselves - both their actual bodies and their institutional representation, including formal organizations and what may be said about institutions. We regard economics proper as the act of rational institutionalized agents, which the person itself is. Yet, it is the actual human being and their knowledge that is active to make the institution real and guides all of the actions of the institution. The institution does not exist by magic or decree, and so the true constraint to establish the ecosystem is the actual existence of social agents. If we are managing things in the world, it is their worldly form that is to be arrested and understood before the idea of an institution is arrested. All economics concerns the institutions' logic rather than something that made sense to our native connection to the world, for if it were purely about what actually matters, economics would be a trivial resource calculation problem of little interest to us. The body itself is an ecosystem where all of these constraints are active, including the claims of other agents against it; internally, though, no constitution of a "economics" of the body is construed by our own understanding, because the economic view was contingent on an institutional understanding that could only arise when we are developed. Animals and young children do not have a developed sense of economic knowledge, and the theories and practices of economics are never natural laws. The repeated failures to understand economics fool wise adults. It doesn't occur to the body itself that it is at war with itself, as if the parts of the body were violently clashing with each other. The mind and the sense of self might be set against every part of the body and the mind may struggle with contradictions which befuddle it. To the malignant cancer or the healthy organs of the body, though, they independently do not have any sense of their own "will to power". The organs instead do what the functions of life and their physical nature would do, and so the heart beats, and cancers spread. No one organ can claim dependence or direct command over the other organs in that way. What the knowledge of a human being does is wholly cooperative rather than an economic dickering and dealing over life functions, and the body and soul of a human cannot be split against itself without predictable calamity. It would be highly counterintuitive to the sense that a social agent would require. And so, the internal workings of the body are not immediately relevant, other than noting that they do exist and we will likely act on them. The agent to be constitutionally worthwhile is presumably functioning as a whole rather than as a shambling mound of its parts and properties. This is the source of modern philosophical "contradiction" and why it can cajole and befuddle those who are to be lied to and humiliated. Taken to its logical conclusion, the processes of the body, or anything in nature, can be described to create a reductio ad absurdum about anything and everything. The sleight of hand trick is to take advantage of the body's integration as an agent and as an ecosystem, and by this cajoling, the subdued are beholden and stripped of any security until they psychologically break. It would not work unless there were a real situation that is outside any of our conceits about it, and that we hold it as morally valuable within that system. While it is possible to speak of an economy of the body in the abstract, the ecology of a body is purely a construct human rationality made after the fact, when management could terraform the innards of a human being, whether by their own personal authority or by imposition from another.

Natively, the faculties of the body are presumed to include that which is reproduced by consumable "technology" - that is to say food - and the learning from communication with other people and things in the world. All of these decisions to seek consumable articles, make decisions with the resources of the body, and regulate knowledge and communication going in and coming out, become expectations placed on the person. Whether they are realistic expectations for our sense of fairness does not matter in the slightest. The person will be made responsible and can pawn off responsibility to others if they possess this virtue to project, project, project that took the place of any forthright behavior we might have wanted in a better world. This primitive technology is segregated from the technology which is kept alien to the body like tools, prey animals, storage, etc., and must be so in order for the social and ecological agent to be understood. In other words, in ecology, agents are always identified as possessing definite traits and behaviors, for the model to make any useful predictions. If those traits are variable, they only vary because of other forces which can be accounted for. If those traits are indeterminate, then it is as if a "black box" exists which somehow creates the necessary outputs and processes inputs by some unknown process. Here again is where "contradiction" is introduced to befuddle this understanding. In the actual world where these faculties of the person are relevant, there are no contradictions. Someone does or does not the things that are ascribed to it.

With these faculties, social agents encounter a world which does not intrinsically bind them to a space or time, but they are always bound to each other. Here again is the next trick of "contradiction" to terminate this understanding by eliminating distance or temporality between social agents. From the managerial and institutional view, it does not matter if someone is ten feet away or ten miles away for the purposes of regarding the existence of that person or their influence on society. So long as the other entity exists, it will be present as social information. The proximity in space of two agents does not intrinsically affect anything in this understanding. What is affected by proximity is the real machinery available to social agents. Humans only act with the tools at their disposal, communicate with what is available to them as symbols or things which can generate them, like writing, spoken language, electronic communication, and so on. Spoken language is treated as a native faculty while most methods for preserving communicated information or transmitting it quickly over large distances are technological at the least. All of the means by which social agents actually affect the world operate over definite distances, and this starts with the native faculties which we are acquainted with. The distinctions between agents, whatever the type of agent is, are not immediately relevant, but will be shortly.

Without any knowledge of the wider world and terrain, the first definition of an ecosystem is social agents themselves. The distance between them and the reach of their native faculties will say the most about their typical organizational structure if all other things are equal. Absent a compelling reason, a human being is the same regardless of where or when it exists, and it is only after accounting for their native behaviors that the environment outside of them can be considered. Absent a compelling reason, humans would form similar societies as they have in the past, and if there is a change within people, there are identifiable reasons why people would change their social organizations. They may not be reasons we consider economically or naturally motivated, but they are reasons nonetheless. Absent any compelling reason, social agents and human beings are free to act. The first constraint on those agents is other such agents, and this is inherent to every concept of ecology advanced. If non-social agents, like the terrain or some device are considered, they are for the purposes of ecology treated as the same sort of thing. The non-living things which would normally be considered "outside of society" are for a time treated as social equals, before the agents realize they're talking about a dog or a thing or some trivial fluctuation. We are primarily concerned with social agents that are understood to be alike in abilities and purpose, because the most proximate effect on a social agent that would regard an "ecology" as relevant is another social agent in the same niche. If there were agents who lived in different niches, they would be far more likely to have little to do with each other, and if they establish contact, the alien niches they occupy would be apparent. In the same niche, agents do not have any preferred attitude towards cooperation or competition which can be taken for granted or as a just-so story.

At first, the only niche that is available to ecology is the agents themselves. A crude ecologism revolves around identity, where the superficial qualities of agents are presumed to possess some uniting force due to inhabiting the same niche and sharing some quality. This is the ecologism of the worst and most craven fools, since it simultaneously exhorts maximal competition within the ecosystem for no real reason. Identity or myths are in of themselves not the motivator for any ecological formation. It makes no intrinsic sense that agents would align "like with like" or see the niche as intrinsically limited. At first, the only values of relevance in the ecology are the social agents themselves, and all information about them that is relevant. Without any view of technology or history beyond the immediate reach of those social agents, such aims of ecology appear absurd. It is rather the case that for the purposes of management, the most prominent feature in the terrain would be agents themselves, because it is the agency of social actors we regard as most relevant for the task of economy. Even in mundane settings like the household, the members of the family are the most relevant values, rather than the building or consumable possessions or the tools available to the family. For now, all of those constructs are not relevant to the persons and the properties of their bodies, which are the primary property allowing for any other to exist in the economic or ecological sense. Without proper agency, there is no economic activity whatsoever. From the real qualities of the social agents, which are things we must abide if society is to be a realized condition, we move away from sociology as merely the transfer of information into what we conventionally understood society to be - the assembly of human beings that coexist, whether we would like to regard their labor as productive or not. We do not get to decree by thought alone that someone does not exist and that their existence is irrelevant to society. A retard is not considered human or a member of society in any real sense, but nearly every focus of the human race concerns the lowest classes whose existence is a fact until it is snuffed out. If someone wishes to do that, then someone must exterminate the unwanted, because the damned do not fade of their own accord no matter how much the holders of ecology insist it is "natural law". Without the necessary physical step or something taking place in a material world, the society will have to abide that which it wished to cast out, regardless of any belief it held about it.

It is this - how to make the world as social agents wish it to be - that became the reason for ecology rather than mere economic decisions that were personal, or economics as a religious practice concerning the moral value of debt or a transcendant sense that such things were relevant. We could continue to speak of debt in the abstract, but every debt is paid with something material and substantive if it is to be morally relevant and be a debt worthy of consideration. A purely ideal "debt" would be nothing more than an invocation or some indulgence that can be freely reproduced or pulled out of the ass of a priest. Society in its genuine sense - which is merely information exchanged between its agents - has to become a realized thing for society to mean anything other than a vague aspersion about nature, and to assign to agents any identity that would be relevant for life's task of managing any of its affairs. Even if the assertions were not premised on the economic religion or any claim of debt or transaction that we would think of as commerce, something like this would have to happen to give society its meaning. We learn very quickly that the nominal tokens or values of things are secondary to the most proximate cause of human suffering - other humans. It would be the same with social agents of any other type, unless they are specifically instructed to regard a different type of agent as more relevant. By default, social agents relate not to superiors or inferiors but peers. Absent any information suggesting actual superiority or inferiority as a clear and present condition that they must abide, the default for a social agent is that it would regard other agents as essentially equal, if they are to be recognized as social agents at all. Since that information is not a metaphysical law - superiority would be demonstrated by a meritorious value we consider morally relevant, which implies first being able to identify and measure those qualities in persons - we would never "just-so" accept the superiority or inferiority of any entity without a chain of reasoning suggesting that it does exist. That behavior must be learned, at least enough to recognize that a superior exists that overrides the native social sense. Whether that learning pertains to the genuine state of the world in all details is not relevant. People can believe in superiority or inferiority that is far removed from anything measured scientifically or by any developed moral judgement. By default, agents would be equal in relevance if they are recognized as agents at all. The only judgement in that view that would be relevant would be if the agent exists at all or does not. This would be the basis for all other gradients of social worth or proof, and all concepts of civic worth however it is judged. Civic worth obviously implies politics among many other things, but at a basic level, social agents are judged as relevant first by demonstrating that they are in fact agents equal to someone who could make that judgement. This judgement would only be made within society by the agents themselves, because intrinsically there is no third party observer "above society" that can make this judgement for us, without being alien to the social agents. It is the social agents themselves that regard themselves as living in any sort of society or ecology, before any outside judgement can be imposed on the mind and native sense of the world. There is not, without a compelling reason, anything to suggest there is an ecology outside of society as the agents see it. There is a world outside of society, and there is more to society than we may know. We can recognize easily there are other groupings of people without an ecological concept of such a thing, and that our grouping of people in society is ultimately arbitrated by human beings rather than anything real. All of this social information and information about institutions is, at first glance, something humans or other rational agents constructed, or that we had some primitive knowledge of that allowed us to navigate society without rationally considering it in a formal manner. Society as information only exists in the mind of its agents. To a third party - let us say a psychologist examining a tribe - the subject is purely an alien, beneath the dignity of any agency whatsoever, and cannot be otherwise. The nature of the psychological inquisition prohibits the psychologist from saying much about equals in the way their disdain for the cattle-slaves is displayed prominently and proudly in every act of the institution and its inquisition. The disdain shown towards inferiors is matched by an instinctive groveling towards social superiors, where suddenly the headshrinker has no insights whatsoever about the "superior mind", no matter how spurious that superiority may be. This isn't because the psychologist doesn't know or can't know of that which is equal or superior. It is rather because of an attitude towards society and the mind that has to recognize agency of equals or inferiors that would throw off any projection or insinuation. Normal, valid people, and this is not a surprise to anyone, do not like being treated like lab rats, and the miserable treatment of experimental subjects is not merely callous human behavior. It is intended and deliberate, with full knowledge of what the human race always was, which as we know is just a fucking Satanic ape.

It is of course not a given that any such alienation is inherent to nature or ecological thinking. Far from it, the formation of stable institutions suggests a permanence to society that its constituent agents and information would not allow. At first this ecosystem is purely the realized institutional forms society takes, which are understood to relate to each other. What really happens is that all of the information that comprises the genuine existence of human beings is temporarily reduced to that which is most essential to the reproduction of society in this sense. Humans are reduced to their functions that are economically relevant, rather than their full existence which contains extraneous information and things contrary to any ecological sense. Externalities are at first ignored, but it is understood from the outset that externalities occur as the result of any economic task we would undertake. This is true within the ecosystem of the body itself, for the human body was never formed as a technocratic polity with its parts in a preferred order. Human beings, or any other agent, will leave waste products and generate heat that has no intrinsic economic value or purpose. We didn't choose to exist at all, let alone in a form we would prefer. We inherited the conditions of the past that constituted us, and the same is true of ecosystems. Though in the person the human being is just a "point of light" bereft of any technology, the establishment of agency is impossible without any property and material origin if agency is to be regarded as a real condition, and so social agents - whatever type of society we model - are presumed to possess certain base qualities allowing them to be agents. For humans this entails language, often education of some sort or adjudication that someone is politically sane and not retarded, which is a worse sin than insanity so far as the human race is concerned. Another social agent, in another time and place, may not regard sanity or intelligence as particularly relevant for its own social sense. It doesn't occur to a computer algorithm or a model of society that "intelligence" or "knowing" possesses any intrinsic value in an ecological or economic sense. All of the agency of a simulated society's constituents actually was provided by the programmer and the CPU. In that society, there really is a hobgoblin pushing along the thoughts of all agents, and we are very aware that this is not how material societies like those of humans or animals persist.


We drew a division between the native faculties of agents and any external technology which is in obvious ways a convenient fiction. The division between the agents and their tools is defined not by an average or statistical analysis, but by the barest minimum necessary for the agent to be constituted as an agent. What that barest minimum is may be argued or construed as the "social wage", but no such wages are ever actually paid in coin. It is not possible to buy one's way into validity with any seriousness, and anyone telling you that success is a payment away is drawing out the blood of a debt-slave with no actual debt on record. For those who hold a monopoly on validity, this is not just free money, but establishes their position to decide who lives and who dies. The imperium over life and death is never something that exists as a purely political conceit, as if life could not kill or live without the blessing of an institution, and it is never given for free. Whatever the genuine faculties of a human being or any other social agent, social agencies are ascribed agency only after they are institutionally confirmed as such. The confirming institution may be an assembly of people invested with this authority like a school or a draft board, or it may be persons, but it is always institutions which admit, reject, and expel members, rather than the entities that inhabit them. In the supposedly natural order, there were no institutions to judge this. There would only be survival and the assertion of force. An obvious way to assert that force would be the very social information and conspiracy society entails, and this would be a motivator to push agents into an ecosystem. We may imagine there is an equilibrium where institutions face sobering realities to regard who can and can't think or know, and to think or know is not a figment of imagination but a real condition with definite conditions. To think or know requires having food to survive, space to live, access to knowledge to acquire language, among other things, and these are not trivial or reducible. A lack of any of these things is a crippling weakness for knowledge. We may think of the needs of the human body as needs of the whole body, but in this ecological and economic thinking, all the body and real conditions of us are already subsumed to the needs of knowledge and the mind. Economics supposes that the conditions of life are managed by reason rather than life generating its own moral purposes, and ecology locks in this belief. Such a belief would be necessary to establish agency in the first place, and we are always beholden to that so long as we think ecologically. We don't always think ecologically or economically, of course. The reality is that none of this task is something we "have" to do out of some blind impulse. Once the needs of knowledge are met, the economic task and our concern with ecologies could very well be done and we can live and do what we actually wanted to do once those needs are met. Knowledge and the mind, though, are ever-greedy masters when they are not humbled by a world that did not care about their conceits. No goodwill can ever be trusted to limit the avarice of knowledge, no matter how many times the wise tell themselves that they are above this and only stupid people would be so impulsive. The reality is that the intelligent are almost uniformly the most malicious of the human race, and the stupid tend towards passivity out of fear. The stupidest are almost pathologically afraid to initiate violence, and because the stupidest are as a rule denied agency in society, they are deprived of anything that would be ecologically relevant. The "violence" of the stupid does not concern any deed, but a crime of Being that the intellectuals declared them guilty of - which is, to the purest intellectual conceit, the only crime that exists. It must be made clear that all of this is the conceit of knowledge rather than any genuine moral conviction of humans that they are actually protecting the land or society. The protection of society in the abstract is very clearly nothing more than protection of the ruling institutions and the fiefdoms the mind would declare by assertion and make real by unlimited violence. The protection of society in its genuine existence is what ecology suggests it will accomplish, by making real the institutional conceits held in society. Usually those institutional conceits are only those of the ruling institutions, and any institution that does not rule is only temporarily abided. It is an exceptional case in the human race that they hold any regard to society outside of the intellectuals' preferred vision of it, and never do intellectual masters actually want humanity to be any freer than they were in savagery. That would be anathema to their sense of themselves when the question of the retard, the invalid, and the slave must be answered with any seriousness.

In all cases, technological advance in society is driven by moral values. Even the seemingly "natural" development of life on its own power happens for reasons that the life-form finds, in a primitive sense, to fit some intent of its design. They would not be moral values in the sense rationality would appreciate or values that we would uphold as right to continue, but if someone suggests any direction of technological advance or biological development, there is a reason why this development was favored. It is never something that just happened with no cause, or a prime mover to which the world is beholden. There is no impulse of inexorable technological progress in life that wills it apropos of nothing, nor is it a given that technological advance is intrinsically good or necessary at all. Many times, technology would hurt a life-form, but is adopted out of necessity and without considering the consequences of this development. Most of the people adapted to modern technology in the 20th century, even though there was no good reason for them to do this for their own purposes, and the adoption of technology was imposed very violently by a necessity that was pressed on them by other social agents. We would not presume that because something developed organically and without deliberate effort, it is better simply because it is deemed natural, or because it was older than us or "bigger" in some sense that we're not allowed to question but must find impressive. The reasons for the seemingly inexorable advance of technology in society have little to do with an innate impulse of the agents, but a simple reality written of in previous chapters. This is that technology once understood is not lost easily, and anyone with an incentive to reverse-engineer some technological apparatus can do so in principle without any interference. If any one person finds a technology useful, it persists. Life and biological "technology" that arose without conscious or learned effort in the sense we usually regard technology is stubbornly persistent in its intent and does not die easily or by any "just-so" story that tells us the strong displace the weak. Far from it, the classical Darwinian formulation states explicitly that is not the strongest or best of species that survive, but those that flourish in their environment. Numerical superiority grants an inherent advantage, even if the life-forms in question are very crude and overwhelm a supposedly better eugenic specimen. If this technological advance occurs not in the realm of individual conceits or property but society, the ecological idea becomes more prominent as technological advance is systematized and worked out formally, and the incentives of states and rulers align with technology in a way they did not in the past. This only happens when enough key advances occur, which are beyond the scope of the present writing but have been mentioned in passing throughout this work - that being that communication can be widespread and operate over larger distances, that machines can do things that were previously impossible, and a theory of systems and machines allows novel phenomena that were the realm of fantasy a thousand years ago. While there may be true "accidents" that are the result of some unlikely confluence of fates, or ideas that seemed to come out of nowhere if not for some random butterfly in the mind, we would see in retrospect why those events did happen or why the random event was very useful. In the main, though, the tendencies of life to develop are the result of its responses to the environment, which include the other agents it must abide if it wants to live in a material and real world. There would be no struggle for life if there weren't other life-forms or some events we can determine that threaten life. Even if we imagined a world where life faced no struggle, there would still be a direction life takes for whatever aims it had, even if the life were simple in its intent. We need not concern ourselves with evolution again, because the question of agency is for ecology settled before we can speak of managing ecosystems. It becomes clear as soon as economics is at all conceivable that the technological means of humans or similar agents are extensible, and the extent of this potential is limited but vast. We do not have a crystal ball to predict all possible technologies for tens of thousands of years, and usually futurist predictions fail spectacularly in a generation. A persistent reason for the failure of futurism is that the futurist conceits are held not by competent scientists but by cargo cultists who profane the very concept of science with their stupidity. It is not that technology is an alien to humanity that is naturally good or bad, and such conceits are pointless. They say more about human vanity than anything about their technology. For technology to be truly technology as we appreciate it suggests not merely an intellectual exercise on a whim, but directed advance of learning to realize a material outcome.

When social actors are deliberate, their use of technology is apparent to them, starting with their own body. Very likely, such agents wouuld already have inherited some tool use that assisted the development of rational planning faculties in the first place. It wouldn't be necessary, as a different environment makes tool development difficult. Aquatic animals would face greater difficulty fashioning any tools, among them the inability to construct fire in that environment. We cannot yet consider the environment from which technology can draw its raw material, but we can presume that it exists. The "biome" doesn't map onto a fixed definition like "here there is a desert" or "here there is a mountain". Humans can fashion out of many distinct biomes the same organization of society without any modification, other than spatial details that are not relevant to the information ecology entails. The preferred biome of an agent is not some type of land they are hardcoded to accept, but that which the agent's native features would operate in. This may be as simple as the happenstance occurrence that life has little reason to travel far if they establish a good thing in a particular place, without any necessary reason why that land is technologically necessary or holds any importance whatsoever. There is no "blood and soil" that can be demonstrated to work as a natural law, or a technological reason why anyone would have an attachment to their place of origin or any particular parcel of land. Nor is it something determined entirely by inborn qualities which are regarded as fixed from birth to death, or some essential part of the agent that ties it to a biome. Technology of some sort is very useful, and the body itself is deployed not as a passive condition of being but as technology like the axe, bow and arrow, or any other tool humans device. So too is communications like speaking a type of technology, and the knowledge that humans acquire becomes a type of technology once symbolic language is possible. This view of everything as technology is not really inherent to our sense of knowledge or learning, where everything is judged as a mechanism for technological advance. No such fascination with technology is inherent to the mind itself, and realistically, the technology we use is not intrinsically consequential to our existence or something that must define us. Technology as a general trend is relevant instead because of this ecological question, If not for that, then technology appears to us not as a substance generally alienable like human labor is, but as disparate tools which serve a function and advance because we wanted them to exist for that function. Until the economic and ecological thinking took root, technological advance proceeded not by any organized effort in society, but by inventors who saw necessity and people who saw technology worth preserving. A sense of making something newer, bigger, and better as a self-perpetuating impulse did not grip human societies in the way it would once systems thinking became more prominent in the 17th century. It is not that ancients had no concept of technological advance or science, or that this was possible. Technology did advance and humans learned from past knowledge, making iterative improvements to their technology and technique. This advance, though, was subordinated to the needs of institutions which desired technology, rather than a society-wide interest in technology that was presumed to be active as an impulse that couldn't be held back. Often technology advanced for military applications, or because a laborer saw some new tool as part of their habit of learning things or wanting to produce more or different qualities of things.

Whether humans regard technological advance as an impulse in its own right or something that advanced in fits and starts by necessity, there is no denying that technology exists and affects the society just as our bodies and actions do. By no means was the modern attitude towards technology guarnateed, and the modern attitude itself is not as uniform as ideologues need it to be. Very often, those who do understand technology and engineering have nothing to do with the cargo cult ideologies which are hostile to technology, science, and reality itself, and can't stand those squealing ideological retards, and the ideologues are indeed retarded. Technology in principle exists as an extension of social agents to be technology. If machines just happened to exist, we would not call them technological machines, but events in nature which we describe as natural machines. For example, we do not typically refer to the native faculties as technology because they arose in nature. We do not refer to a naturally occuring rock or tree as technology, but both can be described with mechanistic thinking in great detail. Whether a machine is natural or artificial, it is never a tool that conforms to our conceits about it, or any conceit we held by designing the thing. Real objects always exist on their own terms - and so, when we lose a tool and it is acquired by another, a piece of technology that we constructed or made a part of ourselves is no longer ours, but exists in society. The technological device has a link to its genesis and the history that forged it, and the chain of custody passes from agent to agent. If the device is unattended, someone who eventually finds it will ask who built it, or what natural process was at work to create it. No device we construe as technology just-so existed. This is different from events in the world or things we do not regard as "technology" in this sense. We can accept, after enough inquiry, that something we encounter exists and we either do not know its origin or consider its history irrelevant to the matter at hand. With technology, though, the intent in its construction - even if that intent is something we projected onto a natural thing - is very relevant to the moral value we attach to it. If one person built a device, we presume that the knowledge to do this is freely reproducible and so is the machine in principle. The human body itself is no exception, for humans sexually reproduce by their choice in the vast majority of unions, and at least one partner always chose or was held culpable, or was pushed into the situation by a third party in unusual cases. Mothers will know who the father is if they are at all competent and fathers are not as witless as the infantilizing narratives tell us they would be, and in any event, carrying the child to term and raising it requires a number of choices to accept the child. It is nearly impossible to force a determined woman to carry a child to term, or not kill it at the first opportunity. Failing this, the mother will take steps to sabotage an unwanted child and turn it into a living abortion, to prove the point, and many times undesirable children are not killed but turned into living abortions, examples of the human race's most ancient rite.

Advance of technology begins the process of transforming society from an assembly of agents into "society" in the abstract, bereft of its origins. There is no natural law suggesting this would happen or had to happen, but an ecological thinking encourages it and attempts to make it a real condition against the wishes of those agents or any reason why they should abase themselves to a false collectivity. It is not that ecology is the necessary link between people, but that ecological management seeks to claim all connections in the ecosystem and declare what they can and cannot be. The people in their genuine form relate to each other and a world outside of them without the mediation of an "ecosystem" or any inherent economic logic, and could describe their coexistence as what it actually is or with any other mechanism we would like to describe a social system as a singular unit or a number of units. Ecology demands a singular explanation - that society is subordinated entirely to the economic - and that no other relation between social agents can exist. It is as if the agents are Luciferian points of light detached from any of their prior conditions and history. Before the ecosystem can be established fully, this step is presumed to take priority over history or any actual condition of the terrain. It would have to be so for ecology to be sensical - it begins not with the land itself, but the agents around whom an ecosystem would be relevant. The land or historical events do not exert a passive force compelling social agents towards any preferred behavior that must be respected in all cases. It is necessary for ecology to claim that social agents make their history, before it can jump to the conclusion that they do not make it as they choose. Such a statement implies that there is someone or something that will choose in the place of those agents, which would be ascribed the same agency and will as actual knowing entities. No such knowledge exists in the land or the past though. It only exists in the social agents, and must in order for ecology to be a sensical interpretation of social existence. Even if "there is no such thing as society", those who manage clearly take an interest in the agents which were once members of a society and had a memory of a time before ecological management. All technology, including that which was extracted from nature in a form that was suitable for use as it was, is seem as an imposition on reality, and at the same time, it is more real than the world it displaces. It does this by claiming all that is solid melts into air, and then that a new thing must be accepted in whole before it has truly formed. The hidden power in such a world relies on historical knowledge and a complete accounting of the terrain. Social agents look, for economic reasons, towards other agents as the chief agents forming the ecosystem and events around them. Here, economic reasoning is used to make moral and philosophical claims that are intentionally spurious, because those who monopolize historical knowledge and political secrets always envision themselves as the true governing power, cajoling the agents who are now reduced to flotsam like anything else appropriated in nature.

It is here where technology, which was once developed by the working classes and those who had a direct use for technology, became alien and co-opted by those who despised technological advance that did not serve their purposes. If we could imagine society in a highly primitive state, there were no classes as such. Every human, or any other social agent, was the same low scum as any other, and their distinctions however meritorious never actually counted for much. The first division of labor, and the only true division, was to sort the valid and free men from the invalid who were not to be part of the society. This process could not have been carried out willfully with the native faculties available to people, on the terms of those faculties. Even if the "technology" to carry this out was nothing so substantial that it granted to primitive technocrats an unassailable monopoly on this decision, the very native faculties of people would suggest that this division of labor will not actually endure. It could only be actively enforced. To speak of a division of labor is to speak of a controlled ecosystem where this concept can be made real by force, rather than implied by statements of fact like the differing abilities of agents. That people are distinct in their inborn or acquired qualities does not necessitate any division of labor as such, nor do people have any instinctive knowledge of who is good at what or the exact qualities of a person. People of distinct abilities have no inherent reason to regard those distinctions as unassailable or desirable, or that they are even engaged in any "division of labor" with those alien to them. The true division of labor is established not by any essential quality of the agents, but by what those agents do and how those agents live day by day. Absent a compelling reason, an individual has to manage all of the expectations placed about it regardless of any ability to do so or what other human agents are doing somewhere in the world. It is necessary to presume that those agents are bound to an ecosystem to speak of a division of labor within it. The boundaries of the ecosystem may be vaguely defined, up to inclusion of the whole universe or at least a single planet like Earth. It is always presumed in asserting a division of labor that the domains where it applies are fixed and can be arrested by knowledge, and that this division of labor accounts for a distinction that is morally worthwhile rather than merely a statement of fact. We wouldn't care necessarily if one man is a worker while another is a politician, as if that state of affairs were permanent or granted to the latter any more moral worth than the former. The worker will have to concern himself with politics or else politics will come for him, and the politician natively has to contend with the reality of labor if he wants to have anything to command in politics.

Here we see the ecological mindset is strongest among those who share in the technological interest of life. This interest does not map on cleanly to any class, but it is not the landholders' interests but those of the city-dwellers who would subsume the landholders and take the land from them, by hook or crook. Landed aristocracy rebrands themselves as technocrats who are obviously smart and have experience managing the land, even though their management of the land or anything leaves much to be desired. The technological interest does not pursue technology as an extension of labor, but seeks to divorce technology from laborers outright. By no means is ecology locked into this understanding of technology and preference. For one, ecology can apply to non-living agents or things we treat as agents for the purpose. In this case, we reverse what Darwin did by bringing political economy into the study of nature, and instead insert a pseudo-natural science into our political and economic arrangements. But, we recognize that non-living agents would not have any reason to engage in the same sort of struggle for position. Even for living agents though, it is entirely possible to reject this value regrding technology in our decision making. Living agents can recognize the incentive exists without succumbing to it inexorably. Nothing in technology suggests that its rise is inevitable or follows any preferred teleology. Far from it, the nature of technology is that it has no such teleology, and often exists to disrupt such plans. By suggesting an inexorable and singular "historical progress", it is hoped to arrest history by arresting all technology. It is not the ideas or symbols that arrest history by the power of thought alone, but the arrest of technology which has a real existence outside of us. Only in this way can such "historical progress" ever be asserted, and in doing so, the boundaries of life can be artificially constrained. Whether someone actually wants this, or only seeks to constrain life's behaviors in ways that would be understood as beneficial for the good of society or some non-economic purpose we hold dear, is an entirely different matter. We don't have to do any of this simply by the fact of technology or what humans are, or any life is, or even what knowledge is generally. We could easily dismiss all of the perverse incentives, and usually do so out of necessity. We were able to dismiss those perverse incentives for most of history when we had to, and those perverse incentives are followed because there were those in society who always such such a situation as a goal to attain. Learning that this was possible did not guarantee their success, as if everyone else was fooled and had to go along with a vocal minority that should have been ignored.


Ecological thinking - thinking of political economy taken to real-world conclusions about states, which is then generalized to remove the political element from it - concerns itself not just with a theory of technological progress, but a sense of its history and the origins of technology as a process. It is this which guided the development of economics as an idea. Before this, anything we would call "economics" was seen as a political how-to guide, a precursor of sociology, or religious treatments of the concept of debt and loans and obligations to society and to its members. A general theory of technological progress did not exist as a science. There were philosophical treatments of technology which were either intrinsically political or spiritual, where the role of technology was something to be co-opted by rulers. The rulers, in the main, did not want technological progress in the modern sense and did everything possible to stall it, because technology would be a destabilizing element and required a startup cost to create. The precursors to allow general technological development are more than learning or the construction of suitable machines. The very idea of education was at first limited to favored classes, and only begrudgingly was education extended to the commoners. This extension was entirely driven by a philosophical or religious impulse to get in front of anything that would suggest education independent of the ruling interests and the classes that seized power, and so education and the sentiments of the ruling classes were always inextricably linked. This is not new, for education conceptually concerned the political from the outset. The education of primitive society was no different, and because education was tied to the concept of the political very intimiately, it is outside the scope of the present writing. What is important here is not to suggest that technology or science are intrinsically political, because they very obviously not. There's nothing "political" about an axe or a gun that makes it essential to a particular polity or proprietary in any sense. The treatment of technology or knowledge as property - or far that matter anything that people covet or the people themselves as property - is a convention that has nothing to do with technology or science intrinsically. It is not a convention that is socially necessary at any point, or even politically necessary. The existence of the commons throughout history and its legal recognition makes the insistence on property very farcical. This is especially so when it is known property can be reassigned and debts written off with nothing more than a handshake, making the sacrosanctity of something so flimsy absurd if anyone thinks about it for five minutes. What is important is to understand that in this ecological thinking, the history and genesis of any technology and of the people themselves becomes a part of the ecology itself, and must be so. If the goal is to fix social actors to a time and place, then technology becomes less a tool like any other part with potentials, but something fixed to a time and place and stripped from agency. The history and genesis of something would overtake its use in the present. So too would it become possible and necessary to rewrite history in the model to divorce the thing in our thinking from its actual history, which we would have regarded if not for this conceit. Even if we are aware of this editing of history, merely by placing technology in a grand scheme of historical development we are suggesting a grand model of history, and reality must be made to conform to the theory rather than our sense of history developing from our best knowledge of what likely happened, or our memory or media record of what happened. If there is a media record of the past, then it becomes necessary to state baldly that reality conforms to the theory over what sense and reason would suggest. Even if we are as honest as we can be in doing this, the ecological view of technology invites historical review, and for the first time an arc of history can be suggested to place technology and science in some order of events. This would be necessary to link technology into an overall system, so that technologies that have little to do with each other can be united by some principles that are knowable.

Technology developed in a real world in the environment social actors find themselves in, rather than technology translating immediately to realized form by will alone. Men make their own technology, but they do not make it as they choose, in other words. If people have a history and things have a history, then their relations have a history as well and can be taken together to form a system that is seen as fixed and complete. Any technology to be technology is a thing understood. Tools are not open systems without any intent, even when the "tool" is a naturally occuring object used for purposes that are learned by the user. Any input or output concerning the tool is managed for the tool to be useful. If that is true for individual things, it could be made true for societies and complex systems. There are two approaches to this. The crude one, used by many idiots, is to reduce the complex system to something far simpler than its genuine constitution. This is not suitable for worthwhile ecological management, but it is often the way ecologism is taught to those who are made into slaves by it. The other is to methodically catalogue all that exists in society's potential appropriation and disallow anything to exist outside of it. There would not be any real management of the house if one did not know the contents of that house. This cataloguing did not need to take the form of overbearing control, where if something is known it must be considered an enemy. We do not consider the possessions of our house to be enemies at all. If someone were to account for the ecosystem of human society as a whole, that includes the political machinations of humans. This would mean the kind of total information ecology entailed meant total control over all that exists in society, including the people who are necessarily catalogued as technology just like any other. Here, "men become machines", as the more idiotic koans of 20th century philosophy proclaimed. Men did not become mere machines though. It is rather that their human qualities would become parodies of what they were presumed to be in a free society. Doing this was a choice. There is a version of this where the information ecology pertained to, including its political content, did not become this malevolent. Yet it did, because there was nothing in the world that could prevent those with a mind to do so from pressuring others endlessly until the society broke. The philosophy of struggle would become absolute. This though is a political decision rather than a natural one. Even if no such decision were made, it is not technology or information alone that holds any of this power, as if knowing the name of something truly allowed someone to hold worldly power of it. We could know the names of all actors that amount to anything in an ecosystem and it would not change one iota the machinery all of them hold. Far from it, the ruling ideas throw in the face of the conquered just how much they have lost, only to demand immediately afterwards that this power cannot be referenced. The full reasoning why must wait for another time, but sufficient exposure to this failed society tells us that is operative. The myth is that the predelictions of a few madmen are the only possible nature, because they can violently recapitulate the genesis of the human race and tell you "this is all you are and all you will ever be". It is done on the individual level to forbid forever redemption and it is done at the level of polities and large social groupings, so that any race is reduced - as intended - to its lowest common denominator. It is only effective so long as the human beings are treated as ecological information, rather than the machines being effective for some spooky and unknowable reason. Controlling the minds of the subjects though is not really necessary. All that is necessary is to constrain their action so that the limited resources of a state can be deployed to snuff out all resistance to this plan. The ecological pseudoscience does not make this situation a fait accompli, but would be a necessary step. So too would any solution to humanity's modern condition require working through economic and ecological knowledge. No one prevailed by remaining ignorant of how masters controlled slaves, and this is true of any slave hoping to rebel and true of any master hoping to prevent rebellion.

It is with the development of history that technological development can be seen in the abstract with viable models, rather than guessing something works. In some sense, humans have always asked where they came from and the nature of time itself, and this had been carried on without a formal theory of history or approach that regarded accuracy. Long before Herotodus[4], rulers would erect monuments to their victory, and temples would be established, leaving behind some record of what happened. One reason why histories became more widely read is because it became necessary to do so in a world where civilization formed empires rather than warring states, and one way or another, the peoples of the world would be dragged into history, usually in a very unpleasant role. A democratic society, or what counted as such in the city states, meant knowledge of history and particularly political history became much more important for any man who deemed himself literate. Cruder systems of recounting annals and genealogies where refined not by the men who worked or by any scientific method, but by philosophers and gurus. The historical method that was developed was an intrinsically political concept of history. Scientifically, what happened in the past would not intrinsically mean anything about the present or the future. The past doesn't exist in any real sense. Science is conducted by humans with memory, and even the short delay in mental processes or any communication places all of the information humans work with at some point in the past. The purely materialist view of history has no use for any grand narrative or story suggesting that many unrelated things are tied to a political undetstanding. Any overarching schema to sort scientific knowledge is tested against the body of evidence as best as possible. This has proven to be unworkable to allow for the assessment of the past in scientific lab conditions, preserved without the need of any trust or honesty. We would not need to presume that present objects from the world lie to us as profusely as humans do. Science develops laws based not on a political substitution of fact but independent observation, which is confirmed time and time again when science is done in a sound manner. The laws of nature can only be ascertained based on a belief that there was a past world that does not itself change, and we can from many observations throughout life build a crude framework to develop more formal theories. The political treatment of history is entirely different. The distrinct approaches to history are not defined by materialism or idealism.[5] They differ because the scientific view is anathema to the aristocratic political view. If politics were conducted by working men and women and they had a genuine stake in society - if this was actually a democratic society - the thinking of history would be skeptical and consider human behavior to be conspiratorial behavior and that this conspiracy must not be allowed to assert what it has asserted. The aristocratic view welcomes opportunities for conspiracy and malice, not because the people are naturally too decent to conspire, but because the aristocrat and the political mind spends more time lying while everyone else has to sacrifice something and compromise themselves. Economics, on the other hand, is driven by moral concerns, if not political concerns which are at root informed by some moral value rulers hold. There is nothing scientific about economics. Ecology seeks to command technology and science and can only do so from the aristocrats' point of view. The native connection to sense of the people would see their society and place in it very differently from the philosophies and theories of the world that are allowed political relevance. Politically, the truth of the past or the truth of any scientific claim is no more relevant than it needs to be for political rule to continue. Rulers are beholden to the truth when the world imposes this on men, but the politician can only spite the world. The reasons why become clearer with a better understanding of the political, but in short, politics presumes free men who do not naturally have any rights or freedom in the sense that those words are regarded. The political person is always above the natural world as has to be. To depoliticize the masses while exhorting them to believe "nature is political" produces the perverse incentives and outcomes we have seen for the past century and a half.

For ecology to function as a useful discipline for its task, it has to at least accept the possibility that all political acts are suspect, while at the same time ecology is intrinsically a political matter. Scientifically, we would study societies and environments and suggest a machine that is open, and thus there is no ecology to manage. The management of ecosystems is always a political interest rather than something that the natural world had any design to create of its own accord. For individual people who are not intrinsically and certainly not wholly political animals, ecology is alien to their interests. The aim of individuals or groups of people who contest for position against the state or within the state does not regard any "natural order" or ecological order for themselves. It is for those who adopt ecologism a claim violently held against others and an ideology to be told to the slaves, while the masters are pulled aside and given the real ruling ideas. It is not necessary then for ecology to be scientific or an accurate understanding of anything that happens. It is only necessary for ecology to be developed enough to suggest that an ecosystem, however designed, is closed to all but approved information. Those who hold approval of information claim that they are the masters and that "knowledge is power", and because those who conspire to rule through ecology consider themselves monopolists of knowledge, it makes sense for them to make ecology as totalizing as possible. Economics did not intrinsically feature this. Ecology, in all the forms that it took, did, because to acknowledge what ecosystems really are would obviate the need of "ecology". Ecology would have no explanatory power. The true explanatory power of ecology is that it is an understanding to suggest ways a manager can deploy force to control human behavior. In the formative stage of any ecosystem, the social agents - humans in our case - are the center of the ecosystem, around which its defining characteristics are established. Ecology claims both fundamental connection with the natural world and divorces the masters completely from the muck of the world - and most importantly, the slaves who are to become part of the land, much like the idealized version of serfdom.

It is this that is the darling of every philosopher and cajoler, and this image that they invoke when they speak of Man modify his environment. They envision themselves being that Man, and the lessers were just not "natural leaders" in their typical self-congratulating parlance. The reality of humanity's relations with its surroundings is not that the imperious will asserted its primordial essence and thought-form on the world, or that the world did likewise. That has always been a political logic and a really shitty one compared to anything that would actually rule men. It was designed after all to be corrosive to the virtue that a republican or democratic society required to not turn to shit immediately, run by people who have always despised the people or anyone who would tell them no. They are the only ones who can say no, or if they can push it, they are the only ones who allow "yes" and permission for anything to happen.

What humans, or any other agent, do to construct ecology is ultimately a conceit in their minds, rather than any actual natural boundary or separation from nature by the conceits of a power-mad mind. It is not an empty conceit, for humans do affect the world around them. All of this effort to modify the world is done with other social agents in mind, if it is to be constituted as an ecosystem. As mentioned, individuals have no need of any such concept and find it alien to every interest they would hold and every sense they hold about themselves. Individual people are aware that their true existence is one where their faculties are split between competing aims and wants. It is the necessity of individual life-forms with central nervous systems like ours for the mind to assert its dominion over its own body, so that the conflicting parts are oriented towards any worthwhile goal. This orientation is rarely ever perfect, but the orientation of individual life-forms makes sense to them. The organs of the body do not have a mind of their own or wants that a person would respect over the well-being of the whole. The egotism of cloistered fools seeks to impose their own sense of themselves as a natural law, but nothing about our existence was ordained by nature or protected the mind. The world protects us only from the worst abominations, all of them that we know of arising from the malice of living creatures rather than the elements or some bad juju in the lifestream. For individuals outside of this ecological concept of society, they have to reckon with their own limitations. They are first humbled by the world and all of the forces of actual nature, and perhaps learn from that. Most of us though have a far worse threat than the world to consider - other humans. Most of us learn from an early age that other people do not like being berated or cajoled and that our efforts to do so are not likely to end well. All of our technology as individuals is utilized primarily to meet threats from other people in some way, even if the danger of other humans is not immediately apparent. Absent the threat from other humans, it would not matter if we do not meet some arbitrary standard set to be impossible to reach without a cheat code handed to those in the know. None of that has ever made humans better, for it only exists as a great filter to humiliate and lock out undesirables. Nothing is gained by playing that game, winning it, or even overcoming it. It would have been better for our individual interest and the collective interest of everyone in a society to not allow such games to dominate our private affairs, and that would require the threat of other humans to be answered for. This might have been possible if humans overcame their genesis and decided 10,000 years of ritual slaughter and backstabbing was enough. Human understanding of history though was to be monopolized by trained liars and then a false history would be superimposed over events those who lived through them knew well, once enough time had passed and the losers of the last struggle have been sufficiently marginalized.

We did not arise with this ecological conceit fully formed at the level of society. So far, no philosophy up to now has really considered the consequences of technocratic society and ecology, because the latter was made a sacrosanct shibboleth, and the former was a fait accompli when it asserted its existence. Until the land can be fully controlled - until the long-run goal of every state in history is attained - humanity's environment is dominated by the social agents, their machines, and their history. Humanity only can relate to other things as what they are, or what they appear to be at first, and this is sufficient for managing any legitimate matter ecology pretends to serve. To the crude mind who does not understand the modus operandi of those who govern, they see ecology and human society like this, imagining everything as its own spirit, given a name and assigned expectations based on past experience with such things. So far as any unity of all those things exists, it is a religious matter or a shorthand, since dealing with individual things in large numbers is taxing due to the limitations of the human mind and its effort. Even if we supposed all that existed was unified as a "just-so" story, we would have to suppose there was a way in which disparate agents were united. There would be causes and effects between the social agents and the things they appropriate, which is the only basis for any concept of a unified "thing" that we call society in the abstract. Society in the genuine sense that we regard such a thing as relevant did not need any "unification". It was necessary to replace that common sense understanding of society with something entirely alien, and declare that society is as unknowable as God. The decision to do this is deliberate and not one asserted out of ignorance or laziness. It is recapitulated violently no matter how obvious it is to you and me that this does not work and never can work, even at first sight. This idea of ecologism was always catered to particular interests in society. It is not a given that aristocrats are given over to an ecological mindset, or that they would would automatically consider other humans to be livestock. For most of history, aristocrats didn't regard anyone outside of their club as relevant at all, as like all humans, they love favoritism and membership in institutions, and despise those who do not get with the program. The program now was to lock down the world in accord with those who controlled technology not just through their tools, but through a general theory of knowledge that could be communicated and reinforced over large distances for the first time, and with far greater knowledge of the machine that is the human under management.

This integration could only be realized by education. All of the machines and communications a master may envision cannot by their mere utilization make victory a fait accompli. It remains the case that no "natural slavery" can be said to exist, nor for that matter that natural monopolies or natural aristocracies exist. Any unification of people suggests their subordination to something to be a realized condition. Without that, they would remain individual entities, whatever their relations to each other may be. If individuals were constructed in such a way that they were integrated in thought like a singular body, they would be very different creatures and those creatures would still face the same question of how disparate social agents are integrated. There is no reason this cannot happen, and in some sense the human subject is a product of their society. Humans could not stand alone for much at all, where all of their wordplay means nothing and they exist opposed to many other humans, who would not be averse to conspiring against an individual. The people who claim belief in "historical progress" as this Demiurge like force rely on a very human intervention in education to enforce that claim. History does not intrinsically have any orientation towards progress or regression to the primordial condition. It is always that same regression to primordial light that is really what such beliefs point to, and the reason for that is purely to defend eugenic interests, or to feed self-sustaining delusions that are older than the human race and contributed to its sorry condition. Education, like any technology and anything humans do, never "just happens", as if by some unknowable impulse. It may be forgiven if we spoke of casual conversation or the drunken behavior of humans in their typically preferred frame of mind. Nothing in an educational setting is left to chance, and conspiracy is the default mode of thought of educators. They do not want a world of forthright actors, and never did. They want a world where students conspire against each other, even when such behavior is clearly maladaptive. Any peace or end to the conspiracy is only a temporary measure to prepare the next scam. It is not something done out of some petty avarice or bad moral fiber, and is never an accident or something done out of ignorance. Such malice is inherent to the intellectuals as an interest in society, and especially those who hold the educational institutions and would be the gurus. The one saving grace is that there is nothing stopping any human, even the lowest of them, from conspiring in kind. What results is a battle of intellects to produce machines with the aim of controlling other people first and foremost. Any effect they have on the world outside of people is secondary to the struggle between minds. This would not be inherent to human sociality in general or even to political sense. Cooperation is not just politically expedient in many cases but desirable, for the political agents have no real benefit from this intercine conflict after all of the excuses and posturing is done. It is the conceit of those whose only asset is their monopoly on intellectual production to enclose the world, and this creates the bizarre situation where common knowledge is obscured and esoteric tricks and systems of occult lies are treasured. It is this that makes the seeming "contradictions" of capitalism entirely sensical to those who would conspire, and why the conspirators prefer to maximize those contradictions to sow as much chaos as possible. Absent the monopoly on intellectual production and all sense of what is valued, there would not be a particularly good argument for the monetary arrangement. There would be the interests of established property, which relied on those claims enduring or being transformed into new claims that secured what the property holders wanted out of their assets. The intellectual on the other hand both despises money - since it implied a level of independence from thought leaders - and lusts for money and the shortest possible route to it, because it is a token most of all of an imperious will to keep mankind enslaved by debt and a moral obligation towards those tokens, so long as finance can be co-opted by an intellectual group that sees finance as their tool, rather than a means to an end as most people would have it. Why we would abase ourselves to Mammon in such a way, when we clearly know better, was never premised on any truth or wisdom to doing this. It was done because it could be done, and enough fear could be instilled to terminate a thought process suggesting it could be any other way. The sole exception would in the end be granted to a clique of people who were truly above money. The artful dodge of the bad anarchist is to claim that property was the culprit of the crime, rather than an imperious lust for tokens of value which were judged not by any merit we would hold, but by the values of those who command the ruling institutions alone. Changing property to possession does not change the genuine heart of the problem - that humans were educated to believe this arrangement suited their aims and that a new scam could be engineered when the old one no longer worked. All the way to today, this creation of scams has worked, and the creation of scams in the past century is an industry producing a whole new system every generation, recycling and regurgitating the ruling ideas in new forms and wearing out the elders who lost the great conspiratorial game.

It would be quite impossible to suggest this is the product of the history of human beings or anything they produced, or any confluence of such things as what it actually is. In short, it was not possible to impose this social engineering unless society in the genuine sense were abolished and replaced with "society", the great and terrible visage of the ruling institutions imposed on the world. Therefore, ecology came into being, and the first ecological claims of Malthus are spurious and stupid claims a child could see through. It was never a matter of knowledge or truth that this was how nature worked - only that such pedagogy can, with sufficient force, be made true because anyone saying no would be humiliated and broken and selected to die. It is this - the selection of who lives and who dies - that separates ecology from a standard sociological treatment or an understanding of materialist history. History and economics did not intrinsically concern the question of who lives and who dies, as that was properly speaking a political question that was settled not in the past but in the here and now. Ecology is the first claim of the technological interest and the class that grew around it to untrammeled authority, dispensing with past alliances and decencies that mitigated the absolute worst qualities of the human race. At first, it can only create crude models that operate more on the bigotries of humans and often the stupidest of the race at that.

It is this substitution of the agents that comprise society for the "whole" of ecology that is at the heart of the entire project. Rather than society as a genuinely united entity like a nation, which entailed some political or spiritual foundation, society is reimagined as a contraption fitting the design of a thought leader, moved by thought alone. History becomes not an assessment of the past, but another tool to rewrite the "code" of society so to speak. It is here where the systems thinking mentioned in the first book finds its niche. There is no reason not to view the society as a system with parts like any other, and attribute to it tendencies that are not contingent on the mere information or an assortment of facts, such that the system cannot be described merely as an assembly of parts. What is done with that is not fixed in ny particular direction. The society is not an organism in the sense that individual life-forms are, and if it were, it would be a very bizarre one, rife with contradictions and not integrated in any of the ways life usually is. The society attacks itself and yet it is presented as inescapable, and this is intended. There is no reason to believe this is what society actually is, but such an image serves institutions that manage and rule people, and those who hold the institutions decide that they can with enough force make reality. To make this stick, all alternatives must be made absurd, and the faculties of the social agents must be measured and policed. In constructing ecology, the individuals are obliterated and replaced with an abstraction, which then invades the actual bodies and their relations. They are made beholden to the imperatives of politics and the economic interests of those who rule, rather than their own interests. This is inherent to the concept, even with a more benign ecology that recognized what it was doing in constructing such a contraption. It would be possible, even easy, to circumvent this, but because there were people who could violently recapitulate their preferred vision of reality and nothing that could stop them, humanity became what it became in the 20th century. The full reasons why this works entail political thought that is not immediately evident from any economic necessity or any obvious spiritual authority we would actually have to abide, and those reasons do not involve that the rulers are inherently bigger, stronger, or better by any worthwhile metric. Very often the ruling aristocracies are fickle and obsessed with the stupidest shit the human ape could possibly do, which is saying a lot. The construction of an ecology is the construction of an alternate history rather than merely a recollection of facts, because no fact except the claims of empires can make an ecosystem "real". We may encounter a natural habitat or a concept of natural boundaries for a given life-form, but they never conform to parcels of land to be managed by the self-appointed rightful stewards. Those habitats are as malleable as people are. The aim of the ecologist then is the be the one directing that change, cajoling the world to fit its preferred shape, rather than do what technology and human genius had done many times. It seeks not to understand the world or even change it, but arrest it in place to make sure nothing disrupts a claim that is essentially eugenic. If we were interested in understanding systems that we can ecosystems for their own sake, we would not invoke ecology but systems thinking and the genuine history of people and society. It would ask a very different question, and everyone asking that question was to be terminated unless they were sanctioned to direct history and the world by thought alone.


Only after ruling out the first three constraints does ecology manage what it purports to manage - the natural environment which existed, at one time, before humans did. There is no preferred point in nature where "pre-history" is separated from recent historical existence. In one sense, everything we do and everything we are is "pre-historical" from the standpoint of when this management takes place. The human society is already part of the natural environment, and so what has happened and what is happening now has to be accepted as a given. That cannot change, and in the moment humans can only act as they do. After the fact, what is done is done and cannot be undone. Our models of general laws of motion for social agents are just models, in which we suppose history could have turned out another way, or institutional behavior can be modified. The underlying life-forms in those institutions would have to conform to the theory rather than institutions being nothing more than the product of humans doing what they have done, if the managerial conceit is to be upheld. As mentioned in the footnote above, the "reversible" process in imperial science is little more than a shibboleth and a just-so story rather than a description of any real event. In principle every act once completed turns the original cause to nothing, and it is gone forever. A purely eugenic concept of what things are displaces what we have long known things to be in their entirety, and an imagined primordial and pure state is supposed to exist for no real reason as the baseline to return to. There was very much a genesis of stable objects, and they cannot be recreated as trivially as we would imagine in our models. The formation of something as simple as an egg is something that recurred in life after many precursors to the animal which can form and lay eggs. Shattering the egg can happen any number of ways, each of which are distinct. To believe in crass koans of reversibility requires someone to take on a mystical thinking about the origin of life and things, and deny that there is a process - the egg would "just-so" exist, and this must be believed for the imperial religion to hold true. It is consciously imposed as a lie or a working, as is the habit of imperial science and magical workings of a demonic sort. A child will probably ask, if curious, where this process really begins and how everything forms, and so a child can see through these stupid koans, but their violent recapitulation is a necessity of the imperial institution. So too is a facetious line of questioning, which is what the fake "debate" over systems mentioned in the first book was. Too many people were ready to call bullshit on the entire scam in the greater empire of the philosophers, and so these fake debates were a way to prepare the populace for the ascent of eugenics over the world they once knew. If the children retain their wits, as many hope to do despite the terror environment of schooling, they will come to the correct conclusion that there is a world outside of society, and the total society of eugenics or German ideology is a beast to avoid at all costs. This is intended, as the goal of such religion is to make humans as monstrous as the aristocracy and internalize its value system above their own. At the same time that society is total and inescapable, the child is taught to hate society and hate other children, where in a better world, such a course of action would be highly counterproductive, pointless, and retarded. It was never the world itself, but human beings who were able to construct a device which enclosed forever the mind, that made this possible. The machine works on natural principles, but the world and actual humans abhor it. It would be trivial to not live in such a society, but those who benefit from the beast will never give up a weapon that allows them to shout "die! die! die!" with impunity. It would be quite impossible to make this coherent if the appeal to power or crass nature were presented as the point. Only a certain sort of person selected for this would embrace the torture cult. Ecology is the way in which both the technological interest - necessary at this stage of history for civilization to wage its war against the world - and the lesser forms of the eugenic interest can unite, and an aristocracy among them decides who will promote. Most of all it must deny that the lower two classes have any agency or even an existence on their own terms, and so the class of labor is defined not by anything they do or are, but by their relation to property and institutions that are held by their enemies. It is necessary to make the ideas of the present society as natural as the world outside of society and fused with it, while selecting which of the original conditions will persist. In doing so, labor in the genuine sense is gone forever, abolished and reduced to a null value to be summoned at will. Whatever the bodies that provide labor do is subordinated to the ecology, rather than the world in a genuine sense or even the will of masters. It is through this ecological construct that the master hopes to bypass traditional filters that impeded slavery, and this construct is far more effective than past slaveries.

Without this, the prior conditions of the world, before human designs exerted an effect on it, do not suggest much at all about what is to be done or why we should do any such thing. Those conditions do suggest something about why humanity did turn out as it did, but this is only knowable when it is presumed that humans themselves are knowable, and humans would act in their environment as they could have. The environment is taken in total, with distance removed and demarcations drawn only by thought alone - and thus, "nature abhors a vacuum". This thinking is then superimposed on the past, as if the philosopher's conceits were natural and what everyone always thought, even though the philosophers are noted to disagree with each other strongly about the ideal society and what they are even describing. There was a world before society, but in ecological management, that world is only understood from the present. It becomes impossible to detach social information and the biases of humans from the world itself - human thought and fundamental nature must be fused together, rather than humanity and life being alien to a largely dead world. There was a world, but it becomes the aim of thought to abolish it - or in more philosophical and flowery language, sublate it, which amounts to the same thing but with an odious corruption inherent in the process. Stripped of this human need to make everything relevant to their thinking, there isn't much to the "base" world. Much of the life that existed prior to society was itself an imposition on a dead rock, and in its own way abides the same historical bias that we do in thought. Life wherever it exists is a plague and nothing more, and attempts to suggest a "balance of nature" or homeostasis of societies are nothing more than an export of political conceits onto an existence where no such thing applied. The struggle for life is chaotic and rife with stupidities that were never a part of any natural plan. If this is the plan of some deity, it's a shitty plan. But, no deity worth regarding as even a minor god would concern itself with human conceits, let alone the political conceits of people who would have been ignored in a better world. Much of what we regard as "God's plan" or anything of the sort is really a story about how we can understand natural history, absent formal scientific approaches. The ecologist substitutes a new institutional conceit where the gods used to reside, and when questioned, the ecologist shows they are more zealous than the typical priest, and describes the natural world not in any language we would regard as useful, but with contemptuous sing-song stories, intended to infantilize and retard anyone who wanted to actually manage the world for themselves. If someone did wish the goal of ecology, they would learn without too much difficulty that this construct doesn't work. The human element is not as dead at the rock it has appropriated, and it is the human and living elements that ecology concerns itself with. The raw material may be analyzed and we learn that much of the world was not as a cruder, animistic mind saw it. The matter comprising everything was never a substance created by divine spark, but chemical compounds.[6] The understanding of what actually happens, as best as we are able to reassemble it with our own sense, must be abandoned in favor of formalism and what thought leaders prefer reality to be; and so, the assembly of knowledge that was accessible to all must be occulted. For ecology to be sensical, control of all information - that of the natural world and that of the social agents around whom ecology is cenetered - must be a given. Otherwise, the question is not one of pre-existing natural conditions, but one in which human agents could choose what, if anything, to do with the things around them. Those things most importantly consist of other people. It is here where stupid comments are made where thought leaders bemoan, in a fake display, how men are made into machines and machines are made into men.

The only requirement of ecology is that it is beholden to science as a method, without any requirement that the science is "good" science - i.e. that it is science that actually refers to a truth of the world. The only requirement is that enough knowledge of the world exists to force humans to accept ecology, so they can be managed. Since humans and everything about them is as much a part of the world as anything else, scientific thought is the only way in which this ecological machine can be constructed, beyond a very crude systems thinking that is more akin to religion than anything reasonable. Science cannot make the world into something other than what it is, but it is possible for humans to construct elaborate models and dual-systems, using economic incentives to work through their worst impulses instead of anything we would do if we wanted the world to be worth living in. It is not the spiritual authority of science that makes ecology a fait accompli, for what ecology creates is pseudoscience. Scientifically, all ecology like economics would be subject to critique. While economics could persist as a science of sorts, though far removed from its origins in nature, ecology can only superimpose models and insist they be real because a manager believes this is how the world should be. Ecology can only do this by co-opting scientific inquiry whose proper origins are in the working class, and proclaiming that an alliance of aristocracy and technology supercedes "vulgar" science that you and I would rely on.

The borders we use to demarcate ecosystems were dependent on the social agents in question - and so, the environments humans adapt to are relevant. By no means is this limited to the Earth, geology, and all that we conventionally consider ecological. Virtual spaces that are abstract can be described with ecological language more perfectly than the natural world we superimposed ecology onto, and those spaces were both constructed by human beings, and took on an existence of their own once created. What is said cannot be unsaid, and there will be a record of an internet forum that can be reconstructed. If the data were not recorded, forums could be partially reconstructed by the memory of their participants, and even if no such memory existed, the effects of what happened in the past are felt in the present. History is always reconstructed by people when needed, but it can only be reconstructed in a way which regards a world outside of us that we have to accept, if it is to be history in any sense that the concept is worth anything. The primordial state before human intervention becomes a myth and a story, even though we know there is much of the world that remains untouched by society in such a controlling way. To this day, human beings remain much as they were thousands of years ago in their basic constitution and old habits remain for the reasons they originally existed, before there were managers imperiously dictating what humanity was supposed to be. To this day, many things humans construct become part of the world and do not conform to our expectation of perfect machines. There is still much of the pre-engineered world that remains intact and must remain intact, for humans have in the end done little more than rearrange patterns that already existed. To transmute known qualities into novel ones is not a trivial thing, and no amount of wizardry can transform anything into anything because we think it should be otherwise. All transformations of the world only proceed in ways they can, and that includes all of the designs humans make on the world. This is the barrier which ecology seeks to lock at a preferred boundary and monopolize, and this makes ecological claims something very different from property claims of the past.

In some way, the inner world minds construct becomes an ecology. The intent of the someone with a whole system in mind is superimposed on the world as best as feeble human efforts can. More importantly, the inner thoughts of someone, which were once judged as not worth probing due to the cost of bringing men and women of low status to the inquisition, were now things that can be terraformed and subsumed into social thought-forms that were repeatedly reinforced. The practices of socialization did not begin in modernity nor on a blank slate, but for the first time, it was conceivable to probe any mind and create, through the impression of enough fear, a subject completely colonized inside and out by the imperial religion. This concept, only crudely applied in the past and theorized as the work of sociology and social engineers, could be expounded upon with the same language as political economy. This required working through biology, since all of the intellects to be probed were living creatures as were the agents that would probe. The computer, the first non-living apparatus of "thinking", was a potential stumbling block to realize this, if the concepts of computation and reason were not commanded by thought leaders. This could only be done by a terrible stunting of the brain from infancy, if not in utero. The basic constitution of eugenics and movements like it would be set by this ecological thinking. At first, eugenics operates on a race - the lowest form of the society it seeks to dominate, reduced to its biological origins and disallowed to be anything else. It does not take long, like prehistoric man figuring out how to enslave animals, to do the same to humans, on the basis of intelligence rather than any other biological trait or any demonstrable merit. Even the type of intelligence selected for would not be meritorious or open to debate. It did not matter by what metric someone was "smarter", but rather that an intellect was smart enough to violently impose and recapitulate the eugenic creed, and terminate from its position in the institutions any intellect that dared to say no.

Eventually, after the very large body of information social existence entails is accounted for, ecology must reckon with what it purports to accomplish. The behaviors of the social agents are generalized and can be placed in any number of environments, in which the agents are necessarily tied to a particular parcel of land or a domain. Simple facts about the natural world or human constitution now become ecological conceits, and are steadily rebranded so that the world conforms to what humans are, and conversely the things - both the natural world and machines humans construct - can affect humans, just as livestock are tied to the will of the drover and all of the constructs of animal husbandry or agriculture. There is no doubt that captive animals have been modified by domestication, and the ecological concept is how this can finally be imposed on humans, foreseen in advance by those who expounded on it. What design the new ecologist had for the world may vary. A benign thinker may see ecology as a necessity to contend with other forces which will resort to ecological thinking, and this author believes the ecological concept - and the economic concept - is a valid one, with proper caveats. The particulars of natural science and its relations to humanity are not directly the subject of this book, and are better described as the work of science, where there is still scientific literature in the sense we would appreciate instead of this jabbering mess the institutions have told us is "The Science". I caution the reader to be ready to criticize all ecological conceits much as economy has to be criticized given its dismal history, and hopefully this writing is the start of a proper critique of ecology - or "political ecology", though ecology like economy intrinsically entails political existence to be anything more than an accounting task of little interest or difficulty.

I remind the reader that the only reason science could be a spiritual authority in the first place was because it allowed for independent verification. For ecology to hold true, this independent verification had to be circumvented, because independent verification would confirm immediately that any such barriers were not natural but the design of men or the intent of life which is not fixed into any preferred form that "ought" to exist. In declaring the rule of the land through science, science in the genuine sense would be replaced with something very alien, so far as the institutions were concerned. Those institutions were still beholden to science in the genuine sense, for they required accurate knowledge to command the world. Ecology is necessary if someone wished to establish a ruling idea that superceded science, while retaining fidelity to a world outside of society where any rule could happen. Anything less would be an imperfect claim of any state to rule the world, and in doing so, the road to ending science in its original sense is established. This will be revisited frequently in these books, but it is here where humanity breaks from its older senses of itself - where Man was both a type of animal and a spiritual creature - to this new sense of an institutionalized subject, commanded and controlled like any other. The rulers retroactively claim that these institutions are some sort of liberation from serfdom. The ecological conceit is something very different from the feudal claims to land and the serfs on it, which were at heart extensions of law codes dating back to Antiquity with variations around the world, each of them producing different expectations of the lord and the peasant's functions in that society. A proper view of history, as I intend to write in the fourth book of this series, would not detect any singular feudalism or serfdom that was a universal form, and thinking that such a state existed is more in line with the philosophical thought of the state than the realized social relationships at work. The lord might have fancied himself an educated and wise steward if he read philosophy and disdained the typical facade of the cult of power, but in practice, the conditions of serfdom or slavery were less than ideal compared to the untrammeled control over life a philosopher desired. The aim of ecology is to obtain the greatest slavery possible with the least will spent to command slaves, and this required stripping away any virtue the enclosed populations held, and exploiting the land just as the people are. After it is done, environmentally destructive undertakings - for eugenics has a corrosive and insidious influence over every space and twists the natural world into the aristocracy's visions of it - are portrayed not only as "Nature's law" but that anything other than this spurious law is ipso facto "bad for the planet". What is really done is the identification of aristocracy with nature itself, and sublating the old world with the new. Only in secret do fragments of the old world and old humanity remain. The "original sin" of the human race is preserved, but it purified form. For all I have written about humanity's foul origin in its deed, there was never any reason why humans were constitutionally bound to repeat the same cycle. The reasons why this happened are not economic and not solely described in this book, for that arc requires much, much more to explain how we got from there to here. What I have hoped to do with this book is lay out the laws of motion or mechanics that economic and political thought entail, with the latter being the subject of the next book and a history linking the two being the subject of the fourth. Only then can the technocratic polity, with ecology as its chief conception of value, be described as what it is, rather than with allegories from political thought that is wholly inappropriate to the real situation. Only after that description can eugenics proper be seen for what it is, rather than the facades of eugenics the aristocracy presents as the overt face of its program.


All of the prior constraints establish the "natural" boundaries of an ecosystem, centered around agents. The agents themselves are treated as information and nothing more, and have to be so. This reduces the ecosystem to something manageable for a plan, as the peculiarities and vitality of agents which do not want or need an "ecology" would make the concept moot if anyone thought about it at all. It does not occur to a primitive animal that it is "tied to nature" or "one with nature" in any spiritual sense, and it does not occur to humans at any stage of their development that they are any different. The human is acutely aware of the distinction between itself and the world before its existence, and how much knowledge or what system the human develops to arrive at this understanding - how thorough his insight into metaphysics or spiritual authority is - does not change at a basic level this connection life has with the world. It would not occur to any life, thinking or not, that it is intrinsically tied to any particular niche by spiritual or philosophical force. This is not to say that life would not be territorial or recognize that there are places it can thrive and places that are impossible to live in, but all of the possibilities are open and malleable. There is no serious moral claim that the natural world is supposed to do anything we would appreciate or consider rational, for the natural world was never premised on a rational will or intent. The natural world is not a living world, but a world that is almost entirely lifeless. The first mythology leading to ecological claims is that the natural world and life processes are intrinsically linked, and that there is no world "outside of life". Ecology necessitates a concept of total society in order to be operative, in whatever way someone would conceive it. This may be a crude system worked out without knowledge of its full implications, but it always pretends to explain the entire cosmology of ecosystems in one grand narrative, which is substituted for the actual history of anything or the world in total.

Cosmology is necessary for us to place knowledge in its proper context, and this is what ecology must subvert and hold as institutional knowledge. In the past, the geneology of human beings was important, but the origin of the material world was not particularly interesting or relevant to their concept of the world or what was morally relevant. Whether Adam was created from dust in the Earth, was just some random proto-human, existed at all, or any scientific claim derived from the Book of Genesis, didn't change the meaningful content of the story, as if the story must be thrown out because Adam was actually made out of water or quintessence rather than earth. Such a story is obviously a metaphor rather than something that literally happened and could be proven with archaeology, and religion has a number of dodges in case the natural history it suggested was questioned. The truly important cosmology in religion concerned the soul, human knowledge, the nature of the gods or whatever the spirits it suggested were relevant to our lives, and what the religion suggested about metaphysics that placed any investigation into natural history on some footing that was agreed upon. Ecology had to make claims about natural history political claims, and most of all claims about biological life had to be manufactured which edited the past or anything we are, so that humans would conform first to the conceits of a technocratic subject, and then to the eugenic creed, where Man was perfected into an expression of the aristocratic class. What results has less to do with any natural history, but a mythology that replaces the natural world and overwrites what we would have independently arrived at if we were the scientists. Only by doing this is ecology established. There is no ecology if everything the agents are is not diagnosed and commanded. Thought itself must become proprietary, enclosed, and part of the ecosystem. Since this cannot be done with actual thought, for the true form of knowledge would reject ecologism and ecologism, the command of thought would be held by institutions violently supressing any expression, any symbol, inimical to the ruling institutions. "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" must be realized. Before ecology, the ruling ideas were never shared with the masses, who were not only allowed to maintain their own conceits, but discouraged from even knowing what the rulers actually thought and did where it was possible. The habit of occultism did not begin in modernity, as if the lords of the world were naive that the vast majority of humanity wished the lord were dead and hanged in public for great justice. Too many atrocities happened for too long for the ruled to ever love their rulers, and that was not even a thing seriously sought by past regimes. It is only with ecologism that rulers delude themselves into believe the slaves will be made to love their slavery. They have so far encouraged some of the slaves to show a superficial, saccharine "love" of their squalid condition, but this is only possible by violently snuffing out anything good that the slave would have held onto, if only inside their mind and whatever small space they might steal back from the master. Ecology must claim that, and all things, for its claims to become real claims, rather than merely property claims like those of the past.

The claim of ecology is that we always "sort of" did this or that thing which is actually very modern, pressing backwards into an imagined past, as if time travel were possible while simultaneously claiming historical progress flows inexorably. This was never a claim of past governments that was serious. There was an acknowledgement of classical empires governed by laws that before the empire, states were governed by the will of men, because consistent law codes were a novel invention and the edicts of kings were never guided by any known philosophical principle. In some sense, religious institutions held untrammeled authority because the concept that there were classes who could say no was totally inadmissible, but the religious teachings would change with each incoming king, pharaoh, or whatever guru happened to teach at a given time. Spiritual and temporal authority were both the domain of willful men and no concept of law independent from that will existed, and this was understood as a development that city-states and empires encouraged. The modern ecologists harken back to this time intentionally, but superimpose the institutions of the current world empire and presume that the most ancient civilizations were secretly British imperialists. The response of anyone from Antiquity or before to today's world would be amazement that anything so monstrous and vicious would be allowed to exist, since the philosophies of Malthus were only compatible with vampiric torture cults of little worth to the world.

Such idolatry and self-abasement is inherent to ecology to make it ecology, rather than an accounting of the environment. The account of the environment, including the true conditions of its social agents, is a trivial matter compared to the totalizing concept of ecology. It is not enough for ecology to make a small number of claims about the environment or living conditions of agents. Ecology is very simply the doctrine of full and total enclosure of the commons, which had up to that time existed as a concept. Even after ecology is conceived as an idea of the elitists against those who are to be confined to this desultory existence, memory of a world where this did not apply still existed, even as its examples were further and further removed from political reality. It would not be until the declaration of the Open Society, in which "there is no such thing as society", that ecology fully displaced the older economic and political thought that was considered the default for the human race. Only by abolishing all that exists "into air" does ecology reinforce its edicts without interference from something as pesky as the ruled. Ecology demands the untrammed force of those who hold the ruling institutions and nothing less for any of its demarcations to be anything other than a cargo cult. Humans in a free society, whatever the type of society they live in, are not so stupid to believe they don't live in an environment. The savage man, and in some primitive sense the animal, is attuned to their surroundings, even if the latter has no language to separate the natural from the artificial. As my writing here suggests, this division and the suppositions that animals lack a sense of "self" or "mind" at all is an artifice of the intellectuals more than anything the animals actually think. What the animal lacks is not so much a sense of itself against the world, but a "theory of mind" which necessarily excludes the impure or any institutional force that can violently impose this separation. To the animal, to the savage, to many primitive men and to many living today who are reasonably safe from the beast that "society" became, there wouldn't be any argument for egotism or the excessive wank that is philosophy's calling card.

Information by itself does not move reality by thought alone. This had been the conceit of aristocrats since the first priest found the first brigand and joined forces. Nor do myths have power because of the performance of a ritual, no matter how elaborate and how much that ritual affects the physical world or holds meaning. It is only by making a play to claim all of the space in the mythology that ecology, and more primitive thought that led to it, can take hold. The thinking of the state and the political, which is beyond the scope of the present writing, operates with the outline of ecology already implicit in the conception of the state. If there is to be a total enclosure, there is only one arbiter which could affect that - the state, and the institutions, people, their bodies and the machines which comprise its worldly manifestation. It is here where the work on ideology, anarchy, despotism, and republicanism finds, at long last, a niche where it can thrive. Up until then, all political writers could only aspire to claim the world, and in reality controlled very little except the opinion of their fellow travelers and the loyalty of generals. The prior alliance of aristocracy and meritocracy was the alliance of the religious and spiritual gurus with warriors and a long-standing military culture where honor, property, inherited privileges and status in noble houses. That alliance saw all of the commoners - bourgeois, free-holding peasants, ruralites, the working class - as equally depraved and creatures to be kept under their thumb at all times. The true change in modernity was not so much that the warrior aristocrats were overthrown in a violent revolution - many times the warriors would reclaim their standing and acclimate to the modern order, and in many cases liberal reforms were not resisted by old men if they believed they had an in. It was not even that religious authority from the Church was replaced with spiritual authority from "The Science". It was instead a reality that a group among the commoners had, due to their utility in establishing states and bureaucracies, enough leverage to assert their own aristocratic aims, and a new alliance within aristocracy could form. This alliance did not appear overnight, ready made to command history forevermore. What had before been confirmed by metaphysical koans and the claims of religion on the soul would now be claimed by the aristocratic thinking of ecology, and it would be ecology that represented this new aristocracy rather than capitalism, the power of commerce (which was in the end controlled by banks who held a knife at the throats of the producers).

The mythological thinking must be internalized in the agents and made real, rather than it being thought which passes through them which the agents regard with their native faculties. Religion attempts to do this when needed, but only certain religious tendencies actively did this. Religion often operated by defining what someone is not to do, and what they should do, with regard to a world that is, regardless of any divine claims, outside of the church's domains. Much of religion, out of necessity, made concessions to the believers that were not the design of the priests, but ways to hook new recruits into it. Religion proper is an even more elaborate matter than politics and inevitably encounters it, but in short, religion, its practices, and the true motives of its adherents, is something very different from ideology, which strips religion down to parodic form. Ideology is a pre-requisite for ecology to be sensical. This is not true of political economy generally, which concerned a direct moral aim of social agents regarding exchange. Nowhere was "ecology" needed to manage the multifarious agents in an environment or envision their relations. In political economy, the mind which manages any agent is divorced from the material conditions that are the proper domain of science, and this is intended from the outset. No critique can presume that those political relations were ever "natural" in the same sense that chemical or physical facts are, or presume that chemistry and physics were now subjected to the humanities. For ecology to be sensical, claims binding human thought to nature at a basic level must be made. Otherwise, the thought of humans matters very little to the actual conditions humanity exists in, including each other. There is, in the end, nothing great about our metaphysical models. They do not create reality - in studying metaphysics, we are only asking questions about how we think, rather than what the world "fundamentally" is. "Fundamentally", the world appears to us as chaos, and all of our theories are the best guesses we can make. They are very well researched guesses which we refine based on facts we can judge by some spiritual authority, but nothing we want fundamentally changes what we do or how we relate to the environment. We can change relations between each other, but to the world, nothing has really changed substance by the working of metaphysics or some magic humans conjured with wordplay. Only indirectly do our shifts in metaphysical thinking affect the environment, and for every such shift, we can predict the outcome without any great ecology binding a particular ontological view to reality itself. All philosophy can do is suggest how we think. This is very relevant to our political and spiritual thought and the affairs we conduct in an imagined world social actors set apart from the material world, but the only material concern in this is that philosophy - which is to say, aristocracy - can feed vampirically off the world, which includes the subjugated people. The subjects are told that they must internalize this vampiric approach to the world, even though it has not brought to any of them a single iota of genuine happiness. The only value of it is that aristocracy could, by assertion, make us abide this and there is no counter-idea that is co-equal with the authority aristocracy draws on. The only other such thought would lapse into aristocratic conceits, thus reproducing either the same essential structure of transcendent society, or something which retains the aristocracy's vampirism in a form that allows most of the bastards to keep on, surviving any revolution or tumult and eliminating any risk to their existence. There is no power in human beings or any other intellect, and no knowledge or truth, which counters this with the same substance. There are many oppposing forces to aristocracy which lay bare its farce, but none of them concern the same political and spiritual thinking of the aristocrats. In practice, aristocracy rarely rules in its pure and unadultered form, and makes alliances with interests which tie to some materially substantive entity, co-opting them just as life itself inhabits formerly dead things. Aristocracy always seeks to undermine anything contrary to it, and the accomplishment is never made by worldly force or any merit that stands forever. To do this, aristocracy must infect the aims of other forces at work - other bases of power, like meritocracy, technocracy, democracy, or the "kakistocracy" that comprises the crude anti-politics of the residuum. The subjects must be taught that aristocratic political principles are the only "real" ones, even though aristocracy's contribution to the human race is extremely negative, to say nothing of its contribution to human individuals. Everything aristocracy grants to those who hold its titles was taken from the world, and that includes any virtues in men which aristocrats claim are their qualities, rather than qualities that rose from the muck or through that dreaded task that aristocrats know to religiously avoid - "work". As much as possible, aristocracy aims to make their "work" of ruling superior in merit to anything else people do, and all work is judged not by any merit we would find in it, or a scientific fact that can be independently verified, or by the esteem of comrades who speak to each other and agree that something should be done for goodness' sake. The efforts of the residuum to escape their condition, whether this is through escapism or the hopeless task of fitting into a human race that screams "die, die, die" to their faces and continuing despite that out of some stubborn determination, are too corrupted and turned into aristocratic parodies, where the "fool" is given false praise, but everyone remembers "once retarded, ALWAYS retarded" means torture and death for the residuum. Political economy had to abide that human beings are motivated by enough self-interest that such aims were contrary to any society worth keeping. Ecology must establish itself as the aristocratic scientific view, and it is here where science ceases to be the domain of those who work and becomes a purely institutional matter, and the most incurious and damaging thought-forms are mandated by pedagogy, so that every standard of comparison to call bullshit on the ecological pseudo-science is subverted. All that remains are tautological claims of aristocracy, which are held to be some sort of sublime super-truths we have to abase ourselves too. The aristocrats then claim that any of our thoughts are either "retarded", "insane", non-sensical and counterproductive, or that we aren't really saying anything at all. The only thought that is judged as intelligent is that which serves aristocracy, rather than intelligence by any objective merit that we would judge. It is here where eugenics can finally make its claim not at the level of families or clans, but a "race", which is re-defined as the political unit so that nationalism, internationalism, democracy, or any contrary model for the political is suboardinated. It did not need to resort to a biological ecologism necessarily, and in typical fashion, the aristocracy carves out niches for the highest and lowest where death and the non-living still exist. For the subject, though, "life" is treated as inescapable and totalizing, and yet it is alien to even the most basic sense we had about where we came from. Only on this basis does ecology establish its peculiar mythology. To do this, religion in the older sense must be replaced with a new chimera.


What I have written above is hardly an introduction to ecology as a concept, or even terribly explanatory of scientific ecology, which despite its sordid origins presents some factual evidence for its claims. The mythology doesn't work by its utterance, but by knowledge of machines which can change the world, and all that exists is seen mechanically and must be seen as such. No ruler will rule by chanting koans and denying the world he wishes to claim and partition into ecosystems. What I write here explains why ecology came to the forefront, and displaced political economy as the understanding of those who ruled. In many ways, political economy was never really the project of the ruling class, or even something they desired to create. The economists, both classical and their modern counterparts, were never ideologues, and ideology is anathema to any genuine political understanding or worthwhile understanding of the world. The ecologists are and have to be, and understand ideology not as their true beliefs but as a machine like any other, and a necessary machine for states to rule. Ideology would displace religious institutions, whose claims were no longer desirable and which conflicted with the interests of technology. Enough technical knowledge had accumulated and entered the possession of the interested parties, and this resulted in the technological interest - represented by the rising capitalists in early modernity - obtaining a greater share of the nominal wealth. Many of the existing aristocracy understood that this path through science would be necessary, even when the scientists came from different interests. The old nobility now had to compete with men of common origin, and this did not trigger a struggle between essences or class identities as a crass narrative would proclaim. The true struggle of modernity, and of much of history, did not really concern classes that happened to exist by some fortuitous event, but interests which were understood and claimed, around which the classes could form. Social class had been understood as a proxy for what different types of men did in a society, rather than something that was ingrained in their constitution. Nothing about genetics suggested that "genes are destiny" for this highly specific purpose, which was always contingent not just on a natural environment or a society where that destiny was realized, but on mass acceptance that this division of labor by social classes was a natural fact, just as the rising and setting of the sun and the tides were natural. In practice, the claims of any social class, whatever their stated ideology and arrogance, were backed by some substantive mechanism that allowed them to rule, and those who ruled have always known that their superiority was under threat. This was not so much a threat from below, as if the teeming masses were not getting with the program due to not being smart enough to get the One True Religion aristocracy always declared in their heart. The threat came most of all from rival aristocrats, who did not intrinsically possess any unity or concept of a nation to be where they are. Far from it, aristocracy always saw "nation" or any other grouping which associated them with their social inferiors as a burden to maintain, and did as much as possible to stymie or outright destroy such concepts in the imagination of the ruled. At the same time, aristocracy was premised on total and abject exploitation of all other interests. The chief rule of aristocracy, which will be explored in the next book, is that aristocrats do not work, and there are many crude reasons that a child can figure out to suggest why aristocracy would do such a thing. Aristocracy openly mocks the fools who willingly offer sacrifice to their cult, and leaves the subordinated little choice but compliance if it has its way. How aristocracy came to be the only possible concept of human government is not a simple answer, as if ecology made it a fait accompli. Because that answer requires accepting humanity's political thought, it is not something that can be explained by any natural or economic incentive that is self-evident. Even today, meritocracy, technocracy, and what remains of democracy are realities that aristocracy has to abide, even as aristocracy rapidly destroys all of them and constantly exhorts parodic forms. The particulars of why these broad groupings of humanity do as they do is not immediately evident from natural facts, since for much of human history, the "proper" incentives and imperatives of the interested parties were never religiously followed.

The division of labor seems to appear as a "just so" story, because since prehistory, humans are habituated to beatings, humiliations, arbitrary whims of a demonic race of apes that became just smart enough to threaten others to force a crude political settlement. Whatever the specializations of a particular person, nothing about what they do suggests anything about what they are. What we are appears as a series of events, playing out. Humans only have in the end the deeds of their existence to present as facts about themselves. The overwhelming majority of those facts are things that were not done in the present or potentials in the future, but the past. If humans are defined by what they are, this includes a genealogy of their ancestors going back to the foul origins of the human race. Yet, none of those things pertain to labor which is conducted in the present. The division of labor concerns not what exists here and now, which is variable, but a past demarcation which is adjudicated after it happened. It exists in the minds of people in society, rather than a description of natural forces or the essential nature of particular humans. The division of labor is from the outset a contrivance - perhaps a useful contrivance for the needs of certain people, but a contrivance nonetheless. It is not that Man must aspire to be a farmer, a workman, a critic, a philosopher, an entertainer, and every other profession, from a crude beginning where he was defined as one of those things. The chief division of humanity was not by the type of labor they did but by social class, tribe or nation, or some identification which was associated with certain political information. The division of labor that philosophers usually addressed was not the division between different types of manual labor or different categories of thought, but the privileges and distinctions of warriors and priests. All of the miscellaneous labors which were not delegated to slaves or the lowest class of untouchables were broadly deemed the muck of the producing classes, all of whom could only struggle over the petty distinctions of their order of society. The division of labor between those who prayed, those who fought, and those who worked, was not based on any true inclination of the men to do those things, but was necessitated by the nature of the acts. Those who prayed concerned themselves with a spiritual authority whihc was not immediately beholden to any economic necessity, and openly disdained the muck of commerce. Those who fought understood that any act they carried out that was not in service to fighting was an extraneous activity, one that weakened the faculties necessary for the hunt or for the diplomatic stance of war-ready states. It was never an essential characteristic of those men that they were destined to pray or fight, or possess some special quality that allowed them alone to do those things. The division of labor in that regard was premised instead on both a want for those classes to not expend their energy on productive labor, and command of the environment which suggested that this condition could be realized at all. The producers and the classes beneath them have no built-in reason to believe prayer or fighting are the domain of specialized men at all, and their experience is that delegating such tasks to aristocratic classes is detrimental to their genuine freedom, security, ability to fight genuine threats, and any spiritual sense they possessed - and because Man is a spiritual animal even when denying that there is any such thing as spirit, delegating those tasks to aristocrats provides none of the things that the state purports to allow as privileges. If men do not take their security and spiritual authority into their own hands, humans will not be so generous to allow each other the same freedom the world readily provided to us. It is quite the opposite - aristocracy begins this division of labor only when it can sense that enclosing the world, the genuine environment that allowed this freedom, is technologically possible. In primitive conditions, this was not possible, and it was not for a lack of trying or a lack of interest of certain humans. The human thrill to dominate, torture, and humiliate other life, especially other humans, is something the race discovered early in its existence, inherent in all of its lurid sacrifices and rituals. Yet, none of those acts of humanity really created a division of labor fixed in nature, and in practice this didn't create any division of labor that was self-evident in primitive society. This is where the would-be technocrat invokes an image of primitive humanity in an ideal conditions, where everyone followed the elders and did what they "ought" to do. The reality of primitive life is that it would have been uncertain, and no human would have any reason to regard their tribe or family granting any specialized role or function. If such a specialization existed, it would have to regard the conditions a primitive band of humans were in - that life was scarce, friendship even more scarce, and there would be no law or anything to suggest a human wouldn't slit your throat while you sleep so that he may have more food, or simply to lighten the load for what remains of the band. The survival of the band, which was always an ad hoc party, did not have any natural basis, and tribal society was rife with intercine and pointless conflict. It was not the tribe's business to create an orderly state, of the sort a technocrat or eugenist needs to impose on the past to make their ecological conceit a true condition. The result is that primitive society, and in practice society all the way to now, did not necessitate any division of labor or suggest that people should be reduced to any particular work task or role in society. That was always the design of social engineers who wanted to suggest an image to manage the herd, with full contempt towards the ruled and paranoia towards each other. The only thing such people share is a mutual hatred of those who are out of the know, who do not possess the secret political knowledge that was the true objective of this division.

There is of course a reality - that individual humans cannot possibly know all there is to know, and that knowledge inherently implies uneven development and distribution. This is no less true in primitive society, where some men knew more than others, and men ranged in age from their teens to their sixties and would have much different experiences. There is then material proximity to new machinery, such as gold mines, weapons and armories, scribes and temples. These machines that were developed are possessions which would be mutually exclusive and not so freely reproduced - we don't envision a temple or an armory for every individual man and woman, unless we are very egomaniacal beyond even the eugenic creed's obsession with the self. The division of labor is premised on the seemingly "natural" situation of limited information, in which ignorance is essentialized and internalized. Information and knowledge in reality are not proprietary things, or even particularly relevant to what humans do or why this division of labor exists. By knowledge alone, the division of labor is cumbersome and pointless, unless someone possesses a claim to property or the past to suggest it must continue, or there is a pressing of the nerve which considered the thought-form itself something that perpetuated a greater working. There would be a recognition that humans do not have fixed potentials which necessitate only one course of action. Humans possess limited resources and can only act with what they are given, but there is no force compelling "historical progress" that is natural or the working of a rational deity, as if knowledge can determine the outcome of any and all events. What a knowledgeable manager can do is predict, with their own faculties, as best as they can what a given human in a situation might behave. They cannot imperiously dictate what people are or what they would do in all situations, but they can reasonably expect an intellectual inferior or subject to behave in ways the manager has worked out. The manager can only see what the manager knows, and has no special insight into subjects, no matter how much management insists all aspects of the subject are now property of the state or "society" as an alien abstraction excluding the damned. Managers would never speak to an equal in the way they speak to subordinates, who exist purely to be humiliated and have not just no right to protest, but not a shred of dignity or a space to call their own.

The division of labor can only proceed in this fashion by ignorance, whether it is forced or natural. If it were truly natural, then ignorance would be a temporary barrier and could never arrest in the mind clear roles for people to follow under threat of torture. The specializations in nature would only be a resource to draw on, and human beings would due to a need for security refuse to naturalize the division or suggest that it is anything other than a temporary condition. No status quo based on that division could be seen as permanent or a natural law, or any guide to worthwhile political life. That is beyond the scope of the present book, and since humans are not naturally inclined towards any fixed political settlement which is immutable, we treat such a temporary division of labor as irrelevant for economic life. Humans with diffferent abilities do not affect the needs those humans would pursue, and those incapable of defending themselves against predation will find in the human race no friends, for humans forsook that a long time ago. The weight of their history has made that clear time and time again, even though it would seem right to a naive sense that we should favor friendship rather than this shit-show we call humanity. Because certain assholes insist we can only violently recapitulate the thrill of torture, and that the whole point of the enterprise was the same ritual sacrifice with gave birth to this foul race, humanity will never collectively know a different world, no matter how obvious it may seem that we could do better than this. Individually, humans are hampered not by a vague collective or "the stupid masses", but by institutions which could have only existed after extensive political and technological development, which for this book are not our immediate concern. Here and now, we could end this nightmare tomorrow, and on a small scale, we do this every day simply by refusing to be the most depraved creatures we can be. The division of labor is only something that can exist because institutions of more than a single person can judge that it exists, rather than any natural law mandating that division would exist. Morally, we might value different abilities and the bodies which acquire them with different merits, but this would not be the basis for a political division of labor or anything that would necessitate so much effort spent. If a division of labor must be reinforced with an unlimited supply of torture and violence, which are the only "pleasure" a follower of Malthus ever knew, it wasn't the starting point of human economic and political thought, but a consequence of it. Usually, political thought arose to explain what was happening presently, rather than any natural law. A description of seemingly natural laws or mechanisms would not present a state ready made, but explains its tendencies and why it would generally do as it does. There are both political and economic mechanisms that operate without regard to any society, because they are inherent in what a society is. It is inherent to societies as information communicated between agents, rather than inherent in the flesh and blood of those agents. Human beings, at a basic level, had no need of any such concept, and their political and economic affairs stemmed from some necessity in life and from the actions of other agents, who respond to each other more than any material condition. The division of labor in a given society may be seen as a temporary condition, or one that provides historical background so that we would know why we arrived here. It does not grant any more predictive power than reality and evidence would suggest. This may be a lot or very little, and that depends entirely on the technology in the hands of those agents, and a willingness to use it for some aim or conceit they have historically held. The moment a division of labor ceases to provide what those who rule wish it to provide, a new division will arise. For example, in the distant past, a vast technocratic bureaucracy was seen as either an impossibility or something to be avoided at all costs, because of the clear and present danger such an institution would present. Nothing about technology suggested the state or institutions had to be these particular institutions the 20th and 21st centuries have been cursed with, and nothing suggested revolutionary struggle was necessary or something that could be corraled and cajoled to produce the outcome a schemer or grasper would desire.

What follows for the remainder of this book is a description of the division of labor as historical facts, rather than "the way things are" or how labor has been operationalized in society. If we are to imagine the pin factory or some other industrial workplace, or a group of men engaged in the hunt, among the workmen there isn't a "division of labor", so much as there is an allocation of duties towards some shared task. Any essential difference between the participants is not as relevant as the allocation of labor, which is limited and necessary for the operation as a whole to succeed. The operations of individual agents towards this task are not really a political division of labor, or a social value of great moral significance. There are distinctions in abilities and distinctions of knowledge, but the division of labor was premised not on a limitation of operational knowledge but a limitation of social merit and secrets that were held so that authorities could decide who lived and who died, and who would be given the honor or shame of some position which they were effectively locked into. That division of labor ultimately stems not from the merit of the tasks at hand, but merit to win a great game which is not economically necessary or even necessary for an ecosystem to exist. That game, which political consciousness is a part of, is beyond the scope of this book, but political consciousness informed much of the division of labor, which is reinforced by attaching moral value to the most trivial operations. Had humanity been a truly cooperative enterprise, we would see this ability not as a scarce resource to be hoarded and destroyed if it didn't fit an aristocratic conceit of what ought to be, but as a good drawn from the world that could be developed and given praise for what it is. The aristocratic society we got did the exact opposite. Deeds which were actively harmful or designed to immiserate would be given the highest praise, while anyone who believed humanity was good was now "retarded", the lowest designation that could be assigned to a human. This would be very bad if the social enterprise was premised on good will, but the social enterprise of the human race was not based on any such good will. What we do with that enterprise would be in principle something the agents can choose, but clearly the dominant agents chose something from which there can be no return, short of those dominant agents' total removal. The removal of those agents would not be possible because among the values those agents hoard would be any operation that allowed the removal of a clear and present danger. That is how the aristocrats originally seized what was already a failed race from its inception and chose to glorify its most abject failures as some great and holy virtue. Were it not for the insistence of such a failed political theory as that which we have been cursed with, the solution to humanity's most obvious woes would be obvious enough that children could see the solution, and would not need too great a leader to direct them like animals to follow the Hitlerian signal, as Germanic schooling has drilled the unfortunate youth to accept. Yet, the hope was never left to naive children. Grown men and women have long suffered under this regime which served nothing good, and there are those desperate enough to believe that it could be different until their dying breath in old age. It is to those elders who suffered, who were told they possessed a "slave morality" in the idiotic conceits of aristocracy, that we all owe the greatest deference. While the so-called "best and brightest" squandered what hope there was in this race and the world, so many of us aspired to build something that was actually better, and succeeded for a time against the inertia of the demons of the human race. Those who truly wished to do good could see, usually by their twenties, that humanity truly was a failed and forsaken race, and this was why "race" was chosen as the political basis rather than what the nation or tribe suggested, or what individuals following some worthwhile spiritual authority would have done. They did good not for the sake of "human betterment" or crass egotism, or a sense of passing on their eugenic legacy or a naive belief that doing the right thing was actually just and good. The moral sense of humanity, and any other entity that would care to truly consider the matter, knew enough about the evil and the bad, even when "the good" defies description and seems to be forever out of reach. It was only ever out of reach of knowledge, and this includes any higher knowledge or prophecy humans or their successors would ever attain. Goodness was never something to be known, or something for us. Nothing good could come from a race born out of ritual sacrifice and the lurid cults that made us "us", and that has been proven beyond a doubt in the 21st century. The greatest work in defense of goodness was an act of spite and hatred for that which insisted we would repeat humanity's folly, and it was done not in the name of humanity or any eugenic interest, and it wasn't done for some technological fad. It certainly wasn't done because there was an aristocrat with any good in his soul to tell us what was right and wrong. It was not truly labor itself as a force willing goodness in spite of the adversaries to labor which are numerous. Labor showed itself time and time again to be fickle, and the democratic aims within humanity would all be subverted because large swathes of labor were amenable to supplication and never wished it to be different. All that is good is demonstrated by the condition of the lowest class, and a stubborn refusal to continue the purest retardation of letting this eugenic creed continue in any way, shape, or form. Nothing of humanity would have been worth keeping if there weren't humans working against this beast and its earlier incarnations, and no matter how many times aristocracy is laid bare as the cruelest farce and one that is entirely within the ability of people to eliminate, the true believers keep insisting that such an urge will work this time, if the Great Plan from the primordial light were just followed to the letter, including the parts which contradict the other parts. Despite all that has been done to shit up the soul of the human race, there is good in the world, and the good can only exist by despising the evil. This is no conceit of men or a natural law demonstrable by science, but it is something long experience has taught many of us, and that knowledge is not something easily transmitted by pedagogy or the ancient educational method of "monkey see, monkey do". What we can do, at this late an hour, is speak to each other without the fetters of some busybody insistent that we have to agree with any aristocratic thought form. Even if aristocracy cannot be easily removed for reasons that are too numerous to recount in this book, the aristocrats themselves are aware that their way of life has never actually worked. Some of them will bemoan the sorry state of their peers, but for most aristocrats, they carry on because no sobering influence has ever required them to ask if this project was worth anything. Any such thought would be "retarded", and only used when aristocracy must cull its own or transfer laterally during the process of revolution.

The chief political division, and the true judgement of economic value, is limited knowledge that is made scarce. Even without this ecology and aristocratic mindset, scarcity of knowledge is inherent to knowledge as a process, and inherent to economic decision making. In the best of all possible worlds, this scarcity would be evident. The reason this limited knowledge has become such a dire problem is not that humans are too stupid to see the trap, or that there is a golden land where knowledge can be infinite, or that stupidity and ignorance are morally equivalent to genuine knowledge and the wise should be shamed for seeking knowledge. It instead became problematic because there were humans who chose political conceits and institutions over anything that was actually meaningful. The political knowledge required to maintain virtue or status is not so complex or arcane, but it is deliberately made so because ritual sacrifice must continue and the torture must be increased, and this is done not out of ignorance or a crass malice, but by the deliberation of those who were just smart enough to invent new scams every generation and insist we must respect any of it. This knowledge is not evident in the natural world, but those who seek the goal of politics must operate within natural limits and utilize natural forces to their advantage wherever possible. That is why above all, aristocracy and its thought-forms were anathema to science as we would have it, and the human race languished for many centuries when there was no good reason why science had to be the monopoly of imperious assholes or associated with people who did nothing whatsoever for science. It was not in the interests of genuine science to share any of this knowledge, for labor has proprietary aims just as capital and aristocracy would, and labor has to fight in a hostile world. What has been missing in all political analysis is the class that is as a rule excluded from all political life or even acknowledged as real for such purposes. Humanity rose from the muck to be anything at all, even the failed race that it is, but it was never the muck that was evil. Evil lurks in the datalinks as it lurked in the streets of yesteryear. But it was never the streets that were evil. Nothing in the muck justified anything that happened or made it good. The muck showed more virtue than aristocracy simply by existing as matter. Knowledge for everyone is a trap, but knowledge is the only guide we possess to communicate any understanding that it could be different. I am confined to writing words or gesticulating in hopes that this will facilitate something, and all of the deeds any human could do individually are irrelevant if they only exist on their own terms, without any meaning. Who alone in the division of labor wanted it to actually be different, except the lowest class? Aristocracy loathes to acknowledge that from time to time, one of my naive fellows down here makes the mistake of contributing anything to this wretched and failed race, thinking that doing this will at least stave off the predators for a little while longer. It is this exploitation, rather than mere generalized and alienable labor, that is the proper source of value.

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[1] In the next book, I begin describing the political not from the position of individual agents but from what the concept must entail at the level where politics is appropriate. Poliics to be politics meaningfully does not exist over any preferred domain like an "ecology", and ecology proper makes political thought impossible. This is intended. For the position of the lowest class, the political aims are always understood as autocratic before they are anything else, for there is no "us", but this autocracy is primarily informed by the lowest class's lack of power over anything in the political. That is, the lowest class tends towards autocratic views of power because if they don't, they will always be taken advantage of and kicked out, no matter what they might have preferred to believe or any promises that they were actually a different class. For our purposes here, the lowest class - and it is the lowest class that is the proper origin of any concept of class society - does not produce, does not engage in economic life, and as a rule doesn't have any place in the world. "Oops, Wrong Planet!" strikes again, and the warning given in the 1990s was intended for everyone to "figure it out for themselves", as the world would be run into the ground for the vanity of some Reaganite criminals.

[2] And here "He who controls the present controls the past, he who controls the past controls the future" makes clearer sense. Modern eugenic ecology asserts a very futuristic view of the world imposed on the past, makes parodies of all genuine history and aggressively destroys them, and does so by choking the present world, placing it under siege. Economics in the older sense is superficially the justificiation for this, for economics must concern itself with the technology to realize this control, rewrite history, and ultimately push the human mind to accept those dictates. The primary science and useful mechanics of eugenism, like those of technocratic society, are primarily ecological, and do not regard economics in the older sense that Marx critiqued. Ecology also very pointedly rejects the political, except as the domain of the self-appointed stewards or in limited roles permitted of those bound to an ecosystem. The logic is premised on economic thinking turned into an ideological koan, but it doesn't resemble the useful meaning of the philosophy Orwell clumsily wishes the reader to associate it with. Everything about the German ideology, Marxism, fascism, and Nazism suggested inexorable historical progress came as it would. History was never arrested in that, nor was it ideologically arrested in liberal political thought. It wasn't even arrested in the mind of the conservative, who was always conscious on some level of history's alteration and how their operation worked. It was a particularly imperial illness, which required belief in eugenics and in the ecological logic eugenics entailed. The reading most were expected to take, if they saw through the obvious philosophical weakness of unreliable authors and narrators, is that the koan referred only to an economic thought made real by force of assertion and unlimited violence without exception. Eugenics and ecology are conspicuously omitted by direct reference, not because Orwell wishes the reader to see the eugenic intent of such a koan, but because Orwell as we have made clear was a eugenist and made his own doublethink, where eugenics was an unmentionable and yet the only solution to such a world in his mind, just as it was with Huxley. It is here where the eugenist conception had no use for economics in the older sense, and the claims of free trade went from spurious to completely antithetical to the world that was now envisioned as "capitalism".

[3] Quote from "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", page 53-55 (N. I. Stone translation): "Direct barter, the original natural form of exchange, represents rather the beginning of the transformation of use-values into commodities, than that of commodities into money. Exchange value has as yet no form of its own, but is still directly bound up with use-value. This is manifested in two ways. Production, in its entire organization, aims at the creation of use-values and not of exchange values, and it is only when their supply exceeds the measure of consumption that use-values cease to be use-values, and become means of exchange, i. e., commodities. At the same time, they become commodities only within the limits of being direct use-values distributed at opposite poles, so that the commodities to be exchanged by their possessors must be use-values to both,—each commodity to its non-possessor. As a matter of fact, the exchange of commodities originates not within the primitive communities,14 but where they end, on their borders at the few points, where they come in contact with other communities. That is where barter begins, and from here it strikes back into the interior of the community, decomposing it. The various use-values which first become commodities in the barter between different communities, such as slaves, cattle, metals, constitute therefore in most cases the first money within those communities themselves. We have seen how the exchange value of a commodity is manifested the more perfectly as exchange value, the longer the series of its equivalents or the greater the sphere of exchange of that commodity. With the gradual expansion of barter, the increase in the number of exchanges, and the growing diversification of the commodities drawn into exchange, commodities develop into exchange values, which leads to the formation of money and has a destructive effect on direct barter. The economists are in the habit of ascribing the origin of money to the difficulties which are encountered in the way of extensive barter, but they forget that these difficulties arise from the development of exchange value and from the fact that social labor becomes universal labor. E. g., commodities as use-values can not be subdivided at will, a property which they should possess as exchange values. Or, a commodity belonging to A may be a use-value to B, while the commodity belonging to B may not have any use-value to A. Or the owners of the commodities may need each other’s indivisible goods in unequal proportions. In other words, under the pretence of analyzing simple barter, economists bring out certain aspects of the contradiction which is inherent in commodities as entities simultaneously embodying both use-value and exchange value. On the other hand, they consistently cling to the idea that barter is the natural form of exchange, which suffers only from certain technical difficulties, for which money is a cunningly devised expedient. Arguing from this perfectly superficial view, an ingenious English economist has rightly maintained that money is merely a material instrument like a ship or a steam-engine, but not an expression of a social relation in the field of production and consequently not an economic category; and that it is, therefore, wrong to treat the subject in political economy, which really has nothing in common with technology."

Presented out of context, this quote is not terribly explanatory and covers concepts we have already discussed. It is better to read the original text to better understand the argument made, but we see here the difficulty of viewing economics without invoking poliitcal or social concepts that can't really regard space. The reality is that exchange in barter often did not entail the kind of trade that later economy meant, and the objectives of herding animals often were not productive or for exchange with neighbors, but a matter of status for the clan and the individual drover. There is no direct link from nomadic cattle-trading to the later commodity money of settled states, and the former continued not on the terms of monetary exchange but from the pastoral and landed agricultural interest of the farmer who held land, and doubled as the conscripted warrior or citizen-soldier depending on the time. More often then trade of the products of pastoral nomads was not for other such products, but for the payment of tribute, gifts, fines, debts by ad hoc schemes, and various markers of prestige. The size of the drover's herd was not an easily liquified asset to be divided, and this would be understood in any era. Very little suggests that there was much trade at all in nomadic society, and the default modus operandi was not commerce but conquest and feats to demonstate the prestige of men in that society. There would, for one, be little of value to trade that wasn't reproducible within the economic unit. Nor was the value exchanged so much about a fixed social relationship in nomadic society. In settled society, where antagonistic and close relations led to classes of slaves, farmers, warriors, nobles, priests, and so on, the objects of trade did not directly map on to the classes or the relationships of individuals at all, but were always things to be exchanged for a purpose which could change at any time. The true value of holding someone in debt was never the face value in some exchange unit, but that the debt was enforceable.

[4] Herotodus, AKA "The Father of Lies".

[5] It is this that really bad philosophers, usually bad Hegeloids, insist is the real contradiction, which couldn't be further from reality. It is completely possible for an idealist ontology to reproduce science, because ideas did not intrinsically hold this mysical force the bad philosophers claimed they did. It is possible for materialism to turn into pseudo-mysticism and crass superstition masquerading as science. What is entirely elided is that these idiots believe political equality is either a fait accompli or "naturally impossible" with pre-ordained rulers selected by God or a Nature deity. That this philosophy, regardless of what clothing it wears, is a slave philosophy for the incredulous enablers of this society's rot, is never to be acknowledged, becasue it would break kayfabe. So much effort is spent to protect the sentiments of people who should have been ignored in a better world, yet we are accused of "sentiment" for wanting basic things that such enablers absolutely refuse to allow us to have, purely by their violent imposition. These bad philosophers are nothing more than warrior-cuckolds - the lowlives of the intellectual class except devoid of the graces someone can attribute to thugs of every nation. Somehow, the 21st century presents a critical mass of incredulous true believers that are even worse than this. The bad philosophy is an artifact of the late 19th and 20th centuries, shepherded into existence when ecology and eugenics came to the forefront. Idealism and materialism are properly approaches to solve intellectual problems rather than "whole systems". It is with ecologism that such stupidity finds a chamber where it can derail anyone who would say no to the scheme, and this serves a function because the ecosystem is designed for these enablers to maximize their predatory mind rot.

[6] Among the newer mystifications of science is a belief that "anything can be anything" and so chemical knowledge established over the past two centuries must be relitigated and reviewed to be ideologically correct - that is, that the very basic substance of the world is now to be reinterpreted by the eugenic creed. Rather than diagnose the genuine flaws of today's institutional science and in particular the shibboleths regarding life and biology, the "critical thinkers" do nothing more than return to bad philosophy from the 19th century, because it is their instinct to retreat to the institutions, and for many of the professionals, the institutions are their power base. They will always go back to an imagined time where their shibboleths held worldly power, rather than acknowledge that much of modernity was built on a shoddy foundation. Rather than carry out reconstruction in a way that would serve what we down here want, the institutions are proud believers in "creative destruction" and other such philosophical horseshit. They'd rather destroy the world than suggest that their institutions could even be reformed, because they decided long ago that their stance towards the people was democidal and contemptuous. It would be trivial to speak some sense, but that would lay bare the failure of these institutions to do anything, and we would do well to remember all of the damage they caused. As long as the institutions have someone to kick down and feed off, they will always return to this. Only out of dire necessity does any advance occur, always on the terms of aristocracy and after the people have been humiliated and degraded.

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