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If there is no way to think or learn a way out of this, and no apparent force that would be necessarily victorious in the final analysis - if the outcome of struggle is for life-force to expend itself in a futile effort to win a pontless contest - what is there to life? In the tripartate view, life is itself the purpose of life, and this leaves aristocracy alone with untrammeled authority to do as it pleases. All concept of a world outside of the society of aristocracy is inadmissible and may as well not exist. The lurid cults of aristocracy always proclaim this victory is a fait accompli, the world will be transformed, and the godhead will scream like a retard and tell us this is holy. Sadly, this is what they actually believe, after all the finery is stripped away and the game is up. The faux morality of aristocracy is not even a convincing show, reveling in every double-standard and making sure the two subordinated groups they intend to keep are as miserable as possible. This preceded any political theory or suggestion that this was spiritually right, and did not even conform to a eugenic interest. Of course, aristocrats themselves are not defined purely by that essence. They are, in the end, living entities with wants and needs no different than the rest of us, whatever pretenses they make for themselves. No class and no person ever can be, and while this truth is used as a mask for men and women who very much see the predatory and primordial instinct of the human race as their goal - for they chose the foolish moral aim of RETVRN^[1] to the primordial light - even such degenerated humans will be seen for what they are, and cannot hide their odiousness. Since they do not intend to, and unlimited transgression and filth are their calling card, it is not worth discussing such peoples' moral sentiments for long, except to detail the mechanisms of degeneration they invoke.

It is very clear that nothing in the tripartate structure is designed to allow us any answers, so much that a child can see that this is not all there is to life. Further, the tripartate structure is designed not to mimic anything in nature, but is a trap designed specifically to disallow anything new to exist. The trinitarian view is designed to regress to the unitarian, to the primordial, which is held by an aristocracy intended to rule forever. This rule never actually settles the world in a state, but continually presses action. At its root is nothing more than the thrill of control. It is not even the thrill of victory, which is fleeting and requires some meritorious act to attain it, but pure, empty, irrational thrill - in the language of the utilitarians, "pleasure". That is the only pleasure that could exist in such a depraved moral philosophy.

We are not here to suffer or feel good, nor to "win" in some vaguely specified game, or in wars that are treated like game. We are not here to win in any great war or struggle of force against force which is granted the status of reality. We not not here for any grand idea. Among the most common tropes of the philosopher is a need to reduce all that exists to one and only one axiom, in line with a monistic ontology which necessitates some common substance to make all that exists sensical and guide intellect. It is at heart a problem of learning, and the limited resources that can be devoted to that task. If that is case, an economy of intellect favors those who reduce what is learned to that orienting impulse. All such orientations invariably fail and lead to the same regression to primordial conditions that defeat the mind and anything it would have wanted, and this is intended. No complexity of knowledge or any assembly of things in the world would be any better, as if variety or diversity held any intrinsic moral worth. It is not in any action or labor that is reducible and alienable enough to become an idea abstracted from its origin. It is not the labor itself, or some overall energy of existence that gives moral purpose as-is. It certainly is not the crass symbols offered as a sop to the losers and fools of the world. All of the faculties of knowledge and all we know about the world leaves no inclination of moral behavior, no matter how many rational traps someone will invent or make for themselves - the eternal cope of an existence that never had any purpose or meaning that could be appreciated. Saying you get to make your own purpose to life is just another cope and a terrible one, and that cope is the worst lie of all. It is unsurprising that this last and most terrible cope is the moral promise given in the past century and a half, where a vulgar bastardization of the mind asserts petulantly "me wantee", and humanity has come full circle. A group in their secret world tell themselves they are totally tricking the fools to self-terminate, but what in that world is worth anything? Those people don't look too happy with themselves, nor do they possess any quality that would recommend them over the people they're killing. Very often, the safe and precious of aristocracy are exemplars of human shit and this is measureable compared to the damned, whose virtue is soaked up by these vampiric perverts. There is not some occult part of the world with "The Secret" that is some piece of knowledge that will make all clear. Knowledge has nothing to offer us that is self-evident to tell us anything about morality, as if it were encoded in the universe, or there were any moral substance to covet. Emotions and passions offer nothing better. All of the emotions and passions of living creatures served some purpose that is not difficult to divine. It did not have to be a "good" purpose or a purpose serving rational or intellectual aims, but there is a reason why any animal would feel or think as they do, about things that they have some emotional or sentimental association with.

If there is nothing accessible by any knowledge to guide moral behavior, how then are humans motivated? At root, there is one and only one reason for humans to have any moral cause worthy of the name - necessity. Whatever humans do, they will follow some moral cause. If they do not have any knowledgable understanding of that, a moral code will be asserted "behind their back", and make itself evident in the behavior and thoughts a human will eventually reckon with. We make a definition of morality here that is not inherently reasonable or ethical at all, or even one that conforms to our usual moral vocabulary. The condition is not depravity or mere rot or decay. A human without any moral guide would not be able to guide learning as mentioned in the prior chapter, and so its impulses to learn would be random and affected by the first alien impulse that they met. The body's native resistance to this is limited, and the failings of intellect or crass rationalism were described sufficiently to make clear the difficulty. Moral aims are not intrinsically defensive or reactive. They are almost always proactive and assertive, as the energy of humans beings is at first generative and seeks to navigate a world. That is how the faculties of the body are oriented towards any deliberate goal, or any goal that appears deliberate. The orientation of life itself follows not from a hobgoblin compelling all of its behavior, but life as a process asserting itself persistently. That would be the first requirement for life to arise in any stable form, or become motile and sufficiently reactive to their environment. A totally amoral organism wouldn't even wander through life on whims. It would thrash around helplessly and scream incessantly. The image of moral depravity, reproduced deliberately by aristocratic societies in every form, is the institutionalized madman screaming for his life, and this screaming is prompted by the sadism that was the birthmark and genesis of the human race. Absent the sadism from humanity or some other animal, madmen tend to be docile rather than active, having learned fear of the world and everything in it so thoroughgoing that it would be incompatible with consistent reasoning. The daily life of a madman is spent coping and recovering while nervously awaiting the next sadism that is the hallmark of the human race. In that state, the madman develops whatever moral stance he can, only to have it shattered by the pressing of a nerve and his miserable social position - a condition mandated by every human society as much as it can, for madmen cannot be presumed to possess any moral authority at all, even concerning their own body or innocuous things. It is forbidden by all the rites and initiations that the human race believes in, and only as a sop or out of the rare necessity is any moral condition of the madman permitted. Towards the retard, no moral stance at all is ever permissible, even in the most dire conditions. To even treat a retard as morally worth anything for a single moment with any seriousness is to end the human project then and there, and this is absolutely haram. Any moral consideration of the retard is always delivered with the most gratuitous insult, and the human race is trained from creation to despise the retard with a visceral thrill that is difficult to imagine unless one is the target of that rage. This, despite the clear lack of truly worthwhile intelligence among the human race, which always races to the bottom and takes pride in their pitiful accomplishments up to now. It used to be that humans were at least somewhat aware that this leads to problems, and it took them many centuries to invent the most noble status a retard was ever allowed - the cretin, who was just barely worthy of quasi-human treatment as a nicety and nothing more. That the ruling aristocracy views most of humanity as totally and completely retarded and insane from birth is the only genuine sobering influence.

Most of humanity, including the aristocrats who advance this meme, understand that anyone can be declared retarded at any time, without an astute political sense to ensure that this never can happen. If the emperor has no clothes, then he is indeed retarded. This is still not the same as those born retarded, and it is always presumed that retardation is an inherited status, even before the eugenic creed made this the chief institutional shibboleth. It cannot be that a valid man became "retarded" in that sense. Someone may be brain damaged or go mad, but they will always be remembered as possessing that shred of validity if they made it to their teenage years as such. Only those "born retarded", and this is religiously marked from early childhood as the most ancient rite of the human race, are subjected to this particular humiliation, beyond the humiliations inflicted on madmen. Even those who commit to total sadism and maximal torture for the thrill of doing so are never treated like retards. By the moral sentiment that sadly dominates the human race, there is a certain moral value appreciating sadism, which selects for the quality and seeks to improve it. Only when that sadism became a sufficiently pressing danger would it be temporarily ameliorated, usually because frequent slave and peasant revolts made clear the insecurity of aristocacy. It was never that the aristocracy feared genuine overthrow. It was rather that the state in reality was much too weak to prevent this, and people will for various reasons assert their will regardless of aristocracy. Aristocracies are never fixed in place forever as their conceits insist, and so new members will populate them and has-beens fall out - but their mindset and lifestyle were aristocratic before they could seriously contemplate revolution, and a nascent aristocracy either accumulated enough strength to displace the old before any revolution began, or there was no old aristocracy of size. Usually revolutions entail large parts of the old aristocracy passing to the new without any break in continuity, for the men that can contest rule always operate on the same political and social principles. Transgressing the political thought altogether is not just immediately snuffed out, but is deemed "retarded" - not merely insane or evil or wrong, but retarded, the worst thing a human can ever be.

So ubiquitous is the hatred of the retard that the moral sentiment to kill on sight anything that is retarded may be seen as the first moral sentiment. This is not really what a moral sentiment is or the true origin of human biology or thought as a germ. It is the eugenic legacy of the human race - that it was born in fratricide - but that moral sentiment is not reducible to this one concept, "retarded". The concept of "retarded" as we use it today did not map on to how inborn stupidity was understood in all places and all times, and very rarely would a philosophy declare that humans were infantilized and arrested in development. That entire conceit could only arise in very particular societies, and would be mal-adaptive and nonsensical outside of them. The typical view of life would have led someone to believe a mentally defective 40 year old man is still 40 years old, whatever his deficiencies. The cycle of regression and humiliation is a particular one of great import to our future work, but is presently beyond the scope of this book. We can see the same treatment of the retard given to any social outcast in different societies, for the approach of rejection and humiliation is effectively universal and came from the genesis of the human race. It came from a combination of its instincts, history, memory, and the germ of intellect and learning that became the crucial distinction above all others. Even if human technology and capacity were premised on more than the development of learning, and that learning had to arise in a body with a tongue that could speak and hands that could manipulate tools, the appeal of this sentiment as a singular force compelling history is a powerful conceit to philosophers and those who concern themselves with education and learning. Because this education would become the first worthwhile distinction that could assign social class, before laws and bodies of armed men could enforce it and declare explicit statuses, it was easy to assign all moral failure with this concept of the retard, however it was construed to refer to inborn and permanent stupidity that excluded someone from social life. It finds its familiar counterparts and pseudo-explanations - "sin", which implied failure in hunting which became a permanent condition of spiritual importance is the most exact match, and sinfulness would be reduced from a complex array of maledictions to its most essential ingredient - that to be sinful was to be retarded, not just as a measure of intelligence but as a permanent moral failing. Eugenics stripped away all other concepts of sin and all complexity which allowed for independent adjudication of sin, so that the Eugenic College alone dictated sinfulness in all things, and thus set all moral laws and taboos. So, even this most ancient genesis of humanity is of no use for moral sentiments in humans. Even if one could naturalize the eugenic creed in its vulgar intellectual form, it would not explain the primitive sentiments of animals, who had far less use for any such creed or conceit. Ritual sacrifice and thrill when doing so is not observed in animals, however vicious they are to each other. A hyena has no shame in cannibalizing its own and turning on brothers, but that has nothing to do with a eugenic sentiment that is developed. It's just the standard viciousness of their race, and the lowest hyena is still far superior morally than the fanatical eugenist of the late 20th century.

The moral claims of intelligence, and most especially the perceived lack of it and its permanence as a socially recognized condition with dire consequences, are unique among moral claims. Intelligence and mind, and the processes of learning that make formal inquiry into systems possible, possess a claim to moral worth that nothing else can. There is nothing in the world like intelligence which can replace its function. Any artificial intelligence would be better understood as a tool enhancing existing intelligences than a free-standing entity, and that tool's utility is contingent entirely on the capacities of those who hold it. With many tools, there are substitutes or alternative strategies, and the necessity of the tools may be questioned. Intelligence cannot be questioned in its utility. Learning and history are also the only clear way morality can lead to formal ethics. In short, it is through learning that moral decisions can become valued in society and communicated in ways that are comprehensible, generalized, and alienable. Without that, moral sentiments can only be communicated indirectly, for example by grunting or shouting to intimidate, or indicating emotion with or without any deliberation. That communication without learning and knowledge still is relevant, and we learn of that which is a moral duty of intelligent mind and that which is morally valued but not the product of learning or deliberation. The two interact with each other to produce a fuller understanding.

Morality is never purely rational. That is the task of ethics, which is a different concept. Moral claims suggest a world outside of us where moral acts and moral values of objects would be relevant. This is to say, morality takes place in a real world, and that real world is distinguished from fiction to make it morally considerable. All of the moral values we could acquire are from the world, which are contingent on being able to relate all that exists. A monist view of reality then is necessary for a coherent moral sense - there are no special rules for special places and no true "dual systems" or hypocrisies that are tolerable. Hypocrisy itself may be held as a moral value or something with moral assignment, but it is always recognized on some level that it is hypocrisy. No one is ever seriously operating with a dual moral system that confuses them for long. The idea that morality can be manipulated in such a way is among the reasons why "doublethink" and habitual lying are taxing on the mind and the organs allowing it to exist. All must be one in some sense, even if the "one" never really exists except as the world itself which is always comprised of disparate things and transcendent truths that might be accepted. Morality can only confront the world in total before any part of it can be properly judged. We do not have by any knowledge a full accounting of the world, but ignorance of the law is no excuse. We would do as best as we can to account for incomplete knowledge in all moral assessments. Just as no part of the world can be unknowable if we are to ask a serious question of it, no moral claim can be defended if standards for comparison are lacking. We may know so much about the world that we develop a general understanding and account for as many unknowns as we can extrapolate from our knowledge base. Incomplete information becomes our curse, for outside of our judgement, morality wouldn't exist in nature or any substance. If we had that unicorn of perfect information in a perfect environment, all of our moral quandries down to the smallest iota would be resolved. Since this is a literal impossibility - if we imagined a universe-spanning entity we are really imagining a primordial light subsuming all, which obviates any moral question - we make moral judgements not just about the knowns of the world, but account for the unknowns. With any moral value there is uncertainty and skepticism, and this is an opening for someone who is naive to the deceptive human ape and its games. The uncertainty of exact and perfect moral values is not to be confused with uncertainty of information or an overall uncertainty. We know moral values within a system, and can relate that to other systems we know of and a sense of moral truth that is not tied to any particular thing. What we do not know is what else might exist to compare against, or finer details that would undermine judgement. In any substantive quantity or definite quality, there is no uncertainty or ambiguity of moral judgements. Nor is there such a thing as "moral relativism", where two people see the same thing as intrinsically different in nature. Two people may arrive at different values for a thing and ascribe to it different moral qualities, but they cannot claim that the different moral values change substantively or quantitatively the claims being made. If two people see moral value differently, they are capable of understanding the judgement of the other in principle, because both have seen the same thing, and would have enough context to know of the thing they disagree about. The ignorance of the two people of each others' knowledge, or their ignorance towards the world for themselves, is not relevant. Both people have made moral judgements on the premise that they know their information about the world is incomplete and must account for that. If there were genuine ignorance, both could in principle share information to resolve that dispute. If the two simply held distinct sentiments, because their lives and experiences were very different, this information can be known and we would be able to understand why another would see something very differently. We are aware that the other person senses and thinks about the world, even if their thinking is very different from our own, and even if their thought were vastly superior or inferior. We could, in our feeble attempt, place ourselves in the experience of a hypothetical omniscient observer, or a space alien with a very different corporeal structure, or place ourselves in the position of a bug. We would at least be able to guess what distinguishes us from something far greater or lesser, and would have to be able to do so if we are to even make a judgement of their intellectual superiority, inferiority, or the very different thinking of this other entity we would inhabit. If we couldn't, we are just telling ourselves a mystery exists where there isn't one and terminating all potential thought, and all potential moral judgement. We can do this, or convince ourselves that other entities are truly unknowable, but in doing so, ignorance is not strength.

We rule out the philosophical wordplay where we confuse symbols of the world for the whole of meanings. Instead, we approach the world as a reasonable person would - as something real where events occur, and objects are understood not as information apart from context. There is no other view of the world that is the appropriate domain for science in the genuine sense. At first glance, we separate in the mind science as a method and sense experience. The key distinction between science and ordinary sense experience is that the former is the domain of the mind's ability to learn and draw conclusions from that learning. Sense experience operates not as the transmission of symbols or contextless information, but as the processing of those transmissions in a way that the receiver assembles without "learning" in the formal sense that the mind does. The acquisition of muscle memory or familiarity with some sense data is not scientific in the strict sense, though something certainly is learned and the mind is aware that this is a kind of learning. Sense experience includes the things which affect the body regardless of our registration of it in the moment. We cannot help but sense that which affected us "in secret" when the effects become apparent. Even if we deluded ourselves to believe a finger hasn't been cut off, reality would assert the truth and sense would recognize, perhaps to its surprise, that it is indeed missing a finger, and that this is going to be the way it is moving forward. Whether with science or sense, for this purpose - and any developed and meaningful product of science or sense experience that we would explain to another - they do not operate "in the moment", as if they were the result of inexorable forces pushing in one direction. Science to be science recognizes a past, present, future, and that the course of any event is its own course rather than something ordained from outside of the event intrinsically. Sense information operates on the same principle, regardless of our beliefs about time or causality. If this didn't happen, we would not be talking about the experience or method that is morally useful as a guide to anything, but something wholly alien which superficially resembles the thing we wanted out of science in the first place. Since sense experience is a precondition of developing science, and science in turn informs our approach to sense experience itself, I will not spend too much time on non-scientific sense. Here, the origin of learning's moral direction in science is more relevant. We presume that we ask this question of the world to find the origin of moral judgements, rather than asking a god or some other spiritual authority, about which we would have no intrinsic knowledge that would be proven by natural laws. Absent any other thing to orient learning, the encounter of the mind with the world, and the inability of the mind to assert reality by learning alone, leads the mind to seek its answers in the world, however it perceives it and with whatever methods the mind deems useful for its purposes. It could not do otherwise until it has developed enough knowledge of the world to suggest the world could be something different than its naive models indicate. We did not come ready-made with any theology or religious explanation, as if those things were encoded in the body in a way that can be scientifically verified. If they were, we would see the formation of religions with remarkable regularity and religious thought would be so natural that it could not be a question. That most people are not very religious is not a violation of natural, but demonstrates that religious zeal is highly unusual, even with very active religious institutions that mandate fealty to the religion. It would also indicate that all confusion over which religion was right would be trivial to resolve, and the lost and confused would be quickly corrected by "the gods". Since this is very obviously used as a stand-in for the priesthood and institutions, it is not a god in the genuine sense and should be ignored. Even if there were gods or body thetans or some spiritual explanation in the realm of ideas, the scientific approach to the world still begins with the mind's encounter with world and rightful skepticism of any claim.

Science in the most basic form should be defined before moving forward, to remove ambiguities that are conflated with it. The objective of science is not intellectual development or a great goal of the method. It is not even any method in particular, as if there were only one or a limited number of ways "science" would be conducted. It is simply the pursuit of truth regarding the natural world from the evidence available, presuming there is a world to be studied and that it is knowable. How this truth is compiled or communicated is a very different thing from the act of pursuing it. It is always conducted by knowledge, whose faculties are limited. There is no "science" happening outside of entities knowing it, which would adjudicate for us any facts or findings. Science does not intrinsically rely on facts, as it can and must concern itself with suppositions or guesses about which no factuality can be established. It would be very helpful in communicating science to work with facts that are agreeable, but this is a potential failing when a determined social agent wishes to lie as profusely as possible about basic things. We have seen many examples of such lying, and by all that is known in science or reason, there is no rule suggesting a liar cannot lie. It is quite the opposite - science suggests that profuse lying is very effective at dictating truth that knowledge is made to accept, because science can easily determine that the thought process allowing us to conduct science is malleable. This is morally unsound for us, because it casts doubt on our ability to conduct science, and we would have to presume our mind and sense is sound and consistent for science to tell us any substantive or meaningful truth. Yet, it is not possible by science to verify science. That reasoning is circular and clearly leads science to turn on itself. We can suggest that science grants spiritual authority to ask questions about what can secure our mind, and absent any other explanation, we would rely on science to speak of spiritual authority conceptually. We could place spiritual authority in a process other than science, to which our science and mind is beholden, or which our mind works with in a way that allows science to continue in a way that is sound to our sense of the world and ourselves. We could also suggest that such a spiritual authority, up to and including the "gods" or supernatural forces we might invoke, is subject to the methods used in science, for any "god" would be part of the same world that science investigates, however far removed that would be from our conventional knowledge. We would in science be aware of what different subjects are and the proper purview of reason and sense experience in answer questions about any of them, and would be able to relate all subjects to another. Science never arrives at any "theory of everything" that is reducible to some koan, without degenerating into a cult of little relevance to genuine science. It does suggest that everything is knowable and relatable, but so far as there is a "theory of everything", it is only that knowledge as a process in the world is our portal to tell us anything else about the world, and that any "super-knowledge" would be nothing of the sort. The "theories of everything" devolve into technocratic navel-gazing with a predictable outcome, and so far as such projects ever build a coherent cosmology, it is only after science and us can reckon with what we are actually doing in this world. They would be built not on a germ of science as a process, but a conclusion drawn from considerable experience to tell us how we can describe the world. And so, the sense experience of a cruder sort does not cease with science, as if there were a point of no return where someone must join the "cult of science" and abandon what their native connection to the world tells them. Far from it, science relies on continual sense experience, which our methods and past knowledge refine. If we wish to, very large proposals of what the world is are entered into the scientific lexicon without any scientific proof of them being real, but are accepted as a matter of course. This happens not because science mandated it, but because we would in communicating with each other need to accept implicitly many things we take for granted, and we would not condone ruthlessly attacking knowledge that is common if that attack is mounted for the most spurious purposes, or is done in some vain effort to cajole reality to be what someone wanted it to be.

All that is knowable is not reduced to "science" or even "sense", as if this were the extent of what it meant to know things. There is much about the world we never directly sense or have scientific theories to explain, but that we accept by inferring that there is more to the world than is immediately evident. To encounter the world properly requires accepting how much of it is unknown, and to know the extent of what is known. In short, science requires us to acknowledge that non-existence or void is necessary to speak of differentiation meaningfully, as there is no other natural division in the world to suggest a classification scheme written into nature. Nature does not abhor a vacuum. It welcomes such a thing, and suggests non-existence would be the default assumption. So too does that assumption exist in science. We do not invent phantoms or ghosts without particularly good reasons for doing so, and all such ghosts are provisional until a better explanation arises. We can construct that which no sense experience would confirm, such as abstractions. We know what those abstractions meaningfully are, and can seek evidence that the abstractions "exist" - that we can define qualities of things or situations where those abstractions explain something confirmed by sense. The abstractions are never "the thing" or a substitute for "the thing". We can tell the difference between a substantive object and our conceits about it. When something in the abstract is envisioned, we are capable of connecting it to its concrete counterpart without any wordplay suggesting the abstraction is anything more than a placeholder for our purposes. We don't have to actually consider an infinitely fungible coin of money to conceive of value's fungibility, for instance, and we know what all of the symbolic representations of money are and what tricks of finance actually do. There are many things that are abstract and lack any concrete counterpart. "The state" for instance is very different as an abstraction from the various forms it takes as a realized force in the world, and this is the source of so much stupidity. This applies to abstractions without any great political implication. We can devolve into arguments about what colors are, what biological constructs are, and so on, and then lock into abstract conceits that are upheld by institutions and become dogmas. In biology, the dogmas are intense because biological rationales became the chief political rationales, above the ideologies and parties that were purported to govern.

There is nothing in knowledge which has a direct, unquestionable connection with the "true form" of things, which makes their workings clear for all. We know that such a truth must exist to speak of any forms, but we never quite detect it. Science and sense both work with models, but they are always models which are intuitive enough that knowledge can apply them to a world where there would be true things, rather than preferred forms of them. If we choose a model of reality that is divorced from what native sense tells us, this has nothing to do with science. All scientific models would either be confirmed by the native sense, or would allow us to answer why naive reasoning fails and how to correct it. The naive reasoning is known to be naive, and so if someone exhorts you to "believe the science" and turn off a sense that you can reasonably expect to be accurate, they are performing a magic trick and nothing more. It is only possible to suggest your sense may be wrong if there is enough ambiguity that another explanation may reconcile with many other things we know. This is not as easy as it seems when science must develop a cosmology tying all things, and we can only use a very limited understanding as the basis to relate them. It is not needed for science to create a "total system" to be "real science", but all science purports to describe a singular reality, and cannot section itself off to a special part of the world. Science cannot assign arbitrarily the proper purview of any investigation, let alone designate that for clearly political divisions or the biases of men. Science always entails learning, and so the models of the world science develops are learned and products of intelligence, and are reproduced for every person which practices science. They may be reproduced by independent investigation or taught. The latter effectively amounts to the same as reinventing the wheel, but with many expedient instructions guiding the student to conclusions another scientist developed. All of this science is conducted without any necessary institution or authority from above dictating what it can and cannot be. The scientist must still seek spiritual authority from outside, but that seeking is ultimately the choice of the scientist. There isn't a "neutral science" in the sense that science can be conducted without an authority to allow comparison and adjudication of facts. That said, the adjudication of facts is not in of itself necessary for science to be conducted. At a basic level, any such investigation, no matter how spurious, is "science". There is no rule against conducting bad science. There is also no guarantee that the most rigorous and honest science will allow someone to arrive at the truth, as the wisest men can build elaborate theories far removed from what happens, believing they are doing everything the way it ought to be done to be in line with the truth and all facts they have known up to that point. Because facts are much more reliable than senses and determinations we would have to reconstruct, we turn to established facts and theories. Which establishment we turn to is our choice, but we readily recognize that others like us asked the same question and conducted some sort of science to determine the truth. They may have published their knowledge without reservation, or produced some media occulting secrets that they wrote for those "in the know", or as a way to conceal this knowledge from hostile parties or unworthies. Whether we trust the establishment's facts is less relevant than our recognition that there were people asking this question, and we take from their statements and actions what we will. Given the human propensity for lying, we would discern any truth from people with the belief that lies can be detected and overcome, and that in one way or another, truth is accessible. Those who speak of pure lies and the most profuse lies can only lie in certain ways; if they lapse in the Big Lie for even a moment, they leave an opening that allows a ruthless critic to pry open the Big Liar and make him or her spill their secrets. It is no surprise that those who commit most religiously to the Big Lie are both vulnerable to torture and given over to torture cults, and find torture impressive and morally worthwhile for its own sake. The two practices go hand in hand, because someone has to believe in the might and moral authority of torture to believe the Big Lie won't turn viciously on itself. Anyone lapsing in the love of torture will eventually crack, or fail to lie as effectively as someone who is a devout liar. Science is skeptical, but never doubtful from fear, or uncertain because of wordplay. That fear - for the language tricks to manipulate reality rely ultimately on fear or some other manipulation beneath the dignity of reason - is the intrusion of institutions and the failings of human faculties.

All scientific endeavors, like any knowledgeable act, are moral acts in some way. This is not to say that science is driven by emotion or what we would want, but that every scientific endeavor is guided by a sense of moral judgement regarding the natural world, or command of the natural world, that is worth calling "science". Science must remain committed to the natural world and an approach to nature, rather than an approach that is intrinsically human-biased, institutional, or based on ulterior motives of property. We would need to have some connection to the natural world and to our native sense for science to be conducted, and following institutional authorities telling us to conduct "The Science" blindly is anathema to science. Nowhere is the truth in of itself the moral aim. The moral aims do not take the form of sentiments or black boxes which are inexplicable. They are, in this early stage, nothing more than assertions that there is a cause that is something more than a mechanical motion compelling behavior. Sense experience cannot be modulated by these moral aims in the same way, without training the body's senses to alter perception. We do not morally choose what our eyes see or ears hear. No one believes it to be a genuine moral cause to claim you saw something other than what you saw, or to not see what is in front of you out of a belief that ignorance is strength. Science, or things that would suggest some formal reasoning and systematization, is developed deliberately, with the limited resources available for learning. The scientist knows that there is only so much time to work with, and the past learning that allowed further inquiry. There is further a need to seek out events in the world that can provide data, experiment, and translating the thought of learning into something that can be written down or communicated, or at least recorded for future scientific inquiry. While sense provides a wealth of data, much of which the scientist wishes to filter out since it is noise, science to be effective must mitigate wasteful allocation of time and resources, and does not indulge in trivial things if it is to be a worthwhile endeavor. The conduct of science is only beholden to reality if we are beholden to reality for something we want to do in the world. We might not like the truth, but if we want to learn about the natural world, the worst thing to do is lie to ourselves about what our sense tells us and what science, reason, and all of the approaches to truth about the natural world would require. We can lie to ourselves or others, and we may make honest mistakes, but to say that lying is strong is the first true death of science in the genuine sense. We would like to conduct science in a way that matches reality not because science has the power to do this, or because we are morally good or invested in truth, but because the truth of the natural world would serve us better than a little white lie or koan we told ourselves. Even if we told ourselves the smallest of white lies in science to make our job easier - we memorize something about the world and apply that to find new truths - we would remain aware that our prior assertions were flawed, or we knew we were simplifying and reducing something complex to a system we can work with, rather than be caught in the morass of reductio ad absurdum.

It is this that is the first and purest economy a human undertakes. Before the house of resources can be managed in an economic task, the faculty that allows someone to think economically must be disciplined. Whether someone believes in political economy or rationing out their material resources or sees such an exercise as wasteful, the faculties of reason and learning are always managed by the mind. This would be as true for a Marxist as it would be for a classical liberal, despite the disdain for economism among the former for reasons they have justified and are better explained by the Marxists themselves. There is no getting around the reality that any mind, no matter how intelligent by whatever metric one imagines, has limited resources to learn new things and acquire new information. This task is not just about developing a scientific theory or model of how the world works. The application of science to work tasks, or any deliberate action regarding the natural world, is dependent in one way or another on the basic task of science. The same faculties apply to the allocation of intelligence resources to domains outside of the natural world, such as politics or the abstractions humans often contend with. Those domains would be within the purview of science, since they are the result of human existence which is at root as natural as anything else. The abstractions they deal with are not natural things that can be isolated in a lab or treated as physical data, but they can be recorded and theories can be constructed about politics, society, psychology, and anything. They can be, in principle, applied to theology, with the caveat that the scientist is aware the methods of science derive from metaphysical and ultimately religious thinking, and religious matters are rarely presented as theories or rational doctrines that are suitable for the same study physics or chemistry. Religion, and the world, is never reducible to "science", as if the world couldn't exist without science being active. Much of what we learn and know is not conducted through any scientific approach, and it is entirely legitimate to reject science as a method in favor of another method that is suitable to the wishes of life or the mind. All of those other methods would be themselves understood by scientific analysis to determine the mode of operation, but in our everyday experience, we do not need a theory or any scientific approach to learn about the world or navigate life. Much of our life does not involve any great science, or only a crude form of science that would be worked out by the guesswork of a child. That crude form is still science in the loosest sense, whatever we may judge of the quality of such a science. But, in everyday life, we are not looking for experiments or theories to explain things, and demanding proof to the extent even crude science would require. We can learn on faith or follow instincts, or operate with working principles that were never the result of a scientific approach. Often, what is called "science" in modernity is not science in the sense that the word would be appreciated, but a pedagogical approach to operations that is cloaked in the language of "the science". Learning from Bill Nye the Science Guy's wacky sound effects is not a scientific approach.^[2] However any learning is done, all of the results are in principle things science can verify. It may be that what was learned concerned a cosmological view which was intended to make scientific inquiry impossible, or was intended specifically to occult knowledge so that science would be resisted. Perhaps the thing learned of was vague and no realistic faculty humans possess will ever arrive at useful scientific findings regarding it. How we would account for the resources of the mind is not immediately evident. To assess those resources requires a thorough assessment of the mechanisms of knowledge and learning, in addition to a sufficient assessment of materials available for data and research. All of those assessments would be far beyond the economic thought available to science alone, absent anything else. It is further not evident from science alone any preferred direction of learning that the mind itself would mandate, or a certainty of any animal's nature demanding learning fit any preferred path. The resources of the mind, whatever they are, are known to be limited. If they weren't, we would know everything there is to know and we don't need to bother with any more learning.

At first, the findings of science are only to describe what the world is, assign proper names, assemble information in some way that is easily readable and comparable, and establish sense of what is valued in the first place. The first value is born out of logical connections and deductions, which is necessary to construct any axiom or complex object that science can assess. There is not yet a moral value attached to quantity or purpose. Science has no direct purpose for itself, even for its own sake. To state scientific facts is to state the obvious and is not inherently worth anything just because it's true. This presumes the facts are adjudicated correctly and resemble the actual world we live in, which we will take for granted since we concern ourselves with the most honest science we can conduct. There are some moral conclusions to draw that are self-evident from the objects described. We cannot claim that things are other than what they are, or do things other than what they actually do. There is a limit to what objects in the world can be perceived as, before our description of the things is far removed from anything that would be morally worthwhile or relevant to the actual world the description is meant to model. We cannot make society into things it is very much not, especially when the failure of a false model is evident. We cannot in reality make a "dual system" of science and call it science in the genuine sense. One system would be the real science or sufficiently real for the moral purposes science serves, and the other would be a system of habitual lying and consensual reality that is mandated by institutions. Even as moral values are attached more to our emotions, proprietary wants, and things removed from science, we are still beholden to a world when describing the things or actions that are granted moral value. The other values derived can be understood scientifically - we have models of why we feel as we do, and why property is relevant to humanity and would have arisen in some form due to what we are as living and thinking animals.

A mental barrier is erected between what things are and what they could be. What we want or need is at first a condition that simply is. We want what we want, regardless of any reason why we should want it. We do not abide any moral value intrinsically considering anything abomination, good, or evil, and none of those things are substances of the universe or things we can universally recognize. There is no moral value in anything that can be derived from science telling us what things morally are, beyond the facts that describe definite qualities and quantities. It is also not intrinsically morally worthwhile to regard 10 units as morally different from 10,000, aside from noting the distinct quantities as a fact. We would have to judge instead something that results from the distinction of quantity regarding a particular thing, which would be emergent from the causes to describe something new. Often these are multiple causes, but there are singular causes which may be seen as foundational for our purposes. For example, we do not need an elaborate theory to explain why water - dihydrogen oxide - possesses the qualities it does, and where quantities of it can be discovered. We might have a theory of how this substance came about in studying natural history. From water comes its consequences. The substance is crucial for organic life and is among the chief material bases for civilization. Without fresh water, humanity suffers greatly. The moral values resulting from those consequences are not fixed, as if more water is always good, or there is any marginal utility that is universally recognized. All of the quantities of water are only meaningful morally when they correspond to utility, and utility is always a definite quality or condition rather than a substance outside of it. Utility in humans is a product of the body's mechanisms before any psychological appeal of water can be considered. Regardless of what humans think in the abstraction, they will require so much water for tasks, and can do with excess water so many things, if it can be stored and carried. All of those conditions are definite qualities and not freely exchangeable. In science, there would be no ambiguity about these qualities, nor any "spectrum" that can be determined by any law of nature. A range of tolerance for acceptable values of any given purpose would be morally equivalent for that purpose, and comparison within that range would be devoid of moral or computable value without any qualitative distinction in outcomes, all of which are also definite qualities. By no law are any of these scientific facts motivators for persistent behavior. All of the basic values can only affirm themselves - and therefore, the object of love is love, the object of money is money, and so on. There would be no intrinsic reason any one thing necessitates a new thing morally. The impulse for new moral sentiments arises either from something beneath the notice of the thing we value, or from a confluence of events which synthesize something new. Absent any compelling reason, one thing does not become another by some spooky force that is contradictory or incomprehensible. There is always a reason why that happens, and noting that it does happen does not imply that it ought to happen. For moral purposes, facts are valued as nothing more than what they are, and analysis and synthesis suggest a view of the world that someone can adjudicate for themselves. Science as a method does not dictate authoritatively what anything is or is not. It builds theories and models which refine sense we already possessed. This recursive process of science begins as something crude enough to be taken on faith, or because we hold those truths to be self-evident. The spiritual authority science relies on is not reducible to "science" itself as a germ, but a recognition of what science studies. In short, the spiritual authority of science corresponds not to any institution or preference, but to independent verification of facts, and independent direction of the scientific process. This makes sense given the proper origin of scientific approaches to the world. Science originates not as a thought experiment or with the monied producers motivated by coin, but with labor and the genuine existence of laborers. The first science arises not because it was handed down, but because many who worked found understanding the world very useful.

From looking at the body, electrical signals or chemicals in the brain, not a single emotion can be discerned as something morally significant or real. Nothing in nature "encodes" for one particular emotion, as if there were a substance for even the simplest of impulses such as fear or pain. No emotion or iota of sentiment in the world can be reduced to that. Emotion is a necessarily subjective experience that is at first something without any word or symbol to suggest its existence. By default, we have no words to describe as our "feelings", which is why they are feelings. If feelings corresponded to anything rationally determined to suggest how we are supposed to feel, we would describe them not as a state or substance of love or hatred or liking any particular thing, and such gauges of preference are notoriously pseudoscientific to say the least. It is well known that when humans are coached, they can be made to say they "feel" any particular way, and words from a thought leader will dictate what those feelings "are" and how they can be communicated. In this way, it is hoped that the sentiments of humans can be changed, for whatever moral influence the educator or overseer has to manipulate or cajole a human. Even if this were done for reasons that are defensible and appreciated by the recipient party, such interactions are intrinsically manipulative and override the native emotion of a human being. Perhaps we want to be manipulated in this way or see this serving some higher purpose which is not emotional. The feelings themselves are things only we know, and they are known not by description but experience and familiarity. It may be helpful to assign a name to some emotion, but this will always be a half-measure. The full state and sense of ourselves, including every nervous impulse, is not something easily condensed into a singular word token. We do not even fill the consciousness with a singular such emotion or "state", as if emotion were a state machine playing a game. In principle, we could know for ourselves every iota of our feelings and construct a model. This would likely not offer great explanatory power. What we know very well is that all of our feelings exist for some purpose. No feeling just happens spontaneously, even when we let ourselves feel whatever instinct or the environment summons and that feeling was not part of any rational design or seeming purpose. The purpose of emotion does not mean anything more than the fact of its existence, but it usually the case that we could trace some chain of causality to explain emotions and their recurrence.

What we do with these emotions is ultimately for us to decide, rather than something mandated by any moral philosophy or religious tenets. It can never be a sin to "feel", even if we would rather not feel a particular way or see an emotional state as problematic and against all of our interests. If we did sense an obligation to change emotional state, there would be a rationale for doing so that is outside of the purview of emotion or science. There would also be a way in which these emotions, like any other reflex of the body, are honed and trained. Humans being natural liars, they learn to manipulate their emotional state, and among the manipulations is the projection of a stone wall which we are told is "emotionless". This readiness for battle is too an emotional condition, holding against anything that would confront it. It is not truly emotionlessness, but a projection of strength that is expected to impose on the surrounding environment and withstand anything another willful agent throws at it. It makes little sense to maintain this projection against the natural world or for one's own self-indulgence, and the emotional state of humans rarely registers intense hatred or any stern emotional state towards anything other than living things, with a very strong bias towards other humans. Emotions are almost entirely preoccupied with our feelings towards other humans, society as a whole, and institutions humans built that present the clearest danger and most relevant fact for navigating the world. Emotions towards a natural disaster or the wind or the gods are misplaced and we easily get over those feelings. Emotions towards a pitiful symbol or spectacle, or a mere idea, are comically and tragically misplaced. It is only in a society where symbolic representation and lying reaches the level of critical failure that emotional investment in symbols, flags, idolatry, and other such things becomes disproportionate to any genuine purpose the symbol has. The symbols are just words on a piece of paper or a pattern on fabric. Even when the flag symbolizes the state that one is a member of, the object of emotional relevance is not the symbol or idol but the state as an institution and the state's realized expression. People who are not part of the state's preferred social structure have long found such idolatry surrounding the state to be a sick joke at best and a travesty haunting the Earth on average. The emotions in of themselves are not the sin, for it is through those emotions that many moral senses will arise. We do not develop moral sense because it is scientifically necessary to live. We could easily develop a moral approach to life without regard to any emotion, and regard emotion as a nuisance to be muted or dulled. Emotions are not the sole motivator, for many primordial instincts are not emotional at all but reflexes we come to accept and hone like any other muscle. The passions proper are not derived from emotions, but speak of something deeper that becomes a much more prominent want in humanity. And of course, all of our moral values are choices we make in the conditions we live in, rather than something emotion "made" us do. It would not be possible to speak of moral actors in humans did not deliberate, or were expected to own their deeds and their very being. Morally, all that we do and all that we are is questionable, no matter any judgement of guilt or fault. Justice does not exist by any natural law nor does it exist as any sentiment or passion on its own. To speak of justice, which will be revisited in later writing, is to speak of a world and a sense of what it could be, and speaks of a world without regard of any individual preference or conceit of what it would mean to be just. That could never be a passion that concerns a local sentiment, since any justice worthy of the name would be very aware of the world and society in which a just social agent lives. Even if that were accepted, justice does not intrinsically hold any moral appeal. The moral causes animating humans are usually unjust and intentionally so, and this intentional hypocrisy is glorified and defended as positively just. By all of the thinking we hold to concerning justice, there is nothing intriniscally wrong or amoral about doing this. If we were to think of a world without this lying, where truth reigns instead of human sentiments, the world that is produced has no need of justice and would see the defeat of humanity as a fait accompli. Humanity has had to lie to itself to pretend that it is not what its past made it become, and pretend that there is a future by faith alone or some new technology or promise of a crass sort.

The lack of emotion is not the flawless machine operating smoothly, as the technocratic conceit portrays such a state. The drilled and conditioned soldier, impeccably replicating what is programmed and carrying it out, is not devoid of emotion. Every contemptuous utterance of military-speak, every talking-down, every humiliation, drips with a contempt that the soldier must feel to carry out this mission. If they did not feel in a way that maintains this aggressive stance, they would not be effective soldiers. Of course, this is the most degraded emotional state of the soldier - someone who projects strength by glorifying venality and all of the worst aspects of the cult and practice of war. It is not difficult to see this contempt for what it is, and that for all of the protestations of those who revel in shame and ridicule, it would not be effective if this visible contempt did not exert emotional force. Lying and dissembling require a willingness to lie, and an acquired immunity to any sentiment to suggest that doing this is wrong. In practice, anyone who fights cannot conform to this ideal that is presented as "military efficiency", and those who fight are in private and sometimes in public very emotional and passionate, and must be so. That emotion is not a dull sentiment drilled to its most essential substance to be pushed like a machine. Emotional regulation suggests that the fighting man would feel in ways the slave, the subordinated and humiliated worker, does not, and that the fighter alone has the "right" to feel this. Those who are most effective at fighting are not those who project superficially the emotional state and venality of their profession, but those who are adept at controlling emotion, responding to their environment in ways that suit the needs of defense while not being violated by "illegal orders" affecting that state. How the soldier is individually conditioned is something different from mass psychology and the mobilization of large numbers of people, and the soldier is trained above all to fear their commanders and despise non-combatants. Regardless of whether the soldier knows this to be bullshit, or whatever life the soldier has outside of fighting, the cult and practice of war suggests their emotional state is responsive to hierarchy, the needs of utility for victory, and a sense of merit based on that above all other senses of merit. The true emotionless state is the fried brain shambling through existence, not really caring what happens. This is the conditioning of the lowest class in the miltiarized state school, where the slaves are indolent and fearful and overcome with such anxiety that it dissuades them from rebellion, productivity, or much sign of life at all. The intent is clear - to eliminate all standards of moral comparison, so that the slave is nothing more than a lump of matter made into some utility of the master, without thinking about it. As with the drilling of soldiers, the purest form of the slave's "ideal emotional state" is maladaptive towards the tasks a slave would optimize, if the slave were to be a useful productive implement. The indolence, drunkenness, and malaise of a slave's existence is not the point, but a preferred effect to prevent their rebellion and uphold the overall social order. States that are the preference of institutions and classes becomes internalized emotional states, blamed on the individual so that the institution may be expressed in its place. We see the common thread that the lack of emotion is not a mark of probity or independence, but a sign of indolence and moral decay, where the actual human is replaced by an institutional representation that is detached from any condition. Even commanding emotion, which is the true goal of such conditioning if carried out for the utility of some task, requires an emotional investment in doing so, and a disgust towards the sort of indolence that is common in institutions, which are distant from anything the actual flesh and blood humans wanted from them. The indolent are so deprived of emotion that they cannot bring themselves to hate their own decrepit state or do anything about it. That is what it would mean to be truly emotionless, and only a sick society would believe this is a desirable moral quality.

Emotions do not need to be intense or correspond to a desired magnitude. The reality is that there are no such magnitudes which can be ascertained, for emotions are not substances like so much opium that is sold by imperial agents to cajole outcomes out of their subjects. Pain is not measured in any unit even as a base emotion. It is impossible to rate pain on a scale of 1 to 10, and anyone asking you to do this shows their utter contempt for you. Any emotion is only elaborated upon by asking questions about its origin or its connection to other values, moral or material, that it pertains to. We do not ask "how much pain", but where the pain is located, and what that pain indicates. Only in this way would the pain be described in any qualitative sense. We might, for physical pain, note the sensitivity of the nerves, but this "metric" is not premised on any scientific evidence that would be confirmed in a lab. We are aware of our own nerves well enough that we can readily assess for ourselves what the pain is and the urgency of response. Translating this nervous activity into language is problematic, but the understanding is something familiar enough that others can sense that pain without any linguistic rendering that could be written down, and could summarize after the fact what that was in a way that is communicable by meaning. It would not be something expressed literally, in the exact language scientific inquiry would need to establish a formal theory. We nonetheless act on that awareness of pain, or any other emotion, as if it were more than a singular utterance of an idea or an intensity of that utterance. We are able to make comparisons between these states without a scale or spectrum suggesting what we are "allowed" to express or construe as genuine emotion, and translate that comparison into something that could be written down. Whether a dry explanation would do justice to something that is particular to us, and not at all universally felt in the same way from one human to another, is another question. It is not too difficult to convey minute details of an emotional state in a way a reader would understand, and relate by meaning or metaphor or a commonly understood expression the state with a compact phrase that is a reference.

In daily life, emotions guide a moral sense that we rely on for anything more complex than trivial instincts. Even the motivation to get out of bed is an emotion, unless one is so denuded that they are reduced to an instinct to seek food and do the barest minimum possible to appear living, responding less to fear than an expectation that something out to be done despite a lack of feeling for it. Emotions still operate at a low enough level that we would not consider them foundational for everything or significant moral causes on their own. They do inform our thinking about what is moral, for good or ill. Emotions can be manipulated by others or trick us into doing things that we know to be irrational and counterproductive. Yet, they also convey understanding simple enough, especially in interpersonal or political matters that entail reading this state and intents that derive from interests which are usually emotional. If we ignore emotion in our moral philosophy, we wind up with people hating life and everyone around them for good reason, and this becomes typical and expected without really being acknowledged as consequential. You could not make a coherent ethical or moral claim that such a hate-filled existence is bad or evil or anything else, but it is not hard to see how such an existence will be dreary and lead to predictable outcomes. I should not spend too much time on each basic emotion or pontificate on them for long, and I trust the reader has enough awareness to know what they are and the variants of them. Mental games and tricks are played, particularly with love, hatred, pain, and pleasure, which loom over the other states and often are invoked to eliminate any nuance or minute understanding of the body or why those emotions exist, or where they are directed. Eugenics as a system is heavily reliant on emotional manipulation, consider its origin in utilitarian philosophy which emphasizes the most crass and degenerated emotional states over anything meaningful.

The passions are often conflated with emotions, but suggest something much more elaborate. Where emotions are either minor or major and always fleeting, passions are enduring and entail motives that operate at a level that is something more than moral, ethical, or anything natural. They are not necessarily spiritual convictions and usually aren't, and do not rely on any authority that needs to justify their existence. The passions are, in short, the most elaborate expression's of someone's deepest and true wants at a primal level. They are informed by contact with the world and all of our sense of it, including ourselves, but are never beholden to it. They are not beholden to any reasoning or knowledge suggesting why we should be passionate about anything, and do not necessarily entail any history or soulful content whatsoever. They are, in a sense, the reason for us to exist at a basic level, absent any other compelling motivation that suggests the passions would be set aside. Without them, life would not mean much to our feeling. We might be able to conceive of someone content to be passionless, continuing through existence for some other cause, but even a drive for serenity is a passion of sorts. Someone seeks calmness in a world gone horribly wrong, and this calmness is not merely a desirable sentiment but am approach to life which allows for a very basic need which can be intellectually appreciated - security. More than that, it would be a starting point for someone to reorient their trajectory and consider their further activities, without the fetter of existing passions or some lower condition of existence or feeling. The calm human is not so much emotionless or rational, but possesses a confidence about what it does that is reassuring beyond anything a confluence of feelings or material value can bring. We seek an objective to do something that is passionately pursued, without any particular emotional state. It may be our life's mission to build a house, or reproduce because we like the idea of a mini-me running around the world, and it is not for any other interest to tell us we're not allowed a passion for those things. We may discipline ourselves in the passions and choose to some extent what we would pursue, whereas with emotions we would expect to feel what we feel with regards to our situation. We would stop to think if our passions can be reconciled with our existence and all other moral values, or if our passions are intrinsically bad. If it is a passion to torture people, reasonable people would see that as problematic for their own sake. Other people recognize passions in others and recognize the passion as an indicator of potential friendship, or sense a clear and present danger which must be removed at all cost. Rarely do we take a neutral stance towards any passion, however much we might claim neutrality to keep the peace. Even passions that seem mundane become an interest of other people, even though we would think it is no one's business but our own. Eventually, passions are no longer merely our own concern, because they typically entail coexistence with a world of other such creatures who may covet the same thing, but can only do so in a limited space. The existence of passions in conflict does not in of itself guarantee that the conflict must happen, as if passions are pursued by some inexorable force of the soul or the universe. Fear of consequences or a sense of something greater than the passions are motivators to forestall that confrontation, and no war would be fought purely for wanting it unless someone were secured from the consequences of the full extent of war. Most of us never have such a luxury to declare war unilaterally, and if we can wage war it is only of a limited sort. Only through the highest levels of political life does war take on meaning that allows it to be a pursuit of some passion - otherwise, what war usually means is the will of the local state strongly disapproving of that which transgresses its monopoly on legal force, or what would count as such in a society without laws as such.

The instincts operate beneath notice of ordinary consciousness, scarcely registering as emotions but are never really encoded facts in the scientific sense, as they are often claimed to be. We may isolate mechanisms in nature that explain instincts, but instinct to be relevant is something understood to operate as a consequence of knowledge, rather than "just so" existing as a force of nature. We can control and hone instincts, but we cannot control material substances, even if this control is limited and only acquired with training rather than any learning in the sense the mind accomplishes the task. Instinct may be an outgrowth of those mechanisms, but can just as well emerge from an emotional, passionate, or moral sense that is valued. Every tic, every impulse, can arise from causes that need not spawn from a particular basis. An instinct may arise and dissipate beneath any notice that would be relevant from observation, but we know this happens very often. Emotions are not merely higher forms of the instincts, but are something different altogether. Emotions only answer to something that is self-evident to our sense, and while we may lack words to express emotions, we know them when we feel them and can recall them. We do not notice instincts, and our treatment of them is very different. The instinct is never morally valued unless we find some rational purpose to suggest it is; by itself, it is not even valued in the sense that a material or scientific value is. The instincts do inform much of the basic behavior of human beings, and we treat them like muscles to be honed rather than things which are in of themselevs the point. Only through certain practices can regressive assign to instinct a greater value than we would assign to it if we were to be moral actors. Because we do have many instincts to comprise basic processes, our sense of ourselves and what we are doing is dependent on recognizing instincts as what they are, and they occupy a particular niche in conscious existence and in life. Those instincts exist and cannot be nullified without radically altering what life is and does, and what we do with our bodies no matter how much we divorce instinct from rationality and mind in our constructs. The conceits of a fool who believes they are a point of pure rational mind are very instinctive, pathological and predictable, because such a person is playing a mental trick. That person would require reconstructing every instinct and emotion to conform to this model that is imposed on reality, and maintaining this is any real body requires continuous energy to arrest the state. Such a body would impose its model on the world around it almost axiomatically, and becomes very sensitive to the surrounding environment, in spite of all of its conceits. The instincts of such a person are exaggerated and exploited, particularly in societies where a thorough accounting of instincts and every other psychological trait becomes an institutional obsession.

In struggle, a battle, a challenge, a problem to solve, or some other instance in the world which someone encounters, the adjudication of merit becomes the necessary moral value for solving the situation. Because objectives can be broken down piece by piece, with every potential interaction considered as a game, it is a gross simplification to speak of a singular meritorious value without qualification. I concern myself here not with wider game theory but with the adjudication of merit for any particular part of the game. A proper game theory requires a thinking of the economic problem proper. Merits stand alone and do not necessitate any game. In principle, they do not require an immediate problem. All that exists and all that can be done can be judged by some merit, in a hypothetical problem of our creation, or in observing such a problem resolved between two alien objects in the world. There is no smallest unit of something that is the baseline for judgements of merit, and in principle the merit of very large systems can be reduced to a singular value or outcome. For every game so imagined, there are a number of inputs - causes - and outputs - effects. These inputs are values that arise in a way that allow merit to be judged as a result of the game. The values are qualitative, and they are each discrete, no matter how small a fragment of substance is. A given quantity of a value is itself a quality for the purposes of further judgement of merit. The quantity does not exist apart from the quality. The inputs to the game are previous outputs, which continues backwards ad infinitum. This sense of moral value in merit only exists inside the "game" mentality and value of what results as the result of a game. We make of that value what we will. Since qualities cannot be directly mathematically compared, the translation of one quality to another is established within these games, and only there, so far as the game mentality is maintained. Differing number quantities are understood through the logic of mathematics, which is premised on a naive set theory which requires countable objects and the concept of subdividing them into fractions, infinitesimals, and so on. Mathematical quantities can only be added when the qualities match or are convertible to one another, which is never axiomatically guaranteed. In two chapters, this concept of merit in game theory will be revisited. It is important here to make note of what merit is in moral values we would assign.

Where scientific moral values are read from the world and presumed to be neutral facts if we are to hold a conversation about their value, merits are inherently private judgements and local to the interest party that judges them. Where the values of nature are mutually understood and never seriously contested against well-established fact, the values of merit are always up for grabs, and the stakes of victory are on the line. This is not to say that what is meritorious is purely at the whim of whatever someone wants. A game is played with multiple parties, and the world itself is viewed as a party to this game which the player might see as the problem to be solved. Merit is a value for keeps. While not every merit is worth taking and the costs of the game can ontweigh the benefits - or the game as a whole can be a game with no winning solution or where every outcome is designed to make sure you lose - merit will have to be possessed one way or another. Demerits or shame can never be redeemed, just as merits or pride can never truly be annihilated from the true past. This judgement of merit is at first for the interested party alone, but by virtue of playing the game with competitors, the competitors will know at the least that participants in the game seek merit, and that all merits are things that must be judged against the world where the game is played. All such games, regardless of our consideration of their genuine meaning, are played in a real world that allowed them to exist, and we regard the game's value to life in general if we so plese. This works only so far as the world is seen as a game or a simulation, as we did early in this writing. The world as a whole, and any part of it, does not conform to any game. Playing the game, however much the situation is forced on someone, is still a choice of someone. If you are dragged into a game against your will, it only happens because another will made it so, and the game does not intrinsically hold any moral worth whatsoever. The only way to make someone play is to compel them forcibly to play, or for some natural law to suggest that refusal to play means eventual consequences from other actors in the world or eventual death from the forces of your own body - for example, the body lacking nutritious sustenance and thus dying of starvation or preventable disease, because you were too lazy to go get more fruit or decided enough was enough and this was the time to pass on.

Merit is attributed to deeds rather than the being of persons, and can only be so. Being itself is a type of action, an imposition of something onto the world that is judged to be morally valuable with regards to the world. That is to say, it is undeniable that merit of any deed can be judged, even if we do not see the acts as intrinsically meritorious; and so to is this being judged as the accumulation of all meritorious deeds of that being. This applies to people and it applies to objects which are judged on their merits. What people think about themselves, in their own fantasy, has no bearing on merit as a concept. Since the objects do not hold for themselves any sense of morality or thought about it, their merit is entirely in the eyes of those who appropriate an object, or who see the object as something in motion for their intent. Merit does not regard knowledge or thought as intrinsically relevant at all to meritorious worth. For the manager or proprietor, thought is judged not as something with a special existence where special moral rules apply, but as just another object in the world, with properties we regard. We recognize thought and intelligence as meritorious not because thought alone dictates merit based on its emotional or instinctive wants, but because thought and intelligence are proven by competition to be relevant to the needs of life and moral judgement. There is no law of nature that intelligence cannot judge itself, but there is a persistent stupidity in humans when viewing themselves and a crass self-indulgence that is encouraged by the predatory. For the crass, meritorious deeds are purely symbolic and detached from a real world; and this is possible because the merit was in the end adjudicated for a game, and does not possess in of itself any moral authority. Why we judge merit is not self-evident at all, but we can always judge this. The meritorious do not need to prove themselves against any natural law which provides a metric. The meritorious only need to meet the win condition of a game that is defined by us. The world itself has no need of this, but we have need of the world and recognize that which we cannot change by will. The force of human will and interest that does construct an environment is not judged by merit or struggle at all, but by moral values of a much different sort, which are not relevant here. Why we truly do anything has nothing to do with moral worth in merit. We will, regardless of what we judge as meritorious, possess a sense of someone's overall merit of being. This may be called many things, and conflated with concepts of honor, social proof, moral goodness or probity, or an account of debts and credits. I assign the name "prestige" to this confluence of merits as a useful placeholder for the nebulous judgements of merit that are summarized by society. This is not because the prestige is in the end "fake" or a contest of appearances in actuality. The prestige of someone is judged not by the superficial but by a realistic assessment of ability. What we value as prestige in legal or social custom, or the games of posturing and threats that comprise much of human sociality, has little to do with our genuine sense of someone's strength, or an object's total potential merits. This is judged necessarily because anything we do that would be meritorious and recordable in language is an object, or an event we can treat as an object or something that is. If something exists, it could be construed as possessing meritorious qualities, or de-merits that are associated with the name of a thing and its genuine existence. In the social game we established in the human race, superficiality and venality are always meritorious, because history and experience have proven to us that the human race does not care about any more merit than that which secures them. If low cunning and backstabbing are demonstrated to win time and time again - and they never do function in this axiomatic way - they possess a merit that is impossible to deny, no matter how much we know these habits to fail in the long term. Outside of the game environment, merit is meaningless - our moral values would instead be the values in-kind, accepted as what they are and for us to do with as we please.

Every merit is contingent on meritorious acts generally. No merit stands alone and apart from the game environment, and no game truly escapes the world in which it is played. A simulation, like a computer game, is recognized as a simulation because it is played out in imagination, and we know from experience that the game environment does not directly affect the outside world. Yet, our knowledge of the simulation derives from the same world, and the simulation environment can tell us things about the world outside of that game. Within the game, many more games can be isolated, each of which are contingent of merits that are judged from outside of the game itself. No game is ever self-contained or a "total system" in this way. The world itself is never purely a game at all, and the world-as-great-game is itself a simulation of the world that conforms to our sense and knowledge, as we can tell easily. In the game, extraneous values that are null for the purposes of merit are uninteresting to our moral judgement in this regard. If a strategy does not involve some element in the game, then for the purposes of that strategy's merit, the other element does not figure into any judgement. A strategy must account for all values in the game environment without necessarily regarding them as meritorious or valuable. Many objects in a game environment are either purposeless but exist because they do, or because the game environment is not controlled. For example, in a soccer playing field, illegal objects are not considered part of the game, but there are rules and regulations in the event a foreign object disrupts play, or an illegal action is committed by a player.

All meritorious values, or values that are subsumed into merit towards some task, are relatable by classification and dependencies. It is only possible to truly classify and identify things based on what they do, rather than esoteric definitions of what they are. If definitions are purely a thought experiment or hypothetical, than anything can be anything with enough philosophical wordplay, and any emotion described above can be manipulated to affect judgement, by ourselves or by other influencers and cajolers. All such definitions are judged by some merit to demonstrate what exactly they can be in a classification scheme, regardless of how well their definition fits into an existing schema or whether the "thing" described in a theory actually exists or resembles any real process. To best judge the merits of actions and outcomes in a game, and of the things themselves involved in the game, all of these must be understood as relatable towards those outcomes. This implies not necessarily a rank or substance of worth that is innate, but that different things and actions produce qualitatively different outcomes, which can be judged logically. The quantities of some object imagined as a fungible substance - for example, tokens of currency or ounces of water - are only meaningful in hierarchy when they amount to qualitative changes. The further implications of this arise when moral thought becomes economic thought, and the "win condition" is judged as a payoff which is necessarily fungible in some imagined grand scheme. In principle, no such "win condition" is necessary to judge both merit and hierarchy. We assemble hierarchies of factual knowledge simply to classify what we know. The mind must do this simply to ration its limited resources to solve any problem requiring learning, and it is this which is exploited most of all.

What makes merit and hierarchy relevant is that it is, so long as we are playing a game, unavoidable. The mind in its learning task is indeed playing a game of sorts. It accepts the challenge of some problem, even when it would rather not play that game and is forced to by events outside of it. If the mind truly refuses to play a game that confronts it due to unavoidable material conditions, the result can only be denial and an inability to see that which is obvious to a neutral observer. In that sense, the world is always the eternal opponent of the mind. The world is not the opponent of consciousness or life itself. Far from it, the world is what allowed life to exist and flourish, and it was the world's mechanisms that, by no virtue of any of our probity, stopped life from maximizing predation and doing abominable things. This is not much comfort, for the world does not consciously do this for our benefit, and the world's cruel sense of justice does not absolve us or protect us forever. We can claerly do better, and this is not an elite understanding but a basic understanding many humans have throughout their existence. The world itself does not play this game, for that is a problem of our conceits. It is not even a necessary conceit of the mind or learning to see its existence as oppositional to other minds or the world outside of it; but for that to truly happen, the mind becomes something very unorthodox to human standards of their selves and how they have learned, and the human mind has learned to distrust new things for many sensible reasons. We may choose the terms of the challenge we set for ourselves to solve, but we do not choose the reality we had to accept in order to begin this process of understanding the world. We can choose to simply not care about things in the world, and let the snot-nosed brat kick you in the back with the full support of the school security officer. It is, for me, not really consequential to play such a rigged game. To everyone else, such an egregious mark of demerit and shame could never be tolerated. This is intended and must be maximized in the school environment. If not for that foul institution's stranglehold on the world and all future employment, it would be a silly challenge to respond to any of that, and very likely I would not be there at all. Nor would the snot-nosed brat be there, who was certainly encouraged by a predatory society and had nothing to gain from this exercise, which he would have forgotten about the next day just as most of us would. The reasons why those acts and the entire game of schooling are relevant are never just-so facts, as if this institution was eternal and baked into nature. It is not a rule that any of that stupidity is a necessary sin for humanity to continue existing, and everyone involved would be better off if that were not encouraged. It is never a natural law asserting something that organized, but the deliberate acts of those who see the game as beneficial and can impose it as a social standard. The hierarchy preceding the establishment of schooling, and the hierarchy that forms within the society dominated by schooling and all that I am writing in these books, is something that exists on a meritocratic basis. The merit is not a merit of justice or anything good, but the simple merit of winning a rigged social competition, for aims of those who sit in positions to engineer society. The rigged game is still a game which must be won on some merits, no matter how spurious. The rigging itself is a game which must abide merit and a hierarchy suggesting what is possible to rig and what is not.

In any event in the world construed as competitive or a struggle, there is no escaping merit and the reality it entails, no matter what ideology or other morality may be invented to sell the struggle. Struggle does not conform to the limited practices of war or social engineering, which are not in of themselves moral acts at all. Those who fight war do not need to adhere to a singular moral philosophy religiously in their internal affairs, and those who fight war can think whatever they want about the situation. What they cannot do is suggest that merits are something other than what they are, and thus, hierarchies premised on merits of those things can only be twisted as far as the abilities of a mind to shape reality allow. If someone wishes to ignore merit, that is their choice, but they would be wrong in the final analysis of the game. To the world as a whole, this moral question is not relevant, for the world has no moral stake in the outcome of any competition we perceive. It is a question for us not because merit is intrinsically valuable or a thing to avoid, but because we would have no other way to make basic moral comparisons about very different objects. In science, systems are judged by facts and our ability to determine them, and pertain to the subject that is studied alone. We may relate different fields of science to each other by facts and accept the facts without further struggle. In our own practice of science, which must be learned by us rather than carried out by some universal process of science baked into nature, we judge those facts by merits necessarily, for we set for ourselves the struggle of determining truth against our own failings and lack of knowledge. We have reason to doubt the adjudication of facts by people, and science as a process only allows people to create models, rather than suggesting any model that is "above Man", as if science were a literal god cajoling us to believe in it. If we are conducting science though, past merit or institutional authority is irrelevant to the truth science portends to, and this becomes morally valuable regardless of institutional conceits about what legitimate scientific statements are. Science to be science does not regard such artificial barriers, and the merit of the world's truth takes precedence over any claim about "real science" by pedagogues or personal authority. For the purposes of science, competition is not a concern, nor is any other presumption humans make about the world. All such presumptions are secondary to the world itself, which must be held as something real without any of us to decide what it is. To believe otherwise is antithetical not so much to the practice of science - science can be conducted on less-than-ideal premises - but antithetical to the moral claim to truth science would suggest, and thus those who imperiously declare facts despise the very concept of science and will proudly repeat that. The insticts, emotions, and passions are not matters of competition or any adjudication at all. They exist without regard to merit, and emotions are a poor guide to merit in any sense. We may value feelings for some moral purpose, but if we are to just feelings by the standards of merit, all of our feelings and sentiments would be subordinated to meritocracy and its cold calculations. Emotion, instinct, and passion would become tools for control in every way, and may as well not exist, or only exist as another machine, abstracted from any genuine existence. This would include the very sensory input required to make any meritorious judgement; and so, in the extreme, such a faith in the moral authority of merit turns inward on itself. Merit becomes nothing more than an autistic conceit, detached from the things that were held to be meritorious. To the world and to a neutral observer seeing such a conceit about the righteousness of merit, where a title or office is held to be the arbiter of moral truth alone, it would appear clearly un-meritorious and worthless for any purpose. Clearly, some sense of scale and acknowledgement of non-existence is necessary, rather than merely the statement of a game environment where agents behave in a virtual space and are only answerable to their qualities. This would apply within the sense of meritocracy itself.

For every meritorious outcome and every distinction of prestige, there is associated with it rank, which is always understood as a spectrum of real numeric values. Without any necessarily limiting condition on the point of merit, all real numbers are potential values. A floor might be set, beneath which rank ceases to be relevant at all for meritorious judgement, and a ceiling might be set where no further promotion within that judgement is possible. All meritorious outcomes of a particular quality have a definite rank, without any uncertainty of this value in the final judgement of the world. Whether we recognize this rank in our study of the outcomes, or whether we can, is not relevant to our assessment of rank. It is always a definite quality for us to act on it with any certainty. The higher the rank, the better - or worse, in the case of demerits indicating failure - the outcome for that quality valued. There may be qualifications of this ranking, and usually the value of rank does not indicate a linear progression of "goodness" to the outcome, as if rank were a fungible substance. Rank as a measure of quantity is ill-suited for most meritorious purposes, as quantities are in of themselves meaningless for merit without corresponding to a desirable quality. We can, though, consider a general rule where more is better and none is bad, without any ceiling to how much rank is worthwhile. For example, in principle, holding one trillion dollars is a thousand times greater in "rank" than one billion, and this is an undeniable advantage in purchasing power if viewed in a vacuum. The particulars of commerce and finance would be less relevant if, instead of money, the unit to be hoarded were bushels of wheat or numbers of human agents of equal labor-power for a task, such as soldiers, and there were in society a general rule that the effect of more food or more soldiers created a linear progression of strength.

We then consider what many warrior aristocrats or those who wish to be think about rank. Superior training and superior weaponry have, when taken together, a geometric effect on overall military strength. Well-trained, well-equipped troops can stand up to many more times their lesser brethren than linear arithmetic would seem to indicate. How those things are judged involves necessarily more ranking of the training methods, weapons. There would be no other way to make such a statement without working with ranks whose meaning is itself understood as indicative of quality. The rank of something is never written on any thing, or something which could be determined universally by science, since this rank doesn't have any "real" existence outside of our moral task of judging merit. We have already eliminated consideration of hierarchical qualifications or distinct classes, and we are aware of the merit in fact of deeds and prestige of things that are held as qualities. The rank is itself a quality of something ascribed to it, rather than a quantitative fact that is measured. Something measured scientifically would not constitute any rank axiomatically; it would at most be a statement of fact that more of some thing exists. It may be that the best-trained and best-equipped soldiers do not perform as well as a ranking scheme would indicate. The final test of merit is not in ranking the staged armies, but their confrontation which is contingent on conditions beyond a commander's control.^[3] We can of course rank this outcome, and we do so without needing to know mechanically every aspect of the game and system. We make judgements of rank on limited evidence and do so out of necessity if the concept is to be morally useful.

The final outcome of rank may fit into ranges of values or fixed assignments, which are given a distinct title and quality, and then placed in a hierarchy. For example, a chain of command promotes by rank, rather than necessary function or a built-in value of the members of a group. The rank is presumed to be a universal scale for this chain of command to work and a sense of meritocracy to be maintained. Even if the "merit" was that someone purchased a commission to become a general, or the general rose by knowing how to brown-nose as is often the way, rank must be respected and regarded. It becomes a merit unto itself, which will in the end be judged by the world to see if that rank is befitting of the man or the institution as a whole. We can invent a whole schema and classification of ranks to judge the rankings, and suggest that there is some natural ranking order ordained by Heaven. It is when rank moves to the realm of the theological or pseudoscientific that it veers away from anything rank originally indicated, and this is the sign of an institution which is going off the rails and needs something other than meritorious judgement or fact to remain a force. Alternatively, obsession for rank or office-holding holds the same problem excessive merit generally does - that the rank dictates imperiously that it must be respected. So long as it commands enough force to make it so, there is nothing stopping this from asserting itself.

For moral values to be relevant to any greater sense of what is right - for morality to do what we conventionally believe it refers to - it is not reducible to any one fact or thing, in a sense that all of the world reduces to this one value above all over others, or a universal standard which must be the mark of moral value. Moral values will be judged against others by people, and this judgement is in the main a judgement of merits, rather than an adjudication of fact or a feeling. All moral claims are made about a world where the moral claims are believed to hold relevance to life generally, and so the claims will likely conflict with each other at some point. Passions, instincts, the material reality of things, and the competitions between people, all exist in the same world, and do not need to regard each other to exist. Because morality is held as a guide to what is right, rather than merely a statement of opinion, the competitive view of moral philosophy prevails over the passive knowledge of its existence. Moral actors do not wait for an ethicist to validate their values, and they definitely don't supplicate to an authority to tell them what to think and what to do. Deference to a moral authority is not the same as the shameless self-abasement that has long gripped humanity and became institutional in the past century. Moral actors are always individuals and must be considered such in order for their actions to be relevant, whether they are persons in society or they are objects judged by individuals. There is no intrinsic social obligation to morality, since society itself is suspect and never exists as an entity locking its membership in a cage. That task would be a moral judgement of institutions, as only institutions could make such a claim to arrest people into a preferred arrangement, and those institutions are always comprised of agents, regardless of whether they hold an ideology suggesting that the agents do not exist or are unknowable. While individuals are the moral agents, the true judges of morals are the actual flesh and blood entities, or any knowledgeable entity. To a computer, morality is an ethical routine which was contingent on human users. If computers were left to push around piles of matter without human attendance, there isn't a genuine moral actor to judge anything the computers do, unless aliens observe this construct from afar. Institutions do not have any independent process to judge morality in the genuine sense, as if they possessed any mind of their own. Moral judgement is premised not just on the statement that it exists but on the interests of the judge, which exist to speak of meaningful morality. If the judge is truly a disinterested party, then for itself, the judge has no moral stake in the outcome. In a court of law, this is desirable - the state appears impartial and not biased by any interests. The judge is acting in accord with a society where actors are moral, and even though the judge's neutrality towards the ruled is expected, the judge is not amoral towards the institution he or she is a member of, and would be obligated by an oath to uphold some standard, among other requirements. There is nothing moral about a scientific experiment, and this is why grotesque abuses in the name of science were a vehicle of the eugenic creed, thrown in the face of the public. Those experiments had no scientific merit or any purpose other than exercising the thrill of torture that is necessary for the eugenic creed, and it is for that reason alone that Mengele was established and encouraged to do as he did. To the eugenist, though, this is positively moral - in fact, such torture is beyond meritorious and exemplifies the core values of the creed, and so their elevation is made frequently.

We have no universal moral code to suggest this is evil, or wrong, because we don't like it, or that the world is offended by the eugenic creed or will defend the decent against this beast. The world's mechanisms do not regard any of our moral judgements one way or another. We can say until our face is blue that eugenism leads to the result a child could see - that this beast can only destroy and make everything it touches into an abomination. Abomination is, regardless of our moral stance, a true indicator of what things are, for it is unmistakable. Eugenism produces abomination at an industrial scale. Yet, there is no moral association inherent to abomination, and the eugenist - in line with the name of their religion, "good genesis" - considers abomination itself to be morally sacred, so long as it is their abomination. Their value for themselves is violently asserted in everything the eugenic creed preaches and does, and it is self-evident to them. Eugenics remains the one true "total system" which does not allow internal contradictions of any sort, while all other ideologies and social arrangements are declared to be contradictory and are fair game for anyone to attack. Eugenics may be attacked superficially, but when any key shibboleth is attacked, or the monstrosity of eugenics based on documented evidence and well-established moral claims is proven and proclaimed, eugenics moves swiftly to attack the infidel with a vigor humanity scarcely summons for anything else. Eugenics claims that it's property is the highest and most sacred claim to spiritual authority - the classical position of the proprietors throughout history is that violence is the supreme authority, whether it is spiritual, temporal, or personal, thus completing the unitarian mission that is one of its faces. But, eugenics spoke of something much more thoroughgoing than a defense of property, and certainly entailed something different from defense of private property. It appears to the present society as if it were natural and unchangeable, and therefore it alone held the moral high ground. According to its philosophy, history is indeed arrested, and it can never be anything else. Yet, it clearly is not this, and eugenics did not produce and could never produce anything it promised. The entire thing is so obviously a get rich quick scheme, promoting venality and filth to keep itself alive, and it has no shame in doing so. Facts do not create moral justice or any inherent scale to live by. We may judge merits by facts, but in the end merit or anything related to it is less relevant than a will to continue acting. Nothing in the world was ordained to exist by any natural law, for the true natural law was always chaos and an origin of nature that is not easily known. The origin of nature has no intrinsic moral relevance at all, since the new has always emerged and asserted its existence regardless of whether it had a moral right to exist or not. Humans did not always exist, and eugenists did not always exist. The eugenic creed is not as natural as its believers insist, and in its wake many who believed in the creed were left with nothing to show for it but a legacy of failure. Anyone who kept their wits about them would predict this failure, but the appeal of eugenics was never in facts or a genuine assessment of nature. It arose at the first technological epoch where its plan for humanity could be imposed, with some effort in directing technology and society in a way that would allow it to rise, and protection during the period where its "Jehad" built up a critical mass that would destroy the world for their cause.

The dominance of institutions over human life obscures what moral claims would have to be if we consider moral actions a worthwhile indicator for what we would do. Morality as a purely selfish mechanism to guide knowledge and learning has a poor endgame, since it does not take a great mind to see that there would be no point to such an existence. It would be better to be truly amoral and unfeeling in the worst way, than to believe in these cargo cults chasing after some holy substance which subsumes all into it. At least with the dreary and dull existence, there is something of fleeting interest that entertains us, and when we leave this mortal coil, we can wash our hands of the problem and leave it to the others. That, though, is hardly a path to anything we would care to do. Absent any compelling force preventing us, we develop further moral sentiments beyond the categories mentioned above. The moral values we truly care about do not correspond to some basic substance of utility or merits. For one, without any purpose that is greater than success in competition, what would be the purpose of any competition? If we believed that competition was the ne plus ultra of moral authority, then the prudent moral philosophy would be for humans to simply have little to do with each other. This is the default of so many people, who have little indication that they are given over to zeal or any holy struggle. Yet, a desire for security involves relating to other humans who we know to be perfectly capable of malice. The only way to protect against this malice is to know the mind of another person, so that their behavior and inclinations can be predicted. It is not surprising that the chief aim of religion is to obscure this mind and intent to outsiders of the religion, and also to protect the property of the adherent within the religion. There is not a collectivist religion in the whole of human history, and such a thing is impossible for people who consider what religion is. Such a collectivism would never be a genuine cooperation, which is an understanding between people who are flesh and blood life-forms constituted as indiviudals. Typically what is called "collectivism" is a prototype for fascist thought systems where actual humans are made to subordinate themselves to something even worse - an institution held by the predatory who wish to rule over a flock. The fascists in due time overcame naive collectivism and found a way to fuse individual sentiments with the ruling institutions, and in doing so, humans would be tied to an ecology, granted "freedom in slavery". Only in this way could conditions be established that made slavery appeal to moral and emotional sentiments. This is only accomplished by creating a total system where freedom is so uncertain and dangerous that it can not be any freedom at all, and only through abject slavery and total abasement can the person be free. It would be the person as an institution that is free, and this freedom is a contract with "society" - now made with the private entities which are the sole remaining society - which subordinates utterly all of the genuine existence the person referred to. All things are abstracted, and yet the language of fascism emphasizes the real and physical where it can suit the aims of the institutions. There will be much to write on that system of thought at a later time, but this much about fascism is self-evident to anyone who has seen the beast and has any reference to the existence of other systems. Naturally, the fascist aims to make all other thought-forms inadmissible, and it does so primarily by moral grand-standing on the most spurious arguments, which terminate the possibility that anything else can exist. A thorough manipulation of moral thought is necessary for fascism, and this thought cannot exist as solely what has been mentioned thus far. We do not need to see fascism to see what morality is. The precursors to higher moral values have been evident for a long time, and in the vaguely understood spiritual thought of primitive peoples, an awareness of something more is already a thing communicated in their societies, that is mutually intelligible when they meet other societies, including those far more developed than their own. It is even the case that developed civilization degrades in certain moral qualities that they admire in primitive society, and this is not a uniform movement towards progress or degeneration. Different societies and different peoples possess different qualities, and these are not merely meritorious qualities, differing sentiment, or differing technology.

There is one uniting quality tying all proper moral values in the world. This is that they are the product of labor. This is not a claim of labor's generative force as a machine to be commanded, labor's emotional ardor or toil, or a legal point of merit. It is not a claim that suggests labor has any right to sovereignty, or that labor is necessarily good. Labors do not have any preferred direction, nor do they exist on some imagined spectrum. By labor we refer not solely to the exertion of bodies or the mind. Much of what the human body does, while it can be construed as labor in the abstract, is not labor in the sense that it is deliberately intended as such. Not all deliberate intent is even labor in this moral sense. There is nothing morally laborious about doing things that are part of the daily existence of a human being, like breathing or eating. In a moral sense, that which is laborious is understood not in the same sense that labor exists as a physical force or meritorious feat. The aristocrat's imperious management and daily pleasures are in a sense laborious, because they are carried out for moral purposes the aristocrat treasures and seeks to impose on the world, and on the members of society. The warrior's labor is actively destructive, but is very much labor and carried out not just with deliberation but moral purpose. Workers do not exist as lumps of utility, and capitalists do not exist as lumps of capital, but pursue their labors for their purposes. The capitalist deploys capital not as a mindless producer or consumer, nor as a breeder of more capitalists to pass on his or her function. Capital to be capital implies management of something which is already morally consequential. The underclass all labor in a sense. If they are not engaged in some sort of labor that would be appreciated by society, their existence and the treatment they endure is a labor in of itself. So too is all of the labor which enforces class divisions and struggles. Labor is not intrinsically tied to any class interest as such, nor is it intrinsically conscious of any class at all. Those who labor do so not for class solidarity, which often doesn't exist and very clearly does not conform to the crass bastardizations of Marxist political thought that are bandied around the internet in the early 21st century. All labor worthy of the name serves purposes which are greater than mere merit, sentiment, business, or a matter of course. Even if the labor appears mundane, it is always something that orients towards a purpose that is greater than the labor itself or the person executing it. If no orientation is obvious, then the effect of that labor is subsumed into a greater effort whether it was intended or not. Labor which does not do this dissipates as soon as it is exhausted, and while it is labor carried out for some moral purpose, there is for obvious reasons a sense of emptiness if the purpose of labor is labor itself, or the purpose of life is life itself. So too are labors performed for a crass craving for merit or rank seen for what they are - a waste of energy towards a cause which is dubious at best. Of course, merit to be truly judged and rank to be worthwhile implies the existence of some higher purpose.

It is not that the higher values exist "for their own sake" as if they were above the world and labor was a sacrifice offered to the gods. The labor exists as meaningful and valued labor because those higher values were acted on, and it is those higher values which actually guide people. We do not think to ourselves that we do this because we want to win a game, or because science suggests a rational and automatic course of action. We might think to ourselves that we feel good about something, but that in of itself is a pitiful excuse to do anything. Further, it would ignore the obvious question - why does anything feel good, or feel pleasureable, or feel evil? Feeling as mentioned would be pointless without an object to feel something towards, and usually there is a situation of higher purpose that our feelings respond to in the first place. The nervous impulse of being hit is not itself terribly interesting without the moral implications of being hit. We do not consider being hit by a falling tree the same sort of pain as being hit by a human fist, because the moral implication of the latter is intuitive to our higher sense. The mere demerit of taking a hit does not factor as much as the greater implications that demerit brings. If it were simple a matter of losing social standing in a society we long ago ceased caring about, all of the threats and acts upon them would be of little consequence, short of threats to maim or kill which suggest a physical alteration of the body. The threat of physical force alone is a terrible moral motivator, since it entails both a considerable exertion of energy and risk for the initiator of force. If the only moral argument someone has to offer is physical violence, against someone who holds the esteem of many other people and knowledge to hold against the brute, it is not difficult to see who holds the advantage in any struggle. All the clever manipulator has to do is ensure the brute's physical violence is parried like a bull seeing red and taunted to its doom. But, the social competition which leads to virtue - literally a quality that commands others to do the bidding of the virtuous - is hardly the only motivator, and virtue itself is a terrible purpose on its own.

These higher values to be truly worth anything are transcendent values, rather than local to a given society or person. It is not that our thinking individually or institutionally creates them, but that, if we are able to conceive of such a thing, it is likely other people have done so before us, or the concept is at least communicable and can become a generally understood value, without regard to the particulars of a society. Even if they are not known to all people, and they scarcely ever are, they are knowable in principle, and we would act as if they were understandable to all, if we are to consider them moral values to live by and act on. All this claims is that the idea exists, rather than claiming the idea is intrinsically valuable to a single person. The idea doesn't exist as a concrete thing, but it is not an abstraction or just an idea that is produced and communicated like any other information in society. For it to be meaningful as a moral value, we hold that it would be something understandable to any entity with the faculty of knowledge, however unlikely it may be for another person to have a rational understanding of the concept, or however incomplete their understanding is.

An example may be made of money, since that is often the way moral value in exchange is understood. Money and the commodities it purchases are, for the moral purpose of exchange, equatable to each other. We may imagine that there is some alternative to money, and throughout history, various forms of money exist with different mechanics. We did not always have money as such, and so this value is not eternal or unquestionable. Commodity exchange is not the sole origin of money, and very likely commodity exchange played a small part in monetary economics compared to the long-standing practice of debts and sacrifice that took on the moral value of exchanges.^[4] Money did not exist as a token or a creature of happenstance. It exists because exchange conceptually was already understood, and the forms money took were not informed by nature suggesting they arise in particular forms or in stages of progression. Cowry shells do not constitute anything like the commodity-money of early civilization, which was not the state-issued coinage of the classical period. Even without money as a persistent presence, there would be a generalized concept of value, or what things were worth, which was regarded not merely as a subjective phenomenon but as a reality people reckoned with. Price-setting markets, in the sense of monetized and fungible values that are consistent, are a much later invention than exchange conceptually. For one, while justice suggests exchanges ought to be equivalent, the general rule of exchanges is that they are unequal, if not entirely one-sided. The state extracts tax, the loan shark extracts the income of usury, the mafioso extracts protection money, the lowlive extracts whatever can be stolen. Other times, the object exchanged for is dubious as a monetary value at all or anything stable. The services of prostitutes are a "double cost" to the john, weakening not just his wallet but his moral resolve and happiness. The reasons for the sex trade have little to do with making money, since the world's oldest profession has always been a way to drain wealth from failed men or indulgent men, given tacit if not explicit approval by those who rule. The prostitution trade serves much different moral aims - eugenic aims to act as a check against failed men, the aims of espionage, a vehicle for procuring women for elite purposes, and many more. All of the things money purchases are objects of utility for someone, however dubious that utility is. The money itself would be worthless if it did not purchase useful things, and among the useful purposes of money is to pay that tax the sovereign now wants in coin, rather than forced requisition or outright confiscation. The coin is then used so the state can provision an army, bureaucracy, and the splendor of those who rule, among all of the other things money can buy for the state. The state could in principle create more money, or just take what they wish, but currency has a number of advantages over the older method. State-issued coinage would always be imposed from above, rather than an "organic" idea people thought was just great. For obvious reasons, established interests saw coinage as an attack on them, and new interests arose when currency became general. What started as a machine for facilitating exchange - one that was instituted by dominant interests who had a plan for these currencies before implementing them - took on new qualities and considerations. The way we think about money today would not have been conceivable during the classical period, to say nothing of the considerable and unprecedented changes to finance in the past 100 years. Money, which intrinsically isn't worth anything at all, became a greater fetish object than anything it was in the past, which is strange because the money is morally almost worthless and obviously gamed to serve today's ruling interests. Misunderstandings concerning money have made fools of many men, and this has made many more fools than ever before in the past century; yet no one denies that money is relevant, and despite ignorance, people have a sense of what their money is worth and recognize its value not by a theory or token value, or by a story told to occult and mystify its use, but by its meaningful existence and the recognition of general exchange and all it entails. People, understandably, do not like their wages and property becoming worthless or devoured by the beast.

The same is true of ANY value entering circulation in the world, or circulation in society even when the value is abstract. All values of moral significance to us are held to be transcendent and communicable as the things they are and what they do. No wordplay or adjudication by an institution changes the value of anything by diktat, as if thought commanded reality. To speak of the prior categories as truly moral values requires them to be understood principally on this level; that is, that we agree that there is a concept of merit, that things are what they are, and that human beings regardless of any law or policy feel and think on their own. Only on that basis would they be truly moral and pertain to a world where they are relevant. If we all speak of a concept called "love", we would know that regardless of our own understanding and opinion, there is an intelligible basis for the concept that allows it to be understood. If we don't accept that, then all we do is talk past each other over the definitions of words, and this itself because a moral posturing exercise. A child can see through this, but a determined liar will push absolute "amorality" as a cover for reality control. Moral values and probity are, among other things, a way for us to guard against this reality control. We uphold intellectual integrity not by following a preferred thought-form or method, but because we morally consider truth to exist independent of ourselves. Only when that is accepted can the mind individually defend itself in principle. If that is given up, then the mind can only operate in a world where it is beholden to whomever is bigger and can lie more often and more powerfully. A moral principle has no force in of itself, of course. It is only forceful when it is acted upon and realized in the labor of people, however it is accomplished. If we do not do things in line with intellectual integrity, then the moral value of it becomes just another idea, depreciated and ridiculed until the idea is stripped out of social consciousness and associated with derision and defeat. Generally, we do not have to debate too long over the moral value of believing in facts that have been adjudicated and can be re-confirmed easily. The infamous Gish Gallop "debate" technique relies on such a flagrant violation of basic reality ad nauseum, and this strategy only works when authorities signal this is not just okay but place the opponent in a straitjacket. This is to say, there has to a strong moral value considering the Big Lie favorable for a greater purpose, so much that the expense is made to make opposition to it effectively illegal if it is substantive and moral in the sphere where the Big Lie is practiced most. Generally, belief in reality itself doesn't have to be a moral consideration. I say this here because the destruction of intellectual integrity and conceptions of reality is a clear and present danger, where in the past such reality control was limited in reach. We would not be able to guard against it unless we held that truths are held somewhere other than our own conceits about knowledge, and that there was a moral sense that we would have to acknowledge for reasons other than fear of another's strength, fear of foolishness, or some emotional manipulation which would be trivial if reality itself can be destroyed. We would not be able to regulate any of these without a sense that any of our moral values is contingent on the ability to say something about morality generally, and about concepts which are not readily comprehensible to cruder senses and thought that science would model.

So, the concepts of moral worth to us are concepts of significance in the world and in society. These concepts are not worth something because they are socially constructed, or because the majority in society said they were valuable, or because a force in the world made up abide them. We would value honor not merely to save face and prevent the suffering of shame, or because honor leads to merit or virtue. It is valued because this concept is related to other higher values, and ultimately it relates to a value we would hold to be highly relevant in general. Honor itself might drive someone for emotional, practical, or spiritual reasons as something worth preserving, without having to judge particular things or have an example of honorable behavior. The concept itself can be debated not just based on what exists now, historical record, or a crass analysis, but what it could be in a different world. We can name many such concepts which hold great signifcance and inform all of our moral decision making. It is with those in mind that many of our other moral judgements are made, rather than simply valuing the world as-is or a model of the world we construct to describe the world, or change the world through managing it. Through labor, we conceive of a world that might be different from the one we live in, and that was sorely needed given the general state of human existence since we became a thing in the world.

We may look at all the things we might value, and recognize that which appears generally to be more significant that others. The details of the material world, which are the subject of science, are not morally interesting in of themselves. It doesn't matter morally whether life consists of genetic material, spiritual energy, was created by God by physically transforming dirt into Adam and then Adam's rib was used to fashion Eve. This question of natural history would not be morally significant just because, compared to what the history of life actually means or what the story of Genesis was actually suggesting about the origin of Man's mind. There are far more prescient explanations in natural history to explain why humans are as they are, and what was morally significant in the origin and early history of the human race. The scientific fact of what material comprises a human body is less relevant than the historical fact that humans almost certainly were born into a world where they already practiced ritual sacrifice and the cruelties animals long knew. The scientific fact of what qualitatively changed in appearance was less relevant than the meaningful history showing a progression of wickedness in the human race, and also that this history was not a uniform progression to greater and greater malice with no opposing force in the world. Humanity became recognizably "human" in a way that showed positive qualities because there was a countervailing force that recognized that all of this malice, sacrifice, and viciousness served no useful purpose, and only wound up keeping humanity worse off individually and in their society. It does not take any great wisdom to see that we don't have to be this. The legacy that humans defend is not descended purely from that genesis, but what humans built generation after generation, and humans learned and re-learned to lead to a life they considered better or worth living for more than the malice that was well-known. We have always known slavery and its consequences, which was the only enduring argument for freedom or anything other than the purest essence of the slave relation.

All that would be morally valued may be envisioned in one giant hierarchy, ranked according to that which is recognized by some uniting principle, and understood and learned by individuals. This learning is then communicated in human society and in the world generally. Communication being what it actually is means that the communication is not a purely willful and controlled act. We only communicate with the physical machinery which allows this, and with implications that arise from physical communication that require our knowledge and learning to form more knowledge. For example, we don't need constant physical communciation to suggest we would know something about what another man is doing 100 miles away from us, if we know many things about this other man, his conditions, his tendencies. We can act as if this other man exists, even though we may never meet him directly or engage in any direct relationship. We would presume the other man is a member of some social arrangement where we would have anything to do with him; and even if we have limited information about society, we can see that there is a land 100 miles away, and perhaps know of a city where humans much like us dwell, who have a culture we know something about. Even if we have no knowledge of a particular agent in that society, we could surmise such a person exists and treat it as if it would be morally relevant. We would not treat a hypothetical person in another society the same as a person we have direct contact with, and our moral attitudes towards others are contingent on the genuine relations we have with them, rather than the presumption of a distanceless relationship subsumed into an abstraction. When we relate to others through such an abstraction - when we make judgements about the people of a given city or a race or nation - we are aware that this is not a substitute for judgements about the individual members, who are not bound intrinsically to that social or political unit and likely developed a whole existence that pays little regard to those groupings. Humans tend to be interested in themselves and their proximate relations before they think of social or political consciousness. Their moral sense on the other hand looks not to local peculiarities but to the world as a whole and that which is considered to transcend distance or ambiguity. The moral actor does not deal in uncertainty and mystification, but in that which is held to be true and a thing they demonstrate in labor. This is something more than the mere deed of labor or performance, and it is certainly not the symbol of those values which is understood to reference a reality beyond it.

That uniting principle may be called "the good" - which is to say, that we have a concept that we can speak of its existence. There is no direct evidence of goodness existing, and no substance or particular quality of it, but its existence is inferred from a simple truth. That is that if the world were purely malevolent or amoral, it would preclude the possibility that it could be any different, and consequently there would be no aspiration to change it at all. At the very least, this suggests that there isn't some Demiurge-like force of malevolence, or for that matter "pure good" as a primordial spirit or creative spark. The good as a concept can exist only because distinction can exist, suggesting that there would be a moral value, a state of being or an action that would be different from another and that this is descriptive of something worthwhile in existence beyond the fact of it. If that weren't the case, then everything we value would be a joke, and we would act accordingly. We would cease to care about any merit, any higher purpose, or any scientific truth. We would not even regard any feeling of ours as relevant, since all feelings and passions are at a personal level fleeting things. They not only pass when we die, but they often come and go in life, with little to suggest that they are by themselves the source of any goodness. If goodness came from "within" - if goodness were defined by human wants alone and some quasi-natural explanation for this were doctrine - then it is not goodness at all, but merely a mental cheat to assert that a base want takes precedence over anything that would be a moral value. While there is nothing to suggest that this is wrong - we do primarily consider moral behavior to be human behavior, since we are the most relevant agent that would express it and the world doesn't have its own moral sentiments that it willfully imposes in the way we do - we would in recognizing that inner goodness suggest that something in the world or Heaven will judge the merit of the person. Even a Satanist view of morality regards this, and usually the crass individualism and idiocy of such a religion recognizes that Satan, in one way or another, judges mankind with all of its familiar malice and exemplifies most of all the spirit of Man - that Man will reinforce its oldest maxims, among them "once retarded, ALWAYS retarded". The Satan's hatred of fools is its most enduring trait, because the Satan is very clearly a stand-in for the human drive for empire and enclosure of the world. We do not need to invoke any godhead or a divine nature to conceive of goodness. In all cases, goodness is found not in abstractions of the mind, but the world, which we ourselves are a part of. Try as we might to appropriate some moral value and treat it as a substance, this is not really how moral values work. Any such substance would be an abstraction, and with goodness, we have nothing to indicate what exactly it is or how we can capture that abstract substance. We only know that there is something within us which recognizes that it can exist, and that we would seek goodness in one way or another. This may be goodness as a possession we hold, or a sense that goodness in the world is worth facilitating.

All of the moral values stand alone. They do not have natural opposites in the sense that is often imagined - and so, good is not logically the whole opposite of "bad" or "evil". "Bad" refers instead to a very different concept, which need not reference "good" at all to exist. The bad is a measure of demerits, shames, and qualities which exert a force that evokes much different reactions than goodness or the lack thereof. While goodness is something difficult for us to isolate or find, badness is ubiquitous and comes in various malevolent forms, each with their own qualities leading to a poor outcome. Badness may even be appreciated for some quality that is valued in its own right. Meritorious and honorable men are not purely "good" men, and will do bad things to win. They will recognize the bad and see their failings correctly, rather than act as if their shit never stunk. It is a fool who claims that they never sinned in clear contradiction to the repeated failures of the human race, especially when men are measured against the cosmos and what we know to be possible. It is a eugenic conceit that humanity was born good and only inexorably decayed, when the reality is that humans grew as they did to allow something new to exist. It is another thing to celebrate the bad and consider it inherently necessary or some sort of goodness, and this is what the eugenists want - to torture people until they declare that bad is good, and there is no such thing as evil.

Evil speaks to something much different than bad or good. The ordinary malevolence of the human race is a simple and fleeting thing, but as a philosophy of life, evil takes malevolence to the heights we have observed. It was no small malevolence the human race commmitted, as if it were an accident or something redeemable to ritually sacrifice over and over again the unwanted and hated. All of the malice of the human race orients around a principle that the malice can be institutionalized and imposed, and this is at a basic level the conception of evil. Evil is a self-perpetuating machine and thought-form that celebrates the regressive and cruel passions of the human race. It is not the acts in of themselves, an essence of something, or the thought of a deed or being. Evil like any genuine moral value is a labor that suggests it can and should prevail, and in the views that evil suggests, there is nothing and no one that can ever stop it. It is against both badness and evil, of which we have ubiquitous examples, that good is ostensibly opposed. Yet, for all of our efforts, we still have no knowledge of the good beyond inference of its existence. We only know that evil encounters a world which has no real need of it, and evil is of little use to us. No attempt to rebrand evil as some other thought-form or idea removes a sense in people that can recognize it as well as they can. Evil must deceive and resort to mystification to tell us it is something else, or revels in contradiction and the lie. None of that has helped the human race one iota, since the plans of evil and eugenics never accomplish much that we would consider worthwhile. The moral high horse of the eugenist shrieking about that which offends his senses is a pressing of the nerve of power, the ultimate "me wantee" cry of a imbecile who believes his learned stupidity is holy. We hold that truth to be self-evident, and the eugenist never seriously denies it. To deny it would be to abandon the "Jehad", and if even one inch of ground were surrendered - if the phalanx of eugenism ever retreated - it's all over for the Great Working. Any surrender must be eliminated from the historical record, in line with the pseudoscientific claims of eugenics that the effect of life precedes its cause and justifies itself.

We may choose any principle in place of these, or elaborate on the concepts in great detail, with examples of each. Whatever principle we use or name we call them, they tend towards concepts which are so familiar that they are effectively universal, no matter how much a philosophy like Nietzsche tries to justify his petulant stupidity that explained nothing of note to the human race. We may make some argument that none of these principles "really matter", or they are too vague for us to say anything about. Yet, they recur, and even those who deny their existence act in accord with them. This does not mean we are obliged to be good, bad, or evil, or that these are pure states of people. We can choose imperatives and causes which have nothing to do with conventional moral philosophy, because those were interesting to us and spoke to something in the soul that was above ordinary knowledge and sense. We can choose a simpler life, while remaining aware of the world. Most of us have no great part to play in the world, and on a cosmic scale, all human hopes and aspirations are not just an insignificant presence, but wouldn't even make sense to us. What would an alien observe if it encountered humanity and the stupidity we have already written on sufficiently to suggest that humans have been made to do terrible things for nothing more than the self-assured idiocy of predators? We can clearly do better than what we have done, and we have done better than the worst of all worlds. If we axiomatically followed the ethics of the worst men, nothing worthwhile would be possible, no matter how much the cargo cult insists that this is the good. For any such value to be truly moral, it would be something open to independent verification. It it never handed down by a guru or thought leader commanding us to think a particular way. There is an obsession in philosophy and theories of the state to subsumed all other values into one, and then to place above all morality the impulse of the state and philosophy itself, which is both above the law and above any spiritual authority challenging it. This is intended and acted upon zealously. Aristocracy always holds for itself a special morality, tied to the predatory element from the very start, and it is this which revels in contradiction and all of the most disgusting lies humanity tells. Aristocracy's claim that its special morality is above all is the most spurious claim ever, ruining all of our understanding for no other reason than it's ability to do so. In that way, it is truly above good and evil, or any possibility that it could be bad. For all of its glory, it produces morally and in any reasonable analysis the shit of the human race and nothing better.

The study and rationalization of morality is called ethics, and in ethics, moral values - which were emergent from a world where they were relevant and preceded our individual recognition of them - are brought in line with the faculties of learning. Ethics and morality are very different things, replacing the genuine moral values with a rational framework that serves institutional aims. Institutions do not have any moral sense or moral value. It is for this reason more than any that institutions never do what they are purported to do, and the more dominant the technological interest is human beings and their society, the greater the ethical malaise and its contempt for all morality. This, of course, exempts the aforementioned aristocratic morality, which is sectioned off into a special part of the world. It is here where ethics creates, out of nothing, a break between "god" in the form of the aristocracy and the "lower moral sentiments", that include anything we would actually care about. Aristocracy as a principle exists specifically to do this - to declare that it is something sacred and holy, in return for nothing at all. It's most absolute and violent recapitulations are on full display in the 21st century, where the pre-emptive strike, thrill of violence, and absolute impunity demanded of its instigators, are holies which cannot be questioned or even acknowledged as what they are. It would not have to do this. Rationally, it is easy enough to understand that the aristocratic ethos doesn't work, doesn't make sense in a real world where events happen, and serves not a single genuine good except the chokehold against everyone else. The aristocracy long understood its existence is vampiric on the whole world and requires no justification or excuse. They made no excuses for the terror. Instead, the aristocrat invoked a magic trick and placed it at the center of their theory of knowledge, which in turn produced an ethics which resembled an ethics regarding the genuine world, but was crucially constructed to protect the vampirism at every crucial juncture. They then invoke "contradictions" and "unknowability", and this is where aristocratic parodies of science and reason lapse into what humanity always was, and the mask is dropped when necessary. In this way, ethics acts as a filter, if it so chooses. It only needs to conform to morality so far as it serves this "greater good" which is unmentionable as what it is, yet corrupts every other sense of the world. The final trick is for the aristocrat to crusade against "corruption", now rebranded as every interest contrary to it, that disrupts this conceit that aristocrats arrest the world at all of its levels. We could understand ethics differently, where it is a tool to refine moral sense, and this indeed is something understood by the better of them. We would use ethics much like learning and intelligence are tools to enhance our knowledge of objects and labors. This, though, would place intelligence, science, and learning in the hands of labor, independent of a "producer" class tied to finance, and this was wholly unacceptable to the ruling order. The breaking point for ethics, and thus where humanity truly fell, was the rise of the eugenic creed. The fall began in spirit during the late 19th century, and at the end of the 20th century, it had been realized. Humanity from then on would truly be a Satanic race and a failed race, and the aristocracy saw it as necessary to institutionalize that state of affairs openly. And so, the strange philosophy of "amorality" is in reality very moral - but its moral values are to glorify not just evil conceptually, but the maximization of all evil, malice, and viciousness of this failed race, and tell all humans "this is you". Ritualized child abuse now became the only form of education this failed race can know, and that is the sad fate we face in the 21st century.

The sad fate of humanity was foreseen long ago, arrived at independently by anyone with enough sense to see that this is wrong. I used to believe that this was common enough that everyone knew on some level, but this is my fault for internalizing the dogma of false egalitarianism that eugenism spread. The particulars of human tendencies are not our interest here, but it is sufficient to say there are those of the human race who never once questioned the thrill of torture and malice, and these people are far more common and do not conform universally to the eugenic ideal. Those people will not change, and they are the first to enjoy the thrill of putting the rest of us in our place in their mind, which is to be maximally tortured and nothing else. There is no other thought in the minds of such people that is moral, and so they have always longed for a society where their pseudo-amorality is glorified and their regression to a primordial state is the only possible world. Those people are retarded. We should ignore them, but that is not an option.

There are two options to respond to such people. One is to defeat them in the world, or channel something in the world that will truly set right the procession of events, so that we may live and those of the Hitlerian mindset are in their true rightful place - as natural slaves, an approach to life they exemplify absent anything we would have done to ensure it. We would fight these people in the world not out of a sense that this is glorious or because the thrill of victory or some dubious merit is the point. We really do not care about the well-being of those who commit to maximal predation, or consider them to possess any moral force worthy of regard. We fight for the same reason life has always fought - because we can, and because doing this is preferable to acceeding to something so worthless. Usually, the sobering influence against such predation was not the damned of the Earth, like me and those I am writing to most of all. Our ideas and actions count for little, and no bully has ever responded to pleas for goodness. To the predatory, goodness is defined by the thrill of victory and nothing more, and this is the nature of their version of the God or the Satan (which are, in their mindset, one and the same and can only be so). So many times, I talk to these people to amuse myself, and when they show that they actually believe the thrill of victory is the point and cannot make a single mental connection to see how that turns on themselves, I know I truly am talking to an absolutely retarded and Satanic ape, just smart enough to project an appearance resembling a human face. It is difficult to suppress the hatred at listening to their stupid philosophy and pandering when they lecture me and act as if they are somehow smarter. The arrogance of these Satanic apes, the exemplar of a failed race which has damned the rest of us to abide their stupidity, is one part deliberate and known, but at a basic level, they really don't make a connection to any other purpose in life, and never once did. Most humans, though, have considered the questions enough to realize that this appeal to maximizing the thrill of torture doesn't work, and the ideologies surrounding it have never made sense or functioned without considerable drain on the world and human labor to sustain their crapulence. Most humans do not proceed as far as I have to see correctly that humans really are a failed race, or if they do, they only proceed until they find something in the world to make do with a terrible situation, hoping against hope that something will be different. It is not that the "neutrals" are inclined to good or even disagree with the imperial mindset, but that they cannot give themselves over to the venality for too long, and have lives that do not benefit from the glorification of maximal torture. It is not difficult for us, or either of these groups, to recognize the distinction between those who are true believers in the eugenic torture religion, and those who punch in their time and have varying views on what is to be done with us and what they would want out of life. Typically, the neutral aspires to some genuine goodness or the apperance of it, and does not internalize the doctrine of absolute depravity that the eugenist revels in and uses as their justification for every deed, and every accusation of a crime of Being. Then there are those that are set against the eugenic order, who are in many ways the ideal oppose of the eugenic creed. How the damned live in this world is not uniform, unlike the doddering stupidity of the German idealists suggesting that we're the slave moralists making excuses. Since the positions of us are expressed in part in these writings, I need not go into too much detail about how the damned cope with the eugenic creed, or internalize it to become vectors of the eugenic disease itself, or simply don't care. All of these groups, including the true believing eugenists, encounter the unknown and the void, and will after long enough ask if there is any higher power beyond conventional knowledge, and if all of the faculties of knowledge we possess are capable of responding to the truth of the world. If any one person thinks like this, then to some extent this form of knowledge, often conflated with prophecy or madness, becomes a realized force in the world itself. And so, the supposedly unknowable, the void, and their relevance to higher moral values, are a topic of interest here.

There is a point where all of our learning and knowledge fail us, and we are at an impasse where we cannot truly know what we think we know. The faculties of anyone will vary, but short of omniscience, it is impossible for a single person to know every possible thing, or even all of the moral values that we hold to be relevant. Much of our work with intelligence involves simplifying the world from complex and real things to simplistic things, such that our meager rational faculties can operate with things we know to be far more than our models indicate. It is this which is played with when the koan of "unknowability" is invoked. It is the interest of the cajoler to drive down the complexity of models and reduce things beyond that which our native sense would normally reject. We know in omitting certain values we open ourselves to incongruities in our view of the world with the world we wish to know and morally value. We also know that our faculties themselves are a limited resource. We only have so much intelligence, so much knowledge, and so many tools to allocate for our moral navigation, let alone translating our moral values into realized action which is the domain of science, reason, and practice. But, this alone would not lead us to embrace the unknown, as if we were forced to do so; nor is a desire for regression and mystification the only use of this inquiry into the world outside the normal processes of knowledge or any exertion that is trivial. Knowing of this limitation, and also encountering a world of hypotheticals and distant futures we can only scarcely imagine based on the evidence, it is a habit of humans to engage in fantasy and thoughts of strange worlds - or a stranger world that someone might live in if humans and their knowledge were radically different. The common trope in technocratic society is the evolutionary leap or quantum leap, in which a threshold is passed, before which there were humans and after which there was a new race. This image is often deployed to hide the eugenic creed or lurid cult rituals, but there is in some of our knowledge a yearning for this existence to not be this dreary - to believe another world was possible, if only we weren't like this. Nothing in the world can truly tell us not to do this. We may be told ad nauseum that we should not waste energy dreaming on impossibilities or fantasies, or that we should revert to the acceptable modes of knowledge instead of this inquiry. Yet, every so often, the world presents something that our knowledge never expected, that was never the result of any genius or great working humans could conjure, and that only in fevered dreams would a human ever predict. The world, and something in the existence of life, once allowed the revelation that allowed us to be something more than apes. With that revelation, humans quickly reverted to their natural proclivity - ritual sacrifice and cruelty. The revelation in of itself was not a turning point or something that intrinsically allowed the cult of sacrifice to begin. It was what was done with it that was perfected by the predatory. This revelation is not a singular occurrence, as the aristocratic myth of Prometheus or the various Luciferian doctrines insist. Many times this revelation arrives anew for a human being in their experience, and many times it was snuffed out. Sometimes, it could grow, for good or ill. Those with a mind towards joining the sacrifice found from this revelation a tool that would expand their ability, for knowledge that a different world was possible could be weaponized. There is no rule glorifying prophecy or suggesting it would inherently select for goodness, and very often the religious leaders tended towards the evil and vicious, finding brigands who found this new proto-religion intriguing for crass purposes. But, the conditions which brought about the revelation suggested that the vicious cycle was the great problem of life. It would only be possible to develop any of this if predation were mitigated. Therefore, there is something other than decency or goodness or merit to suggest that life could be sacred or defended. It was not self-interest or collective interest, or any simple goal, nor was it directly a moral sentiment suggesting a value that was easy to pin down. The potential of any future suggested a true way out of the cycle other than succumbing to its tendencies or opting for suicide. It was less about changing the world to conform to this revelation or a zeal to assert oneself or environmental stability. It was not a crass interest in novelty, for much that is new is bad and untrustworthy. It wasn't any historical progress or process of life, for this approach to the world very clearly had nothing to do with the immediate interests of life, and suggesting contact with something un-living. Naively it may appear to be another world, and so a common trap is to tell those with this tendency to turn away from the world altogether and disdain everything around them. This aristocratic re-direct is a common fallacy with a predictable outcome, and is of no interest to us. We usually see past it unless we are sucked in by naivete and denied standards of comparison, and our worse vices are played to by these so-called gnostics.

In all we do, the direction of our action is driven by moral values rather than any just-so story about natural laws buffeting the body like particles of dust. The instincts are not just any movement of matter, but particular material forces that are morally significant to our thinking. If they were not morally signficant, we would not register them as any instinct. Even a tic or involuntary movement of the nerves has some moral purpose for us. We wouldn't consider disciplining the body to remove them worthwhile if they didn't have a moral value, and we concern ourselves with them at all because there is a moral value disapproving of such unwanted instincts. In this way, we are made to believe we are morally culpable for things that are not part of any deliberation on our part - and if we are consistent in moral values, we would indeed be culpable, no matter how ridiculous it may seem to a sense of justice we naively adopt. It is also perfectly in line with moral values, or even morally worthwhile on its own, for courts to rule arbitrarily and hypocritically, and to value this hypocrisy itself as an act of justice and moral merit. The flipside where courts allow horrific crimes to continue unabated in front of them is not a serious moral concern that moves courts. The court brings criminals to face the magistrate who holds imperial authority over life and death. Far from any sense of justice obligating the judge in any way that can be enforced, any question of the imperial authority violates the very reason that court exists. Any right to suggest the court itself can be challenged would not be a thing with material force, but a convention the court may accept and disband at its will. Realistically, the theory of law only persists because impartiality and maintenance of social order are implied to be the aim of the law, because a grossly hypocritical court would be a court the defendants scoff at and hold in unlimited contempt. If the aim of the court is to abolish its legitimacy altogether, so that the judges can convert to some new magistrate that exercises a permanent state of exception and celebrates the untrammeled thrill of suffering for its own sake, then nothing stops this, and morally the judge or society with such an aim would do everything in its power to subvert the most basic expectations of legal order. A wholesale abandonment of public morality is embraced because all moral authority is invested in the will of criminal assholes who would love nothing more than the thrill of torture, and do so while looting anything substantive from the country, and this is upheld as morally sacrosanct and just over the objection of any poor soul swallowed by the beast. No one would be convinced that such a court is stable or would be able to govern without incredible waste. If the waste is viewed as imperial largesse paid to a class of functionaries, who have every incentive to continue the regime, then this too becomes a moral cause to defend. Nothing in typical moral values would suggest to end this arrangement, and so it continues.

Only one thing would stay the hand of the beast - that something unexpected is possible, and out of desperation, those damned in such a society would resort to things none of their science or moral posturing can predict or react to. It is for this reason that the appearance of chaos, fear, and uncertainty became yet another dogma for eugenics to defend, despite it not being directly necessary for the creed to continue. Eugenics has always feared this chaos, as such things disrupt its order. Yet, the eugenists and their enablers have always been aware that chaos has both an appeal that would disrupt their creed, and chaos has an effect on the human psyche that mere mystification and disinformation cannot. It is not enough to merely lie, or for the lie to gravitate towards some standardized evil. The aim of the creed is to arrest history mechanically, and this includes co-opting all ideas of chaos, opposition, or principles that would be inimical and unpredictable. And so, the magistrates of eugenics would choose a political and moral form where "chaos" and untrammeled randomness is another imperial story. The theories of chaos are not entirely an imperial pseudoscience to disallow worthwhile analysis, nor are the genuine scientific uses of a concept like entropy a cynical ploy. The impression of chaos and disorder in the high magistrates is calculated to dissuade anyone who would think that the unknown could be anything but a thing to be assimilated by the eugenic creed, just as everything else has been. This command of chaos is not so absolute as the myths of the creed insist it is, where all is arrested by "The Science" and yet nothing is ever certain. The possibility of anything new disgusts the eugenist at a visceral level, unless the new is selected by the creed to be another recapitulation of its ugliness. It must make the new appear unknowable and strange, and so this creates a much greater incentive for the eugenist strategy to lie about everything. The Big Lie was never highly effective at lying or cowing people into submission by any impression of reason or even the forcefulness of the lie. The Big Lie was not even intelligently constructed, nor was it the centerpiece of manipulating public opinion. The Big Lie is something eugenics chose almost instinctively and followed with this sixth sense of knowledge, and it appears less because of any use of it or even because of an enjoyment of lying. A voracious beast is always at the heart of the eugenic creed, inherited from its antecedents and carrying on in other vessels, a cosmic backup plan if the creed were ever to lose its stranglehold or face an opponent difficult to defeat with force or subterfuge alone. By seeding many false religions, an army of fictitious al-Dajjals to be put down by Galton's "Jehad", the Galtonites had their Emmanuel Goldstein.^[5] This did not stop the left elements from a requirement to meet some demand of the people, and created an avenue for genuine rebellion. The genuine rebellion operated not on any grand deed or secret knowledge, but exploited the obvious failures of the eugenic creed to govern in any way that would be effective, even for the bare minimum that would have been valued if the eugenist were not a screaming Satanic ape blinded by the cause. They are deliberate in deploying this strategy, and at the same time, unaware of exactly why this works or what they are doing. It is not "doublethink" in that sense, but it is instead one of the true origins of Orwell's mystification to elide the strategy of hypocrisy. There is both knowledge of this unknown, and a lack of knowledge since it cannot formally be allowed to exist. The imperial dogma clearly calls for a religion of "science" to supplant the depreciated Christian institutions, and so the eugenists can't invoke God or even Glorious Satan too openly or with sufficient meaning.

From whence does the unknown arise? It arises not ex nihilo "from the void", but from the recognition of metaphysical and philosophical void and its purpose in all of our concepts of knowledge. If we return to the second chapter of our first book, we wrote of the void and its role in allowing judgements of distance and substance to even be possible. Philosophically, existence and non-existence were posed as contradictions or opposites. The reality is that the void was there so long as we spoke of the world, and substance itself had no reason to actually exist, let alone be morally worth anything at all. There is no purpose whatsoever to be found in the genesis of the world, and this would be true of any other level of reality that is invoked by shoddy mystics. The world was not good from the light alone or the will of the godhead. There are those of us who found existence intrinsically interesting, not out of an inborn thirst for knowledge without regard to its context, but because of a fascination which had no clear emotional or moral origin or merit. It was not a quest of need, for it is often abandoned and picked up again. The need to recreate ourselves periodically is common to humans, and when humans communed with nature in the old ways, they could abandon temporarily the weariness of maintaining institutional pretenses altogether. This was necessary not just to recharge or fill some energy deemed morally worthwhile, but it connected human beings to a sense of genuine distance and connection, rather than the symbolic suggestions of these things that were necessary for a competitive society or dickering and dealing to allow cooperation. It spoke to something alien to a sense of self or abasement to the world. A sense of peace comes with acceptance that there is a void, and a world outside of the total society we are habituated to belief permeates all things. It is this above all that eugenics could not abide - that there was a part of the world it did not enclose, and could never enclose. The origins of eugenism in the habit of enclosure and their drug-addled avarice in its fullest form made clear that all that exists and all that can exist are a part of the Galtonite "gods", and so the crowning achievement of the eugenic creed was to claim that they were Nature itself, and the old concepts of nature were no longer admissible. It is this that is among the chief abominations of the creed, and it was not a position taken because it was needed. It would be perfectly fine for eugenism to be a political idea or a spiritual crusade, for the purposes of its success. The identification of the creed with Nature did not serve any necessary purpose, nor is it seriously believed by any but the creed's devout believers. It instead spoke to a deep craving to eliminate once and for all troublesome void and distance. At its core, eugenism adopted a long-stand tenet of predatory religions. That is that the predatory element always seeks to eliminate any barrier between itself and its goals. It was for this reason that the mental disconnect where effect and cause are fused, effect precedes cause and creates a loop, could be believed. Rationally, it is so absurd that it requires someone to embrace a foul contradiction and repeat it ad nauseum to destroy the mind. However much the koans are repeated, they never succeed in wearing down the brain, even for the devout believers. Eventually, the foulness of the thought consumes the brain of the true believer.

The appeal to do this remains, and it is this controlled insanity which draws so many to believe in the creed or internalize its values without great pressure or thinking about it. A desire to eliminate void is a desire to make contact with an alien and merge in mind with it. This is not something in which two must become one, for both can go their own ways afterwards and such merging would not be the purpose nor what the people drawn to this seek. Few want to be absorbed and abolished, or to inflict the same on another mind, because it would be obviously destructive and pointless. It is the elimination of void that impedes the primordial light that replaces healthier desire and moral purpose in life. By embracing these koans, the eugenist perpetuates for both true believers and the ignorant the shortest possible route to appropriation, and short-circuits any possibility of a connection of minds existing outside of command and control. This cycle to disrupt thought must be revisited at a later time. For now, the controlled insanity accomplishes one goal that no other philosophy could - it makes nihilism utterly inadmissible, and the fire of consumption continues until all life dies screaming - forever.

Most of us, though, have no desire to abolish the void, or any such delusions of grandeur. We may not even seek occasional contact with another mind, so long as we continue through life and claw back a few nice things. It is not hard to see, without any great knowledge, the eugenic creed's intent. It scarcely attempts to hide its intent, because to hide their intent would be a shame that the creed could never abide if they had to do it for too long. Enough contact with eugenists shows that they can't stop themselves from shrieking like the retards they are if they are not allowed absolute impunity and unlimited transgression - hence their appropriation of the term "abolish" to turn a political position against institutions into a term to annihilate anything that impedes their chosen institutions. If this is supposed to be the Absolute, the teleological end of bad Hegelism, then it would appear very prudent to choose nihilism over that shit. If nothing else, the true and full void and nihilism is a parting shot against this failed race for what it did to the world and anything worth living for. That is the one thing they cannot truly stop, and in this, the nihilist is assured of the truest victory, even if it must wait for billions and billions of years. Those who have seen nihilism as a viable alternative could have told you the eugenic creed's insanity has an endgame a child could see, and yet, they did it all the same. The eugenist must make nihilism impossible, and in doing so, it declares absolutely that no one is allowed to escape in any way. It is not enough to merely outlaw suicide or associate it with shame. No, too many people would off themselves rather than submit to this Satanic and retarded cult, if it came to that. What is necessary is to ensure that any possibility of escape is destroyed. Suicide cannot be a way out - if one hint of suicidality is detected, then the creed must ideally drill into the brain and internalize the creed, so that the creed's eternal victory is burned into the brain, becoming the last thing someone sees. As I said, all life does screaming - forever. It cannot function any other way, and the premises of eugenism - which it shares in common with its antecdents and related predatory cults - lead to that obvious endgame. This is their idea of eternal life, and why their obsession with immortality - an infantile one that moves away from any reason why someone would want to live forever, or any method by which that would actually be attained - is another tenet of the wider eugenic religion and culture. It is not about immortality in the genuine sense, but the immortality of the creed pressing into the brain, transcending death and reaching into all void to turn it into more eugenics. This is a beast so many of us are familiar with, for the believers and enablers alike press without really thinking about what they are doing. It is not ignorance, but that it simply does not occur to them that there ever would be anything else. Once that blood has been tasted, there is no going back, and the eugenic creed's habit of transgression is another thing it undertakes less for the rational purpose of doing it or any emotional need, and more because it seeks to jump in front of this very appeal of the void and nihilism.

If we wish to oppose this creed - and on some level, dire necessity requires it, however halfhearted and hopeless the effort may seem - we will encounter this wall of despair at some point. The training of the eugenic faithful requires them to surpass the thought of this and embrace the creed wholly. This is where the purpose of a billion-year contract with their religion becomes clear, and those who wish to taste the purest blood will be made to sign that contract - or else. It is, as with the lesser transgressions and ritual sacrifices, a thing done less for any purpose or even because the contract itself is the point, than the thing done because the ritual recreates the creed and is among its sources of life as a moral beast stalking the cosmos. We have no luxury of a billion-year contract or a daddy flashing the OK sign to allow this. We don't really gain comfort from naive nihilism, and the embrace of naive nihilism and its crass outcomes is the sign of a simpering retard and no more. That "opposition" is laughable, and it is among the desired states of the slave race under eugenic terror-thrill. (To call what eugenics imposes "rule" dignifies eugenic governance far more than it deserves!) The other solution is to invest a pseudo-morality around selfishness and willpower, which results in the same simpering. No, morality exists in the world, whether we regard it as "moral" or not in the conventional sense. No ideology and no practice of human beings changes that morality is laborious, and labor to be labor is moral. That is the way of the world, and it would be true even of a hypothetical unknown, and of nihilism itself. One cannot help but enact naive nihilism if they adopt it, and quickly learns that this approach to life is more futile than the ordinary futility of life. Anyone can indulge in a pathetic ennui until they die, but this is uninteresting. Left to its own devices, such naive nihilism leads to a decay of the soul and a vulnerability to the Nietzschean non-answer and the usual eugenic horseshit. This is undesirable for us; yet if we live in a world dominated by eugenics, claiming some other moral authority is stronger and outranks it is a foolish and futile crusade. We can invent all the prophecies and unknowns and seek desperate answers, and we will indeed do this, but to truly confront eugenism and similar such religions means facing nihilism and despair, and seeing that for all of the shit humanity has done, the world is basically good in nature. Facts confirm the goodness of the world in spite of humanity's attitude - not because it was made good by decree or "just is" good, but because abomination does not stand forever. Every deed of defiance, when carried out in the labor of true spite for such a vile creed, despises the enemy, and is carried out not for a fickle spite of men or the glory of a god, but because you, I, and a whole lot of other people can see that we never had to do any of what eugenics suggested we do. It and its associated religions are so devoid of purpose that it's a wonder such a scam was ever able to assert itself. It is for that reason that it was eugenics, rather than some other political idea, that was the predatory religion of our time. Only eugenics spoke to a genetic legacy and eugenic interest as described earlier in this work, with full knowledge and conviction of Darwin that the origin of Man - borrowed from Malthus' miserable theory - was ritual sacrifice and a cruelty unlike any other in the animal kingdom, and that because this genesis happened, it must be regressed to and eliminate all other possibilities, by any means necessary. The last resort of the eugenic creed is various forms of alterna-eugenics, false oppositional ideas which appear to say eugenics is bad because eugenics is mean. When alterna-eugenics fails, the pseudoscience simply invents a "fake ethics" and a whole fake science where eugenics isn't dominant in biology, while maintaining the centrality of eugenic shibboleths and mobilizing fear, uncertainty, and doubt to cloud all judgement, until eugenics can assert its command of all institutions and begin again its "Jehad". The fake science trades in feel-good stories, and then spreads to non-biological sciences to infantilize those as well, such as physics and the crucial social and psychological sciences that would govern future society.

I would like to insert here a comment that may be on the reader's mind. Earlier I wrote: "If you are not willing to destroy the world for your cause, you are not serious." I invite the reader to ask - if this were the case, and the cause is something as clearly ruinous as the eugenic creed, is that the cause serious enough to destroy the world for it? The cause of eugenics is the only creed in human history which both boldly claimed that it would destroy the world with nuclear weapons, and made it clear that it fully intended to act on that threat in all circumstances. There is no version of eugenism which can unilaterally disarm. I am reminded of a conversation I had long ago as a teenager, with a middle-aged adult eugenist. I asked her this very question - that if society were what she wanted it to be, then why on Earth should I not wish to destroy the society as a matter of retaliation? This conversation entailed a discussion of God, and she chants the familiar sing-song contemptuous lie about God's unknowability. I conducted this to probe her response, to see if she had anything whatsoever to say for herself, and I knew the typical answers of authorities. What struck me this time as different is how she couldn't comprehend the idea of actually destroying the world if it were in the hands of anyone but her - of course, she never stated explicitly any such intent, but everything she did and everything she was made it clear she would kill the whole world for the creed and not think for a moment that this was wrong. I did not feel I should have to explain why something like the eugenism I saw was so abominable that death was clearly preferable, and obliteration of the world to remove such a dire threat was clearly justified. I did not explain, but it should be clear given the verbiage of nuclear war and the threats issued regularly when America went apeshit during the 90s, that the ruling ideas of this society already made such a threat and reveled in making it, and did so not for any cause but because they could do so. Naively, I would think that when the capitalists "won", they would have no reason for continuing this threatening posture towards the world, let alone towards their own people. It was clearly absurd that I should have to ask this question, yet the death cult intensified at the first moment the American oligarchy smelled blood, and there was no reason why we would need to do such a thing. If they won, why? I didn't pursue that line of questioning, though. I simply asked what she thought any of this was for. She could not stop asking me a stupid question - "what is the point of destroying the world if no one will worship you?" I would think that if anyone ruled for the adulation of the people, which I clearly had no interest in, that is the stupidest possible reason anyone could rule. At first I thought she just insulted me yet again, by believing a low-born pleb like myself would be swayed by such a retarded and Satanic thrill of ruling, and this would stay my hand if I had the theoretical world-destroying bomb. The question was not about my thrill for revenge, but about a clearly intolerable society which had repeatedly made torture threats against me and many like me, and acted on those threats enough time to make clear that this would not stop. I would not broach those details, but they were well known enough. The more I continued this conversation, the more it was clear that she really did not think about anything coming out of her mouth - at all. It did not occur to her that anyone could ever oppose the eugenic creed and its maximal torture. I truly believe that she was incapable of making the mental connection that any of this hurt an actual human being with a mind. If I understood the pedagogy of her race - English aristocracy and part of that Satanic unitarian milieu like Malthus - I would know better that no such thought ever could occur to her, just as Orwell simultaneously believed that Winston Smith was sympathetic while writing him as a simpering Satanic retard getting what was coming to him. I made it clear that I had no interest in being worshipped, and would be perfectly happy to do nothing if I were just not put through what I was put through, and I shouldn't have to even pose this question. It didn't occur to her that anyone would have any right to complain or even suggest going away. This was never stated as any sort of authority, because she likely did not believe authority applied to her race and this was the order of nature. Authority to a woman like that exists purely to be abused, and the thrill of such abuses were the point. This is something she made clear when the prior student was in line for "counseling" and she took sadistic glee in torturing the young man, with me watching beforehand, and this torture served no purpose except punishing someone who was obviously in a state of mental terror and disability. That was all she could think about - that she had a position to torture, and the thrill of doing so was an absolute for her race and thus for the world. And it is for her "race", because a eugenist never stops thinking in those terms, while denying that they do any such thing. I should make it clear that most references in this writing to "race" are not referent to the biological or anthropological conception of the term as it would still be appreciated in proper literature, and are instead me displaying my utmost contempt for the eugenic creed's treatment of the concept. If they wish to make humanity a wholly Satanic race like them, then they should - regardless of any proper definition of "race" - be referred to as nothing but a race and the most failed of races. Every race, as we can see, is defined by its lowest common denominator, and this woman is a prime example of the total, abject failure of a race who seeks to impose that failure on individuals who, out of necessity, rise below the lowest standard of races that eugenists aspire to grind us down to. Whether they are English Galtonite Satanics, or Germanic screamers shouting the usual Hitlerian shit, it is always the same song and dance, and they really do not think. I repeat this here to make clear - these people do not threaten to destroy the world as an idle threat. The entire narrative of nuclear war, always aimed at the civilians rather than any genuine enemy, is the knife held at the throat of everyone, and when a Galtonite holds that knife, they act as this woman does and revel in the thrill of torture. They can't not, and will never be different. Ever. This mentality is one their therapy cult and gurus violently recapitulate to tell us all, even the better of humanity, that we will never be better, and that we are the failed race, while these Satanics are the new race, the true race, the only living race. It is for their stupid thrill that we are made to suffer, and it is for that reason alone that nuclear weapons, which serve no purpose for winning war and no serious deterrent, were deployed. Is that really worth destroying the world for - for these retards, and they are retarded, to feel better, not even knowing what they are doing beyond pushing the pleasure button their filth moral philosophy obligates every profession to follow, with threat of legal torture for noncompliance? Satanic race. Failed race. Any moral value would have seen what I saw and that such people should not have been allowed to rule a goldfish tank. It is for this reason that moral philosophy had to be the basis of their true understanding of any value, and why they isolated best of all that which must be interrupted and not allowed to be questioned in any serious way. It is expected that states hold a monopoly on such force that could destroy the world, and states are under no obligation to be kind. It is against the nature of such an entity, no matter who holds it. All of the decisions of the eugenic creed and the imperial religion of this empire are oriented towards one goal and one goal alone - the very same knife at the throats of all subjects, not for any reason, but because it became the only possible thought in such a world, and it ceased to be possible to conceive of a world other than this. The final proof of such a world is not for them to actually destroy the world at any point, but to believe that the thrill of holding this knife is locked in for eternity, repeating endlessly and defeating even the heat death of the universe their imperial cosmology believes will be the endgame of nature. All further decisions of the eugenic creed seek to maximize the thrill of torture, and if that is not clear by now, it will become more and more clear throughout these writings. These people should never be negotiated with, yet the entire purpose of the threat is to compel this submission and turn all non-eugenists into living abortions. Seeing this wretched, fat woman's visage and the vacuousness of her words, the true horror of eugenism is not even that they would do this, for there are reasons why, however vile, a ruler would love this sort of machine. The truest horror is that for all of this torture and pointlessness, that these are the people who will hold the knife above all. I suppose that is the point, though - to glorify the Luciferian conceit of selfishness that animates their race and their creed. What better proof of their claims would they possess than being the most shameless and disgusting of this failed race, beyond the shameless hedonism they encourage in their enablers? The race to the bottom is not just for the lowest class, but exemplifies their inner soul and their image for the world. There really is no thought. For all of their threats and tortures, they possess one weakness - their viciousness and thrill of maximal torture forbids them from ever destroying the world for their cause, and they really cannot conceive of a world where they move back one inch or make any sacrifice. Sacrifice is for the retards and the losers who are told this is some sort of virtue, and their Germanic lackies invent the sing-song story of slave morality to tell us to internalize the perversion of that failed race. We, on the other hand, do not need to threaten total destruction, or threaten anything great at all. We don't need to impotently lash out when triggered, which I think the reader can determine is the true purpose of these tortures and why they are implemented as policy, systematic and distributed throughout the institutions in every way possible. We don't need to bide time like a sniveling retard to get the drop for some "blessed terror", as their narrative prepared us to believe is the threat to America. We simply need to show and act on utter and absolute contempt for such people and the threats they make, and in doing so, we remain a stain on their "perfect system", and will always destroy their image of the world for our cause, just by continuing to exist. Spite can empower us far more than their pathetic thrill-seeking, fueled by cocaine and opium and the lurid rituals of their race.

This chapter has given a brief overview of how moral sentiments developed from a seed of knowledge, mind, and material things to something which could guide human learning. It should be clear that the aim of moral values is not that they are "in of themselves" the point of life, but that values guide human learning in particular. Human knowledge as a process, and the human faculties for sensing the world and discerning the meaning of it, are not intrinsically moral at all. It is further not the case that any of our moral decisions - which is to say, anything we would consider agency or free will - is a question decided at the level of nature or knowledge, as if science had anything to say about either concept. Agency and free will imply not rational or knowledgeable actors, but moral actors whose agency and will can be judged. We would not care one way or another about our will to change the world if nothing in the world was morally significant, and by knowledge alone, all we know is that there is a world and events happen. It is the mind and our faculty of learning that is guided most of all by moral values; and thus, intelligence figures heavily into moral values, beyond its worldly affect on affairs. This happened because intelligence, learning, and the occulting of secrets was the decisive behavior which made human society and communication possible. Our tools, biological faculties, development of the brain, and the basis for intelligence, were the material means by which this intelligence could manifest in the world. Once humans can not merely learn in the way animals do, but communicate learning and construe learning as an institution and a social activity, what we learn becomes relevant. We learn that there are others who learn like we do, and will act accordingly; and because we learn of the world and ourselves, we learn what we are capable of, and possess a language describing the world that animals lack. This makes us acutely aware of dangers that animals only scarcely know, and allows humans both adaptability in defense, and a far greater ability to formulate offensive strategies. More than that, it raises for the first time many prospects in the world that are far worse than death or crude suffering, because psychological warfare becomes possible beyond the impression of shouting or animalistic intimidation. It not only becomes intellectually possible to conceive of war and many other malevolent activities of humanity, but we are specifically aware of moral values that would be used by a torturer or in conflict. We can for the first time conceive of enclosing the world and commanding humans in a way that animals cannot command each other, and we can turn that command and control on ourselves and our innermost functions. In such a world, the loss of agency or will is a harrowing event. The philosopher declares that freedom is an essence above the world and must be protected on those grounds, but this is the liberty of aristocrats who cannot abide sharing that with their intellectual and social lessers. Most of us value liberty because we have seen the alternative throughout history and around the world, and have many examples in a society deemed free of that slavery and compulsion. Anyone who has to work figures out that this slavery is going to suck, even if we were able to somehow reconcile with the institutions of slavery, whatever form they take in any epoch. If we didn't care about freedom or slavery at all and saw it as a false dichotomy - because true freedom really didn't exist as a political idea let alone as a realized state - we are made to care because the interests of any slavery are never passively enforced. Slave institutions are voracious consumes of human beings and territory, and this is borne out in the history of the world, with the most prominent examples of slave societies being both aggressively expansive into territories, predatory in all financial dealings, and usually regressive so far as slavery's interests are allowed to predominate. The progress and moral value of slave-holding societies is not due to slavery being a good, but in spite of the externalities a slave society creates, such as revolts and escalating repression to maintain the low quality of life for all labor. The Romans and Americans both understood slavery not as a boon or spiritual cornerstone, but as a persistent danger to their society. This danger was not a danger of a moral sentiment, but the interests of the slave-holders conflicting with anything the citizens would want, like land and wealth of their own that would allow them to be soldiers or share in the income. Societies dominated by proletarian labor like Britain considered the working class to be de facto slaves, which is why they were treated in the way they were in the early 19th century. The sentimental disgust towards slavery is common, especially in modern societies that can easily conceive of another way that didn't involve such rank exploitation.

What is labor, except the command of the mind of another for some purpose? Labor to be labor is never merely an event but a moral undertaking, which was carried out in some sense because there was a moral incentive at work. Perhaps that was nothing more than a wage in money or fear of the master's punishments, but all arrangements to command and manage labor require some moral persuasion, or something that is equivalent to it in some moral value. For example, we may consider that some coercive force is not really a moral choice of the slave, but the slave acts on it. First of all, the driver of the slave has to be a moral actor, as does anyone driving the driver and so on, until there is someone at the top of the hierarchy who is not driven by anyone. The argument that "nature" or "the world" or "the economy" drives the master, the capitalist, or the bureaucratic manager, is a facile one when considering what all of those things amount to in any serious inquiry. The world and the economy is dominated by the will of human beings oppressing other human beings, rather than the forces of nature hijacking the human mind to tell it what it is allowed to learn. Economics as an abstraction is particularly absurd, as the very idea of "economy" suggests moral value in management as its soundest basis. If economics were merely a technological resource allocation problem, the solution is trivial in any era and in any situation of material inflows and outflows. It is the moral and human element which economy pertain to, and the problem is not merely an intellectual one.

Even if the problem is framed as a purely intellectual one, this only means that the proper moral value economy concerns itself is not labor, the utility of labor, utility generally, or some social relation that may exist. It is instead this quaint faculty of humans to learn things and their intelligence, which is always limited. Adam Smith correctly identifies the genius of men as that which commands labor, and through that, commands economic value. The difficulty arose because of a necessary human element that was seen as whole and indispensible for the free trade idea to work, and this would be true of all further economic writing that followed anything from classical thought. Only in views of cybernetic management that arose in the 20th century did the concept of splitting intelligence from the human source and its body find enough evidence to be appreciated as a force unto itself. This development would be foreseen and was intrinsic in the liberal ideas themselves. It is thus the command of learning that is valued in economic judgements. This pertains to all things. Which moral values guide that learning are not uniform, but generally, there are a few key moral qualities of importance, such as labor, land, and seats in prominent institutions which would command money.

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